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INTRODUCTION 
Ou t of the attitudes and beliefs of peonle is 
formed the subject metter of hist or y . For this reason 
people ' s attitudes toward a part i cular event , period , 
or process are often more i mportant than the truth about 
i t . l i.11at people think ebout Re construction , v1hether 
their thinking is correct or not , is of great importance 
in helping to determine their attit udes toward several 
soc1al and political issues in the twentieth century . 
Historians have the s obering responsibility to present , 
1 
explain , and interpret the past to society . ~fuat hictorians 
think and have tuought "l.bout Re co struction is , therefore , 
of multiple import ance . 
The purpose of this study i s to trace the cl:anges 
manifested in historians 1 inte!'prete.tior.s of Reconstruction 
and to at tempt to give reasons for the directions vThich 
the i nterpretations have taken since t he beginnins of 
tJ.le tv;e .... tieth century . The attempt to explain V.'hy t he 
c~anges occurred as they did is not limited to analyses 
of indi vidual historians ' motives , oiases , and philosophies 
but is extended t o include broad social movements which 
-------
1susgested by William A. Dunnin[ , Truth in History 
and Other Essays by \'illliar!l .~._ . Dunninr.: (lew Yor'r : Columbia 
University Press , 1937), p . 19. 
have significant impa ct on historians and thus on t he 
collective development of new i nterpretations . That 
histor ians , like other humans , a re i nfluenced by t neir 
environment, education , and personal contacts and that 
these f a ctors affect their writincs is herdly a disputed 
idea . To shm-J how t :J.e historian ' s personal environment 
2 
and background affect his personal concep t of Re cons truction 
and how the direction of broader social changes helps 
to determine the course of i nterpreta tive development 
concerning Reconstruction is the design of this study . 
The scone of the dissertation is limited to \·rri tinge 
on Reconstruction vThich have appeared since 1900 , except 
in a very few cases . 1 The rea son for this limitation 
is t he noticeable l ack of his torical literature produced 
before 1900 as contr as t ed with personal r eminiscences 
of pr ominent characters of the Re construction or eulogistic , 
uncritical b i ographies of these psrt icipants by t heir 
li felong friends and confidants . 2 
l,orks published shortly before 1900 are considered 
in t\'10 cases : (l) \·l::en t ne vwrk was \'Ir i tten by a his tor ian 
whose chief contribution to Recons truction historiography 
\·le.s made in the t wentieth century; and (2 ) vrhen the work 
\'ras a part of an i mportant group of \vri tin~s on Re construc-
tion, moEt of rrhich were uublished a fte r 1900. 
2w. F. Mc Ca l eb , in 1912 , noted thet before about 
1900 no important studies \vere vlri tten on the complex 
Recons true tion period . vf. F. :1-lc Caleb, ~evie\'l of History 
of Reconstruction in Loui siana. (Through 1868 ), by John 
Rose Fickl en , The American Historical Revievr, XVIII (Oc-
tober , 1912 ), 156. 
About 1900 the first fruits of those ivho tried 
to i'i'ri te as historians , rather t nan as partisans and 
participants , began to appear . Certainly all partisan-
ship i·Tas not put aside (indeed, this goal of the historian 
is rarely, if ever , achieved ), but real attempts ivere 
made to place Re c onstruction i n proper perspective . 
Uoodrm·T \'lilson , professor of juris-oruC..ence and politics 
at Princeton University, ,.,rote in 1900 t his comment i"lhich 
seems to i rdi cate that the time hed come for historians 
to exploit and explain Re construction. 
The time seems re~ote , historic , not of our day . 
·:;e have dropped its t h i nki ng , lost its pass ion , for-
got its anxieties , and should be ready to speak of 
it, not as partisans, but as historians . l 
Previous research in Re c onstruction historiography 
is limited to a half-dozen articles , 2 all of i"lhich vrere 
suggestive and reflected msturity of judgment and long 
3 
1
·lloodrov-1 \vilson , 11 The Re construction of the Southern 
States ," The Atlantic Monthl:y, LXXXVII (January , 1901) , 1 . 
2Ho1.,..ard K. Beale , 11 0n Re•11ri ting Re construction 
History , 11 The American Historical Revie\"1 , XLV (July , 
1940) , 807- 827; Louis Ruchames , 11 Charles Sumner and Ameri-
c an Historio~raphy , 11 The Journal of Negro Histor:y , XXXVIII 
(April , 1953) , 139- 160; Francis B. Simkins , 11 Ne1., Vieivpoints 
of Southern Re c onstruction , 11 The Journal of Southern 
History , V ( February , 1939) , 49- 61 ; Alrutheus Ambush 
Taylor , "Historians of the Reconstruction , 11 The Journal 
of Negro Histor*, XXIII (January , 1938) , 16- 34; Bernard 
A. ,eisberger , The Darlc e.nd Bloody Ground of Reconstruction 
Historiography ," The Journal of Southern Histor:y , YJ0I 
(Lovember , 1959), 427-447; T. Harry .tilliams , "An Anc.lysis 
of Some Rec onstruction ... ~ ... tti tudes ," The Journal of Southern 
Histor:y , XII O~ove~ber , 1946 ), 469- 486. 
4 
studJ in the field . None of these, ho\"Ievcr, ,.1as intended 
to be a detailed account of the variations in interpretation 
or- ,.,as eXDected to explain t"he rna~ or interpretu ti ve changes 
of the last several decades . The aut:1ors of all the 
articles were revisionist , wanting certain c ... 1a.nges in 
the prevailing interpret.s.tion . The c.rticles 'l.·rere as 
much appeals for re- interpretation as for examinations 
of tJ.1e c ... 1anges in interpretation . 
This study , hoT/lever, is i ntended neither as an 
appeal for c~ange nor as an argument for the status quo 
in the interoretation of Reconstruction . Rather , it 
is inter.ded as an examina tion of the do~inant i~terpretation 
in the early decades of the century and of the v a rious 
interprete.t1o!'1S 'i·thich h2ve developed since, toget:1er 
'i'Ti th an attempt to explain these developments in lit:ht 
of other historiographical and social changes . In addition 
an atterr.1 t is made to assess the present state of Re con-
struction historiowraohy and to suggest the directio_1 
in which interpretation is moving. 
PART I : THE 11 DUNNING11 INTERPRETATION 
CHAPTER 1 
ATTITUDES OF THE "DUNNING" SCHOOL 
The first fully developed historical school of 
interpretation of Reconstruction appeared in the early 
years of the t"Vrentieth century. Most of the proponents 
of this school, whose interpretation has become the tra-
ditional interpretation of Reconstruction , were either 
6 
not yet born or were only youths at the time of Reconstruc-
tion . Being removed by years, and in some cases by a 
generation, from the events they chronicled gave these 
historians the first real opportunity to study the period 
with a degree of objectivity. They '·rere the first historians 
to claim a scientific approach to this body of facts . 
Several of them were affiliated with Columbia University , 
either as faculty or students . Here a considerable number 
of scholars gathered a round the engaging personality 
of William A. Dunni ng , who inspired and directed their 
historical research. In honor of the chief mentor of 
the group, the point of view and approach that developed 
is usually called the "Dunning " interpreta tion, which 
is not quite accurate since Dunning's work is neither 
the e xtreme nor the synthesis of all the varying degrees 
of interpretation which compose the rather loosely drawn 
integument of the school . However , for l ack of a better 
name, or certainly for l ack of a more familiar name, 
the "Dunning" label \'lill suffice to identif'y the general 
school of which he was a part. 
Since the "Dunning" school consisted of some 
fifty hi storians, complete agreement on the interpretation 
of all facets of Reconstruction was not possible; but 
there were broad areas of agreement which allOI'l these 
fifty men to be classified within the school . It is 
best to understand first the elements of interpretation 
which drew the group together and gave the school its 
substance ; then to explore the major elements of individu-
ality within the bounds of the "Dunning" interpretation. 
The historians of this school thought the Recon-
struction process in general a cruel punishment inflicted 
on a defenseless section of the country and a failure 
as a method of restoring the nation to real unity . A 
product of mixed motives on the part of congressional 
leaders , Reconstruction did more to hinder r econcilia tion 
than to aid it. The process led to the concentration 
of arbitrary power in the hands or corruptible leaders, 
and this resulted in the greatest period of corruption 
in American history. Natural leadership in the South 
was incapacitated, and its place was taken by aliens and 
inferiors . The effects on the South and on the whole 
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nation were little less than disastrous.l Moreover, 
the whole process of Congressional Reconstruction was 
unnecessary since Presidential Reconstruction had been 
lWilliam Garrott Brown, The Lower South in Ameri-
can History (New York: Macmillan Co . , 1902), pp . 196-
197, 253; John w. Burgess, Reconstruction and the Consti-
tution 1866-1876 (New York : Charles Scribner's Sons , 
1902), pp. vii, 17, 111-122, 150, 154, 246, 261-264 , 
297; Daniel H. Chamberlain, "Reconstruction in South 
Carolina," The Atlantic Monthly, LXXXVII (April, 1901), 
473-484; Louis A. Coolidge, Ulysses s . Grant (Boston: 
Houghton, Mifflin & Co., 1917), pp. 208-210, 219, 224-
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225 ; William Watson Davis, The Civil War and Reconstruction 
in Florida (New York: Columbia University Press, 1913), 
pp . 44o, 447, 685; William Archibald Dunning, Essays 
on the Civil War and Reconstruction and Related Topics 
(New York : Peter Smith, 1931; first published in 1897), 
pp . 130- 135, 216-225, 249-252; , Reconstruction: 
Political and Economic 1865-1877, Vol. XXII of The American 
Nation : A History, ed. A. B. Hart (New York : Harper 
& Brothers, 1907), pp. 57-58 , 116-121, 213-214; Hamilton 
James Eckenrode, The Political History of Virginia Durin~ 
the Reconstruction (Baltimore : Johns Hopkins Press, 190 ), 
pp . 53, 127; James Walter Fertig, The Secession and Recon-
struction of Tennessee (Chicago : University of Chicago 
Press, 1898) , p . 12; John Rose Ficklen, History of Recon-
struction in Louisiana Throu 1868 (Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins Press, 1910 , pp. 7, ; Walter Lynwood Fleming, 
Civil War and Reconstruction in Alabama (New York : Columbia 
University Press, 1905), p . 341; , The Sequel 
of Appomattox A Chronicle of the Reunion of the States, 
Vol . XXXII of The Chronicles of America, ed. Allen Johnson 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1920), pp . 88, 139, 
146, 173, 282 , 286; James Wilford Garner, Reconstruction 
in Mississippi (New York: Macmillan Co., 1901), pp . 117, 
170-171, 273-274, 353; J . G. deRoulhac Hamilton, Recon-
struction in North Carolina (New York : Columbia University 
Press, 1914), pp . 219, 453, 662-663, 667; George H. Haynes, 
Charles Sumner (Philadelphia : George W. Jacobs & Co., 
1909), pp . 446-447; John Porter Hollis, The Early Period 
of Reconstruction in South Carolina (Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins Press, 1905), pp . 54, 66; Ellis Paxson Oberholtzer, 
A Histor of the United States Since the Civil War (5 
vola .; New York : Macmillan Co . , 1917-193 , II, 268; 
Thomas Nelson Page, "The Southern People During Reconstruc-
tion," The Atlantic Monthly, LXXXVIII (September, 1901), 
'\·rorking satisfactorily. The Southern states, operating 
under the magnanimous policy of Lincoln and Johnson, 
had been making rapid strides to'\"Tard recovery before 
Congress interfered with a responsibility which legiti-
mately belonged to the president or, at least, to the 
president in conjunction with Congress. Without this 
interference the trials and suffering of Reconstruction 
would have been much less acute than they actually were 
289-304; Paul Skeels Peirce, The Freedmen's Bureau A 
Chapter in the History of Reconstruction (Iowa City: 
State University of Iowa, 1904), pp. 86, 167; Charles 
William Ramsdell , Reconstruction in Texas (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1910), pp. 7, 148; Johns . 
Reynolds , Reconstruction in South Carolina 1862-1877 
(Columbia, South Carolina: State Co . , Publishers, 1905), 
pp. 502-503; James Ford Rhodes , History of the United 
States from the Com remise of 18 0 to the McKinle -Br an 
Campaign of 1 9 vola . ; 1920 ed.; Ne'\'1 York: Macmillan 
Co., 1920}, VI, 435; VII, 168, 290; James Schouler, 
History of the Reconstruction Period 1865-1877 Being 
Vol . VII . of History of the United States of America 
Under the Constitution (Ne'\or York: Dodd, Mead & Co . , 
1913), pp . 37-38, 104-106, 179, 258 • Thomas s. Staples, 
Reconstruction in Arkansas 1862- 18 4 (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1923 , pp . 12 , 2 7; Lloyd Paul Stryker, 
Andrew Johnson A Study in Courage (New York: Macmillan 
Co., 1929), pp. viii, 788- 797; c. Mildred Thompson, Recon-
struction in Geor ia Economic Social Political 186 -
~ New York: Columbia University Press, 1915 , p . 399; 
Henry T. Thompson, Ousting the Carpetbasger from South 
Carolina (Columbia, South Carolina: R. L. Bryan Co., 
1926), p. 165; Edward L. Wells , Hampton and Reconstruc-
tion (Columbia, South Carolina: State Co., Publishers, 
1907), pp . v, 202 ; Wilson , The Atlantic Monthly, LXXXVII, 
11, 13-15; Robert W. Winston, Andrew Johnson Plebian 
and Patriot (New York : Henry Holt & Co ., 1928), pp . 395-
396, 492, 510. 
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in this dark period in our history.l 
The "Dunning" school elaborated upon this general 
interpretation with attitudes toward specific factors 
of Reconstruction. 
These historians were sincere supporters of the 
10 
Constitution and usually displayed a strict constructionist, 
states' rights attitude toward it. This attitude led 
them to believe that the Constitution was in real danger 
during the Reconstruction period , the chief threats being 
to the traditional balances and the civil guarantees pro-
vided by the document. The state governments seemed des-
tined to lose their powers to an omnipotent na tional govern-
ment . The ascendancy of civil government and civil liber-
ties over military authority seemed to be in doubt . 
These factors usually caused the "Dunning" his torians 
to condemn the Reconstruction Acts of Congress as uncon-
stitutional. In addition the Reconstruction amendments 
to the Constitution were usually considered ill-advised 
lcharles Ernest Chadsey, The Struggle Between 
President Johnson and Con rese Over Reconstruction (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1896 , pp . 4 , 126; 
Davis, Civil War and Reconstruction in Florida, pp . 450-
452; Dunning, Essays, p . 139; , Reconstruction : 
Political and Economic, pp . 49-50; Fleming, Sequel, pp . 53, 
61-62, 80, 87-88, 118-119, 141-142; Hollis, Reconstruction 
in South Carolina, pp . 54, 56; Ramsdell , Reconstruction 
in Texas, pp . 68, 141, 148; Rhodes, History of United 
States, VIr 33; Staples, Reconstruction in Arkansas, 
pp. 114, 1~6; Winston, Johnson, pp . 329-330. 
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and illegally imposed.l 
The "Dunning" school also deplored the imbalance 
which developed betvteen the executive and legislative 
branches of the government during Reconstruction. The 
climax of this developing imbalance was reached in the 
impeachment of Andre'\.; Johnson, which the 11Dunning 11 historians 
considered, rather paradoxically, to be a tragic farce . 
Impeachment was a long planned scheme of the Radicals 
to dispense with the chief obstacle in t heir path to 
a radical form of Reconstruction, Negro suffrage, and 
perpetuation in po\·rer of the Republican party. It was 
the immediate result of Johnson's determination to question 
the right of Congress to take a'\'lay from him his consti tu-
tional duties and powers . The trial was a political 
rather than a judicial affair, and conviction on political 
grounds would have had dire permanent results on the 
balance between the branches of the federal government. 
Conviction would have led to a congressional type government 
1Burgess, Reconstruction and Consti tution, pp . 111-
122; Davis, Civil War and Reconstruction in Florida, 
pp . 437-438; David Miller DeWitt, The Impeachment and 
Trial of Andrew Johnson Seventeenth President of the 
United States A History (New York: Macmillan Co . , 1903), 
pp. 201-202; Hollis, Reconstruction in South Carolina, 
p . 61; Reynolds, Reconstruction in South Carolina, pp. 502-
503 ; Rhodes, History of United States, VI, 134, 158; 
Schouler, Reconstruction Period, p . 106; Stryker, Johnson, 
pp . 441-456; Winston, Johnson,pp. 341, 377, 379, 395-396, 
492, 510; Edwin C. Woolley, The Reconstruction of Georgia 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1901), pp. 35-36 . 
in which the executive would have been responsible to 
the legislative branch. l 
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"Dunning" historians sharply criticized the Radical 
Republicans as being vindictively bent on the punishment 
of the South, which the Radicals mistakenly considered 
to be recalcitrant and unco-operative. Radicals' motives 
were questionable, being chiefly to maintain control 
of the federal government by the Repub~ican party rather 
than to surrender it to the inevitable majority which 
would be formed by a coalition of Northern and Southern 
Democrats; therefore, according to the "Dunning" school 
the Radicals prevented immediate restoration of normal 
unity within the nation for selfish , partisan reasons . 
They imposed a military despotism on almost half the 
nation in order to reap the political benefits . 2 
lclaude G. Bowers , The Trasic Era The Revolution 
After Lincoln (Cambridge: Houghton , Mifflin & Co., 1929), 
pp . 186-187, 192-193, 197; Burgess , Reconstruction and 
Constitution , pp. 173, 185, 189 , 191; Chadsey, Johnson 
and Congress , pp. 128, 131, 140-141; DeWitt , Impeachment •.• 
of Andrew Johnson , pp. 363 , 405, 545- 549, 609-610; Dunning, 
Essays , pp. 302- 303; , Reconstruction: Political 
and Economic , pp. 90, 100, 105; , Truth in Histor~, 
pp . 95-96; Fleming, Sequel, p . 167; Haynes: Sumner, pp. 322-
326; Rhodes, History of United States , VI, 235, 247-268; 
Schouler, Reconstruction Period, pp. 121-122; Stryker, 
Johnson , pp. 584-586; Winston, Johnson, pp. 428-454, 480. 
2Bowers, Tragic Era, pp. 93, 104, 115, 120; Burgess, 
Reconstruction and Constitution , pp. 127, 135, 164, 218; 
Chamberlain, The Atlantic Monthly, LXXXVII , 474-475; 
DeWitt , Impeachment ••• of Andrew Johnson , pp. 64, 79, 
110, 159 , 174 , 402- 403 ; Dunning , Essays, pp. 251-252, 
The historians of the "Dunning" school were not 
favorable to the Negro. The most lenient of the writers 
considered the Negro race to be ignorant, inexperienced, 
inept, and unready to assume the task of political par-
ticipation, while those most unfavorable to the Negro 
considered him to be an inferior breed which could never 
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attain an equal status with the white race. Their attitude 
toward the Negro played a large role in determining their 
interpretation. 1 Since they believed the Negro inferior, 
"Dunning" historians thought the Radicals were mistaken 
in trying to force the untried freedmen into political 
and social equality and into offices of responsibility. 
The "Dunning" school emphasized the instances of corruption 
and failure in which Negroes were involved. They ridiculed 
the more ludicrous aspects of the blacks' attempts at 
governing and saw in them evidence of complete incapacity. 
Except in this one aspect the role of the Negro was not 
353; , Reconstruction: Political and Economic, 
pp. 119-121, 185, 270-272 , 295 , 300, 306, 341; , 
Truth in History, pp . 114-115; Fertig, Secession and 
Reconstruction of Tennessee, pp. 10, 62, 75, 103; Walter , 
Lynwood Fleming, Documents Relatin to Reconstruction 
(Morgantown, West Virginia: no publisher given , 1904), 
No . 8, p. 3; , Sequel , pp. 82 , 126 , 173; Reynolds, 
Reconstruction in South Carolina, pp. 497, 500 ; Rhodes, 
History of United States, VI, 311-312, 435; Schouler , 
Reconstruction Period, p. 32; Stryker, Johnson, pp. 278 , 
294-303; Woolley , Reconstruction of Georgia, p . 23. 
1see Chapter 8 for a more complete discussion 
of this topic. 
dealt with at length.l Thorough exploration of the role 
of the Negro in Reconstruction was to av;ai t the appearance 
on the scene of several trained Negro historians. 
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lBowers, Tragic Era, pp. 354, 358, 414; Brown , 
Lower South, p . 251; Burgess, Reconstruction and Consti-
tution, pp . 133, 154, 246; Chamberlain, The Atlantic 
Monthly, LXXXVII, 480-484; . Coolidge, Grant, p . 219; Davis, 
Civil War and Reconstruction in Florida, pp . 457, 596, 
615, 647, 684-685; DeWitt, Impeachment ••• of Andrew Johnson, 
p. 626; Eckenrode, Virginia During Reconstruction, pp. 55, 
89, 97; Fertig, Secession and Reconstruction of Tennessee, 
p . 9; Ficklen, Reconstruction in Louisiana , pp. 127, 
178-179; Fleming, Civil War and Reconstruction in Alabama, 
p . 458; , Documents Relating to Reconstruction, 
No . 8, p . 3; , Louisiana State University 1860-
1§2§ (Eaten Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 
1930), passim (This work demonstrated Fleming's belief 
in Negro inferiority, his antagonism to integration, 
and his antagonism to Radical rule in the South); ~------' 
Seguel, pp . 21 , 33-34, 42, 44, 92, 153, 274 , 291; Garner, 
Reconstruction in Mississippi, pp. 109, 133, 135, 137, 
269-270, 295- 296 , 353, 4o8; (ed.), Studies in 
Southern History and Politics (New York: Columbia Uni-
versity Press, 1914), pp . 367-387 (In this essay on "South-
ern Politics Since t he Civil War," Garner shows more 
antagonism to the Negro race than in 1901); Hamilton, 
Reconstruction in North Carolina, pp . 156-157, 199-200, 
422, 453, 663; Haynes, Sumner, pp . 444-448; Hilary A. 
Herbert, "The Conditions of the Reconstruction Problem," 
The Atlantic Monthly , LXXXVII (February, 1901), 148-151, 
157; Hollis, Reconstruction in South Carolina, pp . 51, 
61, 107; Ella Lonn, Reconstruction in Louisiana After 
1868 (New York: G. P. Putnam ' s Sons , 1918), pp . 12-13, 
170, 347; Oberholtzer, History of United States, I, 85-
87 , 105, 139; II, 14-21, 38-46; Page, The Atlantic Monthly , 
LXXXVIII, 289-304; Peirce, Freedmen's Bureau, pp . 2 , 
8 , 46; Albert Phelps, "Nert Orleans and Reconstruction, u 
The Atlantic Monthly , LXXXVIII (July, 1901), 125; Ramsdell , 
Reconstruction in Texas, pp. 67, 71, 73; Reynolds , Recon-
struction in South Carolina, pp. 498-502, 504-505; Rhodes , 
History of United States, VI, 41, 148-151, 191-192, 200, 
416; VII, 168-170; , "Negro Suffrage and Recon-
struction," Massachusetts Historical Society Proceedings 
(2nd Series), XVIII (1904), 465-467; Schouler, Reconstruc-
tion Period, pp . 19, 34, 45, 87-88 , 105-106, 175, 252 , 
257; Stryker , Johnson, pp . 293-299; Thompson, Reconstruction 
Assuming that freedmen were inferior and socially 
unadjusted, laws were necessary to control them and to 
determine their new status within the state; thus , the 
"Dunning" school interpreted the Black Codes as being 
necessary to prevent social chaos in the South. These 
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laws represented an effort to adjust the disrupted rela tions 
between the former slave class and the former master 
class . They were not an attempt to re-enslave the Negro 
nor were they a sign of recalcitrance on the part of 
Southerners . Southerners accepted the situation in which 
the capitula tion at Appomattox thrust them, including 
emancipation. NovT they '\vere ready to resume their place 
1 in the nation of which they must rema in a part. 
in Georgia , pp. 43-45 , 166, 394, 399; Thompson, OUsting 
the Car~etbagger, p . 166; Wells , Hampton and Reconstruction , 
pp . 79- 3, 95-100, 202-208; Winston , J ohnson , pp. 515-
517; W. E. Woodward, Meet General Grant (New York: Horace 
Liveright , 1928), p. 378; Woolley , Reconstruction of 
Georgia, pp . 16-17, 47. 
1Bowers, Tragic Era, p . 64; Burgess, Reconstruction 
and Constitution, pp . 45-46, 52-53; Davis, Civil War 
and Reconstruction in Florida, pp . 421-424; Dunning, 
Reconstruction: Political and Economic, pp . 56-59; Ecken-
rode , Virginia During Reconstruction, pp . 42-45; Ficklen, 
Reconstruction in Louisiana , pp . 137 , 141-142, 145; Fleming , 
Civil War and Reconstruction in Alabama, p . 383; , 
Documents Relating to Reconstruction, No. 8, p . 3; , 
Sequel, pp. 97, 115; Garner, Reconstruction in Mississippi, 
pp. 116-118; Hamilton , Reconstruction in North Carolina, 
p . 156; , "Southern Legislation in Resnect to 
Freedmen 1865-1866, " Studies in Southern History and 
Politics , ed. Garner , pp . 137-158, esp . p . 156; Herbert, 
The Atlantic Monthly, LXXXVII , 152-153; Hollis, Reconstruc-
tion in South Carolina, pp . 51, 57 ; Lonn, Reconstruction 
in Louisiana, p . 13; Peirce , Freedmen's Bureau, p. 57; 
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The "Dunning" historians interpreted the Freedmen's 
Bureau as an intended good but an eventual evil. An 
agency was needed to relieve distress shortly after the 
war, and the Bureau helped to fill this need; but it 
also had bad effects since after its initial helpfulness 
the Bureau became a political tool of the Radicals. 
The agents were usually army officers and Loyal League 
members who used the po\orer and prestige of the Bureau 
to bring the Negro into the fold of the Republican party. 
In this manner, according to the "Dunning" interpretation, 
the agents drove a wedge between the native whites and 
the Negroes and used the latter to support the Carpetbag 
regime in the South. In addition several historians 
objected to the Bureau because it violated their conception 
of the rights of state and local government as well as 
their laissez-faire belief that no group should be afforded 
special privileges and aid in the struggle for survival 
and for power. 1 
Ramsdell, Reconstruction in Texas, pp. 121, 126; Reynolds, 
Reconstruction in South Carolina, p. 495; Rhodes, History 
of United States, VI, 41, 43, 137; Schouler, Reconstruction 
Period, p. 106; Staples, Reconstruction in Arkansas, 
p. 114; Stryker , Johnson, pp. 250-252; Winston, Johnson, 
p. 379; Woolley , Reconstruction of Georgia, p . 21. 
1Bowers, Tragic Era, p. 198; Burgess, Reconstruction 
and Constitution, pp. 44-45, 89; Davis, Civil War and 
Reconstruction in Florida, pp. 377-378, 384-385, 402, 
596,· 606; Eckenrode, Virginia During Reconstruction, 
pp. 58-60; Ficklen, Reconstruction in Louisiana, p . 137; 
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The Carpetbaggers and Scalawags were objects 
of especial scorn by the "Dunning" historians, who described 
them as political adventurers and opportunists. Carpet-
baggers formed an alien group that exploited the chaotic 
conditions in which white leaders were disfranchised 
and former slaves were politically active. Scalawags 
were native white Southerners who collaborated with the 
Radicals and claimed their share of the political spoils . 
Both groups were shot through with corruption. The state 
governments they ran were inefficient, expensive, wasteful, 
and corrupt. This situation was so abominable that respon-
sible native whites were driven to action against it. 1 
Fleming, Civil ,,'lar and Reconstruction in Alabama , pp. 
444-450, 466-469, 654, 713; , Documents Relating 
to Reconstruction, No . 6, pp. 4-5; , The Freedmen•s 
Savin s Bank A Cha ter in the Economic Histor of the 
Negro Race Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina 
Press, 1927), p . 14; , Sequel, pp. 15, 98-108, 
113-116; Garner, Reconstruction in MississiPPi, pp . 109, 
261; Hamilton, Reconstruction in North Carolina, pp. 
196-197, 29~, 300 , 311, 320, 324-326; Herbert, The Atlantic 
Monthly, LXXXVII, 151-152; Hollis, Reconstruction in 
South Carolina, p. 129; Lonn, Reconstruction in Louisiana, 
pp. 12-13; Peirce, Freedmen 1 s Bureau, pp. 46, 66, 85, 
159, 170-171; Ramsdell , Reconstruction in Texas, pp. 
76, 121, 129; Rhodes, History of United States, VI , 296-
297; Staples, Reconstruction in Arkansas, pp . 215-216; 
Thompson, Reconstruction in Georgia, pp. 62-67; Woodward , 
Grant, pp. 378-380; Woolley, Recons truction of Georgia, 
p. 17. 
1Bo"rers, Tragic Era, pp . 201 , 307, 353, 356 , 
363, 369-370, 392, 424, 429, 438, 448, 514, 539; Brown , 
Lower South, pp. 219 , 254; Burgess, Reconstruction and 
Constitution, p. 246; Chamberlain, The Atlantic Mont~, 
LXXXVII, 477; Davis, Civil War and Reconstruction in 
Florida, pp. 481, 525, 684-685; Fleming , Civil War and 
One aspect of this action was in the form of 
the Ku Klux Klan. According to the "Dunning" school 
the Klan began harmlessly enough as a social organization 
for bored ex-Confederates . Their frivolous and mysterious 
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costumes had a strange power over Negroes which was soon 
noticed and exploited to advantage . By the use of intimi-
dation and threat and violence against undesirables, 
the Klan became an agency for the maintenance of public 
order. This type of organization was an inevitable result 
of the chaos in the society due chiefly to the emancipation 
of the slave and to the corruption and favoritism of 
the Carpetbag state governments. The Klan was an effective 
force for social order until undesirable elements began 
to use its name and costume to perform acts of personal 
1 
vengeance or common criminality. The measures passed 
Reconstruction in Alabama , pp . 510 , 515 , 524, 571, 628, 
634, 652, 656, 668; , Documents Relating to Recon-
struction, No . 4, p . 3; , Seguel, pp. 153, 224 , 
287; Garner, Reconstruction in Mississip~i, p . 414; Hamilton, 
Reconstruction in North Carolina , pp . 32 , 341-342; Ober-
holtzer, History of United States , II, 24-25; Schouler, 
Reconstruction Period, pp . 105, 170, 255 , 307; Staples, 
Reconstruction in Arkansas, p . 334; Stryker, Johnson, 
p . 790; Wilson , The Atlantic Monthly, LXXXVII, 11; Woodward, 
Grant, pp. 381-383; Woolley , Reconstruction of Georgia, 
pp . 46-47. 
1Bowers , Tragic Era , pp. 308-311 , 345 ; Brown, 
Lower South , ~p . 191-225; Davis, Civil War and Reconstruc-
t ion in Florida , pp . 558, 563-564, 586; Ficklen , Re con-
s truction in Louisiana, pp. 221-223; Fleming , Civil War 
and Reconstruction in Alabama, pp . 568 , 660-662, 668, 
674 , 689-691, 709; , Documents Relating to Recon-
struction, No . 1 , pp . 5-7; , Sequel , pp. 246- 247, 
by Congress for the control of Klan activity the "Dunning" 
school branded as unconstitutional because they authorized 
1 
undue federal interference in state affairs . 
To the "Dunning " historians the methods used 
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by the white Southerners to regain power were not entirely 
savory, but the results were quite acceptable. The return 
of native white supremacy meant the end of federally 
imposed state governments , the end of the waste and corrup-
tion, and the lessening of the political po\·Ter of inferior 
elements. Natural Southern leaders, the white men of 
character and worth, performed a great service in the 
state- by-state redemption of the South. 2 Not all Southern 
s ta tea '-tere free of Carpetbag government until after 
the election of 1876. The result of this election--the 
removal of the remaining federal troops from their support 
257-259, 264; Garner, Reconstruction in MississipPi, 
D. 353; Hamilton, Reconstruction in North Carolina , pp . 
452-454; Ramsdell , Reconstruction in Texas, pp . 233, 292; 
Reynolds, Reconstruction in South Carolina, pp . 182, 196; 
Schouler, Reconstruction Period , pp. 176, 258 ; Thompson, 
Reconstruction in Georgia , pp. 391- 393 ; Woolley, Reconstruc-
tion of Georgia, p . 47. 
lBowers, Tragic Era, pp. 342 , 345-346; Burgess, 
Reconstruction and Constitution , p. 255; William Watson 
Davis, "The Federal Enforcement Acts," Studies in Southern 
History and Politics, ed. Garner, pp. 205-228; Reynolds, 
Reconstruction in South Carolina, p . 196. 
2Garner , Reconstruction in Mississippi, pp. 412-
413; Hamilton, Reconstruction in North Carolina, p . 654; 
Reynolds, Reconstruction in South Carolina, pp . 503-504; 
Rhodes, History of United States, VII , 138-140, 290; 
Schouler, Reconstruction Period, pp. 173, 244. 
of Carpetbag regimes--was satisfactory to "Dunning" his-
torians; however, they contended that the election was 
won by foul means. Tilden 's victory would h ave been 
assured had the state returning board in either Louisiana, 
Florida, or South Carolina been honest . The bargain 
struck between certain Southern leaders and Hayes's lieu-
tenants was simply an agreement made at the Wormley Hotel 
whereby Southern congressmen would not seek to prevent 
completion of the electoral count or the inauguration 
of Hayes and, in turn, the new president would remove 
federal troops from those Southern states where they 
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still were stationed--thus ending Reconstruction. 1 Regard-
less of any improprieties in the election and the Wormley 
Agreement, "Dunning" hi storians were satisfied because 
it brought peace and stability to the land. They seemed 
1Bowers, Tragic Era, pp . 523-527, 535-536; Davis, 
Civil War and Reconstruction in Florida, pp. 694, 705 , 
715, 727; DeWitt, Impeachment ••• of Andrew Johnson, p . 
625; Dunning, Reconstruction: Political and Economic, 
pp . 334-341 ; Hamilton James Eckenrode, Rutherford B. 
Hayes Statesman of Reunion (New York: Dodd, Mead & 
Co., 1930}, pp. 230-232; Fleming, Sequel, pp. 296, 301; 
Paul Leland Haworth, The Hayes-Tilden Disputed Presidential 
Election of 1876 (Cleveland: Burrows Brothers Co., 1906) , 
pp . 270, 329-330 (However, he does not agree that a com-
pletely fair election would have seated Tilden, pp . 330-
333); Lonn, Reconstruction in Louisiana, pp . 443, 448-
449, 457, 460, 472; Oberholtzer, History of United States, 
III, 281-314, 327-330; Rhodes, History of United States, 
VII , 230, 235, 242 , 255 , 262, 274, 282-286; Schouler, 
Reconstruction Period, pp . 302, 310-311, 329, 343n., 
344-345, 352. 
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to desire peace, an end to strife, and conciliation between 
the sections above all else . They were repelled by violence. 
If the Negroes' contention is true that the road to reunion 
was paved with broken promises to the Negro, then it 
is fair to say that the "Dunning" school preferred peace 
and stability and the suppression of a race of people 
to conflict and the use of force , violence, and federal 
intervention. 
If the process of Reconstruction seemed to the 
"Dunning" school to be disastrous , the effects of Reconstruc-
tion appeared no less so. According to this group the 
nation , and particularly the South, experienced several 
destructive problems stemming from Reconstruction. The 
racial problem was chief among these . Rather than allowing 
the Southern whites and Negroes to work out their problems 
and relationships together in a natural, permanent manner, 
the Radicals inflamed the Negroes against their former 
masters, thus embittering race relations . The wedge 
driven between the Southern whites and Negroes by the 
Reconstruction process was an important causal factor 
in the racial conflicts which were so difficult in the 
early twentieth century. 
Reconstruction not only antagonized the races; 
it prevented a rapid reconciliation of the sections of 
the country, in the opinion of "Dunning" historians . 
With the barrier of slavery removed the sections should 
have quickly drawn together, but Reconstruction slowed 
down this process because of the violent passions aroused 
by the imposition of Carpetbag-Scala,'lag-Negro misrule 
on the South. Racial and sectional antagonism in turn 
caused another disastrous effect-- the creation in the 
South of a one party system. According to the "Dunning" 
school the fear of the Negro in politics and the memory 
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of Reconstruction forged the Southern people into the 
Democratic party rather than allowing their normal division 
into a Democratic and a Whig or Republican faction . The 
Republican party could not become a factor in Southern 
politics because it was after Reconstruction equated by 
the whites with Negro rule and corruption. The fact of 
the "Solid South" caused Southerners to have less indi-
viduality and more homogeneity than is normal for a section. 
There were several other harmful long-range effects 
of Reconstruction, in the opinion of the "Dunning" group. 
The experience caused a strong dislike for federal inter-
vention which created a states ' rights sentiment among 
Southerners similar to that designed to defend slavery 
before t he war . The fear of taxation and extravagance 
which the people learned during Reconstruction was con-
tinually reflected in the reluctance on the part of South-
erners to spend money for progressive public projects , 
even schools . Another effect which Reconstruction had 
on the Southern whites was to lower somewhat their politi-
cal and social morality. Due to the demoralizing Radical 
rule and the unsavory methods which Southerners had to 
employ to redeem their states, the people's respect for 
la\v and government and elections \'las lovrered. Socially 
there was more fear and violence due to the estrangement 
of the races . 
The "Dunning" school admitted tha t some positive 
good might have come from Reconstruction and that some 
abuses might have been removed, but whatever good did 
come from the experience would have come anyway under 
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the regime which the Radicals destroyed . The presidential 
plan could have produced this good and more without the 
corruption and extravagance and vindictiveness which 
marked Radical Reconstruction. 1 
In their writings on Reconstruction "Dunning" 
historians naturally made some judgments about the most 
1Davis, Civil War and Reconstruction in Florida, 
p . 606; Eckenrode, Virginia During Reconstruction, pp. 
61- 66; Fleming, Civil \'Tar and Reconstruction in Alabama, 
pp. 768, 803; , Documents Relating to Reconstruc-
tion, No . 3, p . 5; , Sequel, pp . 87, 138, 236, 
278-281, 303; Hamilton, Reconstruction in North Carolina, 
pp. 618-619, 662-663; Rhodes, Massachusetts Historical 
Society Proceedings (2nd Series), XVIII, 465-467; Stryker , 
Johnson, p . 448; Thompson, Reconstruction in Georgia, 
p . 399; Wells, Hampton and Reconstruction, pp . 202-208; 
Woolley, Reconstruction of Georgia, pp . 109-110. 
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prominent men in the period. Lincoln was portrayed as 
a moderate, tactful man who understood the actual conditions 
in the South and was prepared to act accordingly. With 
his powerful prestige and his political finesse, Lincoln 
would have been in a better position to hold his party 
together and procure a more moderate plan of Reconstruction; 
but it is doubtful that his leadership could have completely 
overcome the strong opposition which was developing in 
the Congress to presidential initiative in the field of 
Reconstruction. Nevertheless, Lincoln's assassination 
was considered by the "Dunning" school to be a major 
catastrophe for the South because it definitely doomed 
Lincoln's wise policy of Reconstruction. 1 
Concerning Andrew Johnson his torians of the "Dunning" 
school show more variation than on any other point of 
interpretation. In general the early members of this 
school of interpretation tended to dislike Johnson, and 
the l a t er members tended to favor him. A crucial point 
in the difference seems to have been in the source material 
available to the historians. (See Chapter 4 for a discus-
sion of the appearance of fresh materials which greatly 
1DeWitt, Impeachment ••• of Andrew Johnson, p . 5; 
Fertig, Secession and Reconstruction of Tennessee, p . 101; 
Ficklen, Reconstruction in Louisiana, p. 99; Fleming, 
Se~uel, pp . 63, 68; Herbert , The At antic Monthl , LXXXVII, 
15 ; Schouler, Reconstruction Period, p . ; Burgess 
dissented strongly from the idea that Lincoln's Reconstruc-
tion was a wise one, Reconstruction and Constitution, p . 13.). 
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changed most historians' attitudes toward Andrew Johnson.) 
Those hi ctorians who were unfavorable to Johnson portrayed 
him as a headstrong, tempestuous, self-willed, demagogic 
man of crude manners and bad character who was not of 
national stature and was unfit for the presidency . Despite 
their opinion of the man, a l l except one of these critics 
of Johnson favored the presidential plan of Reconstruction, 
1 
and they all deplored impeachment. The historians who 
defended Johnson admitted his tactlessness and rather 
crude manners, but they characterized him also as a man 
of great courage, scrupulous honesty, devotion to duty , 
unfaltering patriotism, and as a sound statesman with 
enlightened opinions who had been vilified and misunder-
stood by historians. They deemed the nation fortunate 
to have had such a determined defender of the Constitution 
in an age when that instrument was under severe attack. 2 
lBurgess , Reconstruction and Constitution, p . 
191 (Burgess opposed Johnson's plan of Reconstruction, 
p . 111); Chadsey, Johnson and Congress , pp. 39, 67-68, 
95, 97 , 135; Coolidge , Grant , pp. 215-217; Dunning, Recon-
struction: Political and Economic, p . 82; Fleming , Civil 
War and Reconstruction in Alabama , p . 419; , 
Sequel , pp . 57-58, 71-73, 87 , 121-122 , 128-131, 173; 
Haynes , Sumner, pp . 296 , 300 , 443: Oberholtzer, Hi story 
of United States, I, 167, 179 , 400- 401; James Ford Rhodes, 
Historical Essays (New York: Macmillan Co., 1909), p . 
217; , History of United States, VI , 33, 72-75, 
103, 115-116; Wilson, The Atlantic Monthly , LXXXVII, 4 . 
2Bowers, Tragic Era, pp . 44, 138, 460; DeWitt, 
Impeachment ••• of Andrew Johnson, pp. 124-126; Fertig, 
Secession and Reconstruction of Tennessee, pp . 36-37; 
Schouler, Reconstruction Period, pp . 1-12 , 25 , 28 , 35, 
26 
Ulysses s . Grant l'Tas a scapegoat for most hi s torians 
of the "Dunning" school. They considered him a great 
general but an unqualified and incapable president and 
a weak man, unduly i nfluenced by wealth and carelessly 
chosen associates and advisors . The Grant era was a 
period of moral collapse . His adminis tration \'Tas singu-
larly i nept , unsuccessful , and disgraceful . Much of 
the corruption l'ti thin the government \'Tas due to Grant 1 s 
lack of ability to judge men . 1 
Another chief point of attack for the "Dunning" 
school was Thaddeus Stevens , who \'Tas characterized as 
a man of hatred, vindictiveness , and bitter partisanship . 
Stevens was a great parliamentarian, ruling the House 
of Representatives with unprecedented vigor and effective-
45- 47 , 52- 57, 64, 73 , 75 , 131, 133 , 142-143 ; Stryker, 
J ohnson, pp. vii, 166-168, 209 , 214-220, 278-295, 329, 
341-372 , 454; Winston, Johnson , pp . 371, 373, 379 , 387, 
390 , 393-394, 510, 512 , 519 ; Woodward , Grant, pp . 363-364. 
1 Bowers , Trasic Era , pp. 230, 239 , 288, 294, 371-
372 , 387 , 406 ; Dunning , Re construction: Political and 
Economic, pp . 192, 270- 271 , 286 , 295, 300; Fleming, Sequel, 
pp. 280 , 286; Overholtzer , His tory of United States, II, 
222 , 306- 309, 317-318 , 544-545; Rhodes, History of United 
States , VII , 21 , 112, 189; Schouler , Reconstruction Period, 
pp . 347-348; Winston , Johnson , pp. 501 , 505; l"ioodward, 
Grant, pp. 394 , 398, 455- 456; Edwin C. lofoolley, "Grant ' s 
Southern Policy," Studies in Southern History and Politics, 
ed. Garner , pp. 179-201; (Louis A. Coolidge begs to disagree 
with this point of view and places Grant's adminis tration 
second only to the first administra tion of Washington 
in constructive achievement , Grant , pp . 532-533 . ) . 
27 
ness, but he had little regard for person, precedent, 
or Constitution. A man of destructive rather than construe-
tive talents, he had a consuming desire to punish the 
South, to enfranchise the Negro, and to perpetuate the 
Republican party in power . His plan of confiscating large 
landholdings of Southerners and redistributing them among 
the freedmen was horrifying to "Dunning" historians, 
who were, generally speaking, men of conservative political 
and economic ideas. In addition to the questionable 
morality of tampering with private property, confiscation 
would have greatly hindered the restoration of peace and 
stability in the nation. 1 
Charles Sumner was the counterpart of Thaddeus 
Stevens in the Senate and joined with him in creating 
an impractical and unnecessary policy for the Reconstruction 
of the South. Sumner was an able man of high intelligence, 
but he was egotistical, prejudiced, and fanatical, according 
to the "Dunning 11 historians . He was idealistic, loving 
the Negro on a purely abstract and intellectual plane 
but not on a personal level . He placed the Declaration 
of Independence above the Constitution as a basic guide 
1Bowers, Tragic Era, pp . 73-74, 84 , 223 ; Fleming, 
Sequel, pp. 122-123; Hamilton, Studies in Southern History 
and Politics, ed. Garner, p . 142; Oberholtzer, History 
of United States, I, 38-39; Rhodes, History of United 
States, VI, 125 , 128, 135, 141, 145-146, 158; Schouler , 
Reconstruction Period, pp . 50, 86; Stryker, Johnson, 
pp. 245-248, 440-441; Winston , Johnson, pp. 336 , 400; 
Woodward , Grant, pp. 376-377. 
for government . His humanitarianism distorted all issues 
with which he dealt and caused him to allow his fellow 
whites to be oppressed. l 
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The "Dunning11 school had little sympathy or taste 
for Edwin M. Stanton. The group branded him as a treach-
erous, obnoxious, conspiring man who was a spy in Johnson's 
cabinet. Able but insolent and domineering as an adminis-
trator, Stanton had an amazing record of duplicity and 
obstructionist tactics . 2 
These are only a few of the prominent men of 
the period, of course, but they are in the first rank 
of importance and also are the ones upon whom a considerable 
number of the 11 Dunning11 school cared to pass judgment. 
Some of the general reasons why these historians 
interpreted Reconstruction as they did have been briefly 
suggested--their great desire for peace and conciliation 
between the sections; their conservative political 
1Bowers , Tragic Era, pp. 334-337; DeWitt, 
I mpeachment ••• of Andrew Johnson, p . 587; Dunning, Recon-
struction: Political and Economic , p . 87; Fleming , 
Civil War and Reconstruction in Alabama, p . 339 ; ~~----' 
Sequel, p . 123; Haynes, Sumner, pp. 5-6, 322-326, 384= 
411 , 443-444 (More favorable to Sumner); Rhodes, History 
of United States , VI , 135, 141, 153 , 158; Woodward , 
Grant, pp . 374-375. 
2Bowers, Tragic Era, pp , 86 , 123, 174, 175; Burgess , 
Reconstruction and Constitution , p . 91; DeWitt, Imneach-
ment ••• of Andrew Johnson, pp . 232-288 , 595-596; Dunning, 
Reconstruction : Political and Economic, p . 91; Oberholtzer, 
History of United States, I, 6; Schouler, Reconstruction 
Period, p . 121. 
philosophies, including support of states' rights and 
laissez-faire ideas; their support of stability and the 
protection of private propert y in economic affaire; and 
their belief in the inferiority of the Negro race . Some 
of the writers openly expressed these reasons . Others 
wer e more subtle, but their 'iritings nevertheless demon-
strated a similar set of reasons . 
It is not surprising that so many historians 
expressed essentially the same interpretation since they 
were influenced by the environment in which they lived 
and wrote . Two influential movements were reaching their 
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peak in the United States early in the twentieth century. 
One was the intensification of the white supremacy ideology, 
the crucial influence of which on historians of Reconstruc-
tion will be discussed in Part III. The other was the 
sentiment of sectional conciliation . (Paul Buck has demon-
strated the po,verful forces making for reconciliation 
in the decades between the end of the war and the end 
of the century--forces ~mich included, besides common 
language, culture, and government , economic interchange 
and particularly industrial development in the South; 
romanticizing of the war by veterans of both sides who 
held joint reunions; and writers who went out of their 
1 
way to bring about better feelings between the sections . ) 
1Paul H. Buck, The Road to Reunion 1865-1900 
(New York : Vintage Books , 1959; first published in 1937: 
Bos ton , Little , Brown & Co . ) , passim . 
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By the turn of the century many Republicans and even 
Carpetbaggers had changed their minds about certain aspects 
of Reconstruction, thus demonstrating personally what 
the federal government had shown--a tendency to accept 
either a Southern point of view or at least a toleration 
1 
of the South's undoing of Reconstruction. In 1910 
w. E. Burghardt DuBois, the Negro historian, noticed 
with a sense of tragedy the sentiment of conciliation 
and its effect on historians . 
There is danger to-day that between the intense feeling 
of the South and the conciliatory spirit of the North 
lchamberlain, The Atlantic Monthly , LXXXVII, 
473-484; iVilliam A. Dunning , 11 The Undoing of Reconstruc-
tion," The Atlantic Monthly , LXXXVIII (October, 1901), 
437-449; Garner, Reconstruction in Mississippi, p . 408 
(Adelbert Ames admitted to Garner that Carpetbaggers had 
been overconfident in the ability of the Negro); George 
F. Hoar, Autobiography of Seventy Years (2 vole.; New 
York : Charles Scribner's Sons, 1903), II, 161 (Hoar 
stated that Carpetbaggers would not have been tolerated 
in the North and that one has to sympathize with the 
Southerners who had to endure their rule); James s. Jones, 
Life of Andrew Johnson Seventeenth President of the 
United States (Greenville , Tennessee : East Tennessee 
Publishing Co . , 1901), p . 283 (James G. Blaine admitted 
the impeachment of Johnson was a mistake); Horace White, 
The Life of Lyman Trumbull (Bos ton: Houghton, Mifflin 
& Co., 1913), p. vi (vfuite was a Republican during Recon-
struction who supported the congressional plan but deplored 
the misgovernment in the South. In preparation for ~~iting 
the biography of Trumbull, he decided the evidence showed 
the presidential plan to have been the proper one and 
Johnson to have been a genuine patriot. i~ite was influ-
enced by the writings of Rhodes and Dunning and especially 
by the Diary of Gideon Welles which had recently been 
published.) • 
grave injustice will be done the negro American in 
the history of Reconstruction. l 
It is evident that many "Dunning" historians 
were "present-minded" in their approach to history; that 
is , they ~~ote about the past to serve a purpose in the 
present--to teach a lesson or bring about a desired end. 
Some made explicit statements about this purpose at the 
time , some acknowledged it later , but most allowed it 
to remain implicit . One wrote with conciliation of the 
sections in mind; another wrote for the purpose of demon-
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strating that the s tates must never again allow Negro 
participation in politics lest the horrors of Reconstruction 
be repeated and never again must the federal government 
indulge in large scale intervention in local affairs; 
another found in Reconstruction the forging of a truly 
national government which helped to explain the United 
States ' appearance on the world stage at the turn of 
the century. 
In recent years recognition of the functional 
nature of history has become fashionable . This was not 
true in the early decades of the twentieth century when 
"scientific" history was predominant, and historians 
fancied themselves objective and able to suppress all 
preconceptions because they used scientific tools. Con-
1\v. E. Burghardt DuBois, "Reconstruction and its 
Benefits," The American Historical Review, XV (July, 1910), 
781 . 
sequently, historians of that period are seldom spoken 
of as "present-minded, 11 and the term is reserved for 
those who acknowledge their practical aims and their 
attempts to use the past to throw light on the present 
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and perhaps to help direct the future. However, historians 
of the "Dunning" school and the more inclusive "scientific" 
school ~ have preconceptions and did have practical 
purposes in mind though they were usually reluctant to 
admit the fact. 1 
The "Dunning" school of Reconstruction historiog-
raphy concerned itself chiefly with the political aspects 
of history. This was true of most American historians 
of the early decades of the twentieth century. Society 
and his torians were most acutely aware of political problems 
and, therefore, focused their interest, study, and '~iting 
in that area. They interpreted history as being the 
handmaiden of politics . 2 
Their focus on the politics of the period had 
an important influence on the "Dunning" historians' concept 
of Reconstruction. Since the political situation \oras 
to Southerners the chief cause of controversy, resentment, 
and violence , historians' concentration on politics caused 
the latter to emphasize the severity and disruptiveness 
lTheor and Practice in Historical Stud : crt 
of the Committee on Historic ra h New York : 
Science Research Council, 9 , pp. 50-52. 
2Ibid. ' p. 35 . 
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of the process. This may have helped to generate within 
the "Dunning" school an excess of sympathy for the defeated 
people. Certainly there is no accident in the fact that 
later historians' shift in interest to things social and 
economic as well as political coincided with an attempt 
to revise the "Dunning" interpretation, which had become 
standard. (See Part II.) 
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CHAPTER 2 
THE THREE OLD MASTERS 
As would be expected a great deal of variation 
in emphasis and interpretation of specific points existed 
among the historians of the "Dunning" school . So many 
historians could certainly not agree on all points , particu-
larly when there were so many ramifications involved 
in the subject of Reconstruction . Not only was there 
a difference in emphasis and a difference of opinion 
on some subtopics; there was also a difference in aim 
among the historians of the school. Some attempted to 
present a general survey of the Reconstruction period 
in one or more volumes; some focused on a special aspect 
of Reconstruction or a particular person; others described 
Reconstruction in one particular state . 
Some of these historians fall into fairly well 
defined groups, while others must re~ain rather unclassi-
fied . One of these groups is composed of the three old 
masters--John w. Burgess , William A. Dunning, and James 
Ford Rhodes. Another is the Columbia coterie, composed 
of twelve of the products of Columbia ' s hi s tory and politi-
cal science program,which was under the direction of Burgess 
and Dunning. A third group may be labeled miscellaneous 
and consists of dissertation ~~iters, biographers, non-
academic and popular historians. 
In discussing individual historians it is not 
considered necessary or desirable to summarize the whole 
work or works of each or to make a recapitulation of 
the general outlines of the "Dunning" interpretation for 
each work. The best procedure seems to be to mention 
only those parts of each ,.,ork which made a significant 
cont ribution to the interpretation; those which were 
particularly strongly emphasized; those which seem the 
special province of a particular writer because of the 
special aspect of Reconstruction he studied; and those 
topics on which an author differed from the general con-
sensus of the school. 
The critical and scientific method of historical 
research had its practical beginning in the United States 
with the establishment of graduate programs in history 
and political science in several universities in the 
late years of the nineteenth century. Four years after 
Herbert Baxter Adams created the first of these at The 
Johns Hopkins University in 1876, John Vl. Burgess founded 
the school of political science at Columbia University. 
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Soon Michigan, Cornell, Wisconsin, Harvard, and Pennsylvania 
developed similar programs of graduate instruction in 
historical research. While this was not the first time 
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critical methods were used in history in the United States, 
Burgess and his associates were significant in that they 
were founding a new learned profession . They sought 
to apply rigid "scientific" methods in order to vindicate 
the claim of history to a serious place among other forms 
of scientific research. Within a generation, by 1910, 
the historical profession was soundly established and 
entrenched in American colleges and universities . 1 
A consuming desire on the part of Burgess was 
to establish an American political science similar to 
that established by the German masters . Like the German 
models he centered his attention on institutional develop-
ment in history and was committed to the germ theory 
of continuity in political institutions. He and his counter-
parts in the other developing schools of political science 
and history traced American and English institutions 
back to German origins . Political institutions being 
the focus of his interest , Burgess believed that history 
was to prepare students for politics and the legal profession. 
History was the handmaiden of politics . That politics 
played such an important role in his writing of history 
is, therefore, not surprising. He, like his German models 
and their counterparts in the United States, saw the chief 
problems of his day as political and sought to throw light 
lTheory and Practice in Historical Study, pp . 23-24. 
on them by explaining the institutional and political 
developments which had produced these problems . Burgess' 
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generation, the first after the Civil War , saw the American 
problem as the consolidation and reunification of the 
country. Burgess and other founders of political science 
training in the United States 
cultivated 'past politics' in this institutional 
sense precisely because such 'political' problems 
were those of which they were most acutely aware . l 
Awareness of political development as the central problem 
of the day and their attempts to throw light on this 
problem and to understand it better by tracing the develop-
ments leading up to it gave these political and historical 
scientists a practical purpose in their writings , whether 
many of them were willing to admit it or not. 2 Burgess 
certainly readily admitted his practical , utilitarian 
purpose for writing his work on Reconstruction. 
William C. Brownell , a fellow Amherst alumnus 
of Burgess and an editor associated with Charles Scribner 's 
Sons , publishers, requested that Burgess undertake the 
political histories which were to include his volume 
on Re construction. Brownell and his colleagues at Scribner ' s 
suggested that the time had come when the views of both 
North and South during Civil War and Reconstruction could 
libid., pp. 35-36. 
2rbid., pp. 36-37. 
be given just consideration by hi s torians . A work which 
showed appreciation of each side in the struggle, they 
believed, could serve the practical purpose of bringing 
about a more c omplete reconciliation of the North and 
the South . 
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Burgess was particularly suited to do the job 
because of the facts of his life and education . He was 
born in Giles County, Tennessee, in 1844, of a Whig family 
which remained Unionist during the Civil War . He observed 
slavery face to face and lived under the Confederacy 
for a year, barely escaping conscription by the rebel 
government, before he fled to the North and became a 
Union soldier instead. Burgess was educated in the North , 
receiving his A. B. degree from Amherst College in 1867, his 
A.M. in 1870. He received an honorary Ph. D. degree from 
Princeton in 1883. Although admitted to the bar in 1869, 
he forsook the practice of law for the teaching profession . 
He taught for short periods at Knox College and Amherst 
College before becoming professor of volitical science 
at Columbia University in 1876, where he remained until 
his death fifty-five years later. I n 1909 he received 
a Ph. D. degree from the University of Leipzig in Germany, 
his ideological fatherland. 
When Brownell approached Burgess concerning the 
project of presenting and readjusting the views on each 
side concerning Civil War and Reconstruction, Burgess 
was interested. 
The proposition appealed to me , and I instinctively 
responded to it. I undertook the work as a sacred 
duty to ~y country and carried it through with that 
feeling . 
Burgess emerged from the terror and misery of 
the Civil War l'ii th two indelible convictions. One was 
that orderly government , not violence and war, must be 
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used to settle human affairs. 2 The other was that democracy 
had failed . He lost any confidence he might have had 
in the wisdom and goodness of the bulk of humanity.3 
Having little faith in the masses' ability to rule them-
selves, Burgess was a conservative in political science . 4 
He was an advocate of sound money, as was demonstrated 
by his favoring the resumption of specie payment . 5 W. E. B. 
DuBois, the Negro socialist, accused Burgess of being a 
lJohn W. Burgess, Reminiscences of An American 
Scholar (Morningside Heights: Columbia University Press, 
1934), pp. 289-290, quote- 290; Who ' s Who in America A 
Bio ra hical Dictionar of No table Livin Men and Women 
Vols. I-LX; Chicago: The A. N. Marquis Co., 1 99-1959), 
XI, 418- 419 . 
2Burgess , Reminiscences, pp. 28-29 . 
3nixon Ryan Fox, Review of Reminiscences of An 
American Scholar, by John W. Burgess, The American Historical 
Review , XL (October, 1934), 154. 
4charles A. Beard, The American Spirit in Edward 
N. Saveth , Understanding the American Past (Bo ston : Little, 
Brown & Co., 1954), p . 18. 
5Burgess, Reconstruction and Constitution, pp . 277-279. 
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Tory and an "open apostle of reaction" who has led one 
of America's great universities to teaching that Reconstruc-
tion consisted of the rule of \vhi tes by uncivilized Negroes . 1 
Certainly one of the chief features of Burgess' 
writing on Reconstruction was his racial attitude . He 
believed that in the Teutonic peoples resided a native 
political genius which had developed to a very high degree . 
This authorized the Teutons to assume leadership, establish 
states, and administer political affairs . 2 In contrast 
to the Teutonic people and other whites , the Negro had 
never placed reason over passion nor created any civiliza-
tion of his own . 3 According to Burgess sound political 
policy required that the Teutonic leadership not allow 
other ethnic groups political participation, at least 
until they ''~ere successfully trained to handle this high 
duty; 4 therefore, the policy of Negro suffrage imposed 
by the Radicals during Reconstruction was irrational and 
destructive . 
1w. E. Burghardt DuBois, Black Reconstruction 
An Essay Toward a History of the Part Which Black Folk 
Pla ed in the Attempt to Reconstruct Democrac in America 
1 0-1 0 New York: Russell & Russell , 1935 , pp. 71 719 . 
2John W. Burgess , Political Science and Com~arative 
Constitutional Law (2 vols.; Boston: Ginn & Co., 1 96), 
I, 39. 
3Burgess, Reconstruction and Constitution, p . 133. 
~urgess, Political Science and Comparative Con-
stitutional Law, I, 145. 
But there is no question , now, that Congress did 
a monstrous thing, and committed a great political 
error, if not a sin, in the creation of this new 
electorate . It '\'las a great '\'l!'ong to civilization 
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to put the white race of the South under the domination 
of the negro race . The claim that there is nothing 
in the color of the skin from the point of view of 
political ethics is a great sophism . l 
Burgess was relieved to note that with the United States• 
conquest of the Philippines , the Republican party had 
been forced to recognize the truth of the Southern position 
on inferior races . 
The white men of the South need now have no further 
fear that the Republican party , or Republican Adminis-
trations, will ever again give themselves over to 
the vain imagination of the political equality of 
man. 2 
In addition to his position on the Negro in politics , 
Burgess' interpretation of the Black Codes is significant. 
The Codes, he recognized , did not bear equally on whites 
and Negroes , but he felt this was right and proper since 
more severe punishments were necessary for barbaric races 
than for civilized races . The Codes were necessary 11 to 
prevent the whole negro race from becoming paupers and 
criminals . 11 3 Of the major hi storians of the "Dunning" 
school, Burgess expressed the least regard for the capa-
bilities of the Negro . 
1Burgess, Reconstruction and Constitution, p . 133. 
2 Ibid. ' p . 298. 
31£1£., pp. 45-46 , 52- 53 , quote-45 . 
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Opposition to Negro participation in politics and 
to the Radical program of Reconstruction led most 11 Dunning11 
historians to an acceptance of Lincoln's plan as the 
wise plan of Reconstruction . With this, however, Burgess 
did not agree . Lincoln's ten per cent plan, he believed, 
was ill-conceived and based on "crude and erroneous" 
thinking . Ten per cent was not a large enough percentage 
of the population to wield political power successfully. 
Direction would have necessarily had to come from outside 
t he states, so true state governments could not have 
been established on this basis . 1 The congressional policy 
of requiring a majority of white adults to form local 
governments rather than just ten per cent '\'las 11 true politi-
cal theory . "2 Burgess, as a student of political science 
and the Constitution, decided that Congress was correct 
in assuming to i~seii ~ne power to reconstruct the Southern 
states . No sound poli~ical scientist or constitutional 
lawyer could deny that Congress had the logical, legal, 
and moral right to take over Reconstruction . It should 
have taken it over in 1865. 3 Not only was the principle 
that Congress should reconstruct correct, but Burgess 
also did not doubt the sincerity of the North in its 
lrbid., p . 13. 
2rbid., p . 17. 
3rbid., p . 111. 
main purpose in Reconstruction ; in fact, he deemed praise-
\'lorthy its aims to guarantee freedom to the freedmen and 
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to re-establish loyal state governments in the South. 
Still, he felt that extreme partisan interests were too 
influential. 1 On these two points of congressional right 
to reconstruct and congressional motives for Reconstruction 
Burgess differed sharply from the other members of the 
11 Dunning11 school, most of whom favored the presidential 
plan of Reconstruction, denied Congress' right to take 
over the process, and had real doubts about the Radicals' 
motives. 
Despite Burgess' contention that Congress had 
the right to direct the Reconstruction process, he also 
contended that when Congress did take over the process, 
it made a colossal and stupendous mess . The Reconstruction 
Acts were brutal and wholly unconstitutional. Martial 
law, the removal of habeas corpus, and the usurpation 
of presidential pOi'lers were bad policies on the part 
of Congress; Negro suffrage was even worse. According 
to Burgess the correct constitutional position was that 
the Southern states were conquered territories. They 
should have been placed under direct control of the federal 
government and allowed to return to the Union only when 
they displayed sufficient loyalty. The establishment 
1 Ibid., pp. v11, 127, 135, 218. 
of territorial government would not have necessitated 
martial law or Negro suffrage . The territories would 
have had civil governments under the direct control of 
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Congress . This was sound constitutional principle, Burgess 
thought, but the idea that the states were indestructible 
prevented the applica tion of this policy. 1 
Although Burgess contended that Congress had 
the legal and moral right of Reconstruction , he also 
was vehement in his condemnation of Reconstruction as 
it turned out . Slavery was no doub t wrong and secession 
a blunder, but Reconstruction was a punishment much too 
great for any crimes which the South might have committed. 2 
He described it in purple tones . 
A period of darkness now settled down upon these 
unhappy communities blacker and more hopeless than 
the worst experiences of the war. The conduct of 
the men who now appeared upon the scene as creators 
of the new South was so tyrannic, corrupt, mean and 
vulgar as to repel the his torian from attempting 
any detailed account of their doings, and incline 
him to the vaguest outline . 3 
Reconstruction was so great a punishment that it extin-
guished any sense of guilt in the Southerners and caused 
them to unite in a desperate righteous attempt to overthrow 
Radical Reconstruction and preserve their homes and honor 
and property--indeed, their life and civilization and 
libid., pp . 59-61, 111-122 , 134-135 , 245 . 
2Ibid . , p . 297. 
3Ibid., p . 246. 
1 
all those things which make life worthwhile . 
Concerning the election of 1876 Burgess had ·a 
different opinion from most of the historians of the 
"Dunning 11 persuasion . He contended that counting the 
votes just as they came from the state boards was sound 
constitutional practice . The federal government hadn ' t 
the right to go behind the returns . Anyway, had a com-
pletely fair election been held in the disputed states, 
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the Republicans would probably have won under the existing 
suffrage laws ; 2 therefore, the Hayes election was unimpeach-
able . Burgess , then, was not only pleased with the outcome 
of the election as were the other "Dunningites ," he also 
believed the election to have been rightfully won by 
the Republicans. 
Burgess related in his Reminiscences that truth 
and right are fragmentary things which develop toward 
fullness and correctness along with the development of 
human reason . He proceeded: "the errors of one age are, 
therefore, to be regarded as imperfections rather than as 
i u3 ~~ongs and cr mea •••• Yet in his work on Reconstruction 
Burgess continually suggested what the hi s torical characters 
could or should have done and what policies were moral 
1 Ibid. , p . 297. 
2Ib1d., pp . 292- 295 . 
3Burgess , Reminiscences, p . 290. 
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and correct. He insisted that all impartial, clear-thinking 
people would have seen and understood the issues of the 
Reconstruction era in the same light as would a political 
scientist in 1900 see them. He apparently saw no excuse 
for anyone thinking differently. Any difference was 
due to unfairness, partisanship , ignorance, or sinfulness--
not to strong conditioning by a particular social situation 
in which one lived. 
The preface to Reconstruction and the Constitution 
1866-1876 (1902) demonstrated both Burgess' tendency to 
moralize and his pragmatic reason for writing--to assist 
in bringing about a more complete reconciliation between 
the sections. He stated that his earlier work on Civil 
War and the Constitution 1859-1865 (1901) had demonstrated 
that the South had been wrong in the maintenance of slavery 
and in attempting to break up the Union. Now, the present 
work on Reconstruction demonstrated that the North must 
admit it was wrong in imposing Radical Reconstruction 
on the South; therefore, presumably , both sections of 
the country should admit their faults and understand 
the other 's mistakes and thus create a more effective 
bond of friendship and co-operation between the sections 
of the nation. 
Whereas Burgess only dabbled in Reconstruction 
as a sideline, one of his students, William Archibald 
Dunning, became a specialist in the field . Dunning was 
born in New Jersey in 1857. His academic career was 
inseparably connected with Columbia University where 
he received his A.B., A.M., and Ph .D. degrees, the latter 
in 1885; then, he taught political science and history 
at Columbia from 1886 to a short time before his death 
in 1921. 1 In addition to his education at Columbia, 
Dunning studied for a time under Treitschke at Berlin. 2 
There are some rather sharp contrasts between 
Dunning and his teacher-colleague Burgess. While the 
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latter may be considered one of the most outspoken historians 
against the manner in which Reconstruction was carried 
out and \'Tas one of the quickest to make moral judgments 
on men and issues , Dunning was a master of understatement 
and hesitated in making judgments about historical events 
and persons . Another contrast bet\·Teen the two was a 
difference in emphasis on the immediate usefulness of 
history. Dunning opposed an overemphasis of the utilitarian 
aspects of history. He had studied under the "present-
minded" Treitschke at Berlin and under the equally "present-
minded" Burgess at Columbia and was a colleague of Burgess, 
James Harvey Robinson , and William M. Sloane . Despite 
1Who 1 s Who, XI, 829. 
Columbia 
48 
this, or perhaps because of it, he de-emphasized the 
present usefulness of history and contended that history 
should be studied whether it threw any light on the present 
or not . Ausubel in his study of the presidents of the 
American Historical Association found that Dunning was 
one of the very few who "had not sought to justify history 
mainly on the basis of its immediate social utility. "1 
Dunning was not a prolific writer , choosing to 
pour much of his efforts into '\'rork '\'ti th students. Besides 
his dissertation and many articles , he had only two books 
to his credit, one of them a collection of essays . Post-
humously , another group of his essays was collected and 
published by one of his students . 2 In his writing Dunning 
strove intently for accuracy , judicial poise , and complete 
objectivity . He wrote slowly and painstakingly , sometimes 
producing only a paragraph a day , not because of timidity 
but because of his extreme self-criticism. 
He seemed to fear nothing so much as to be considered 
prejudiced, unbalanced , immature in judgment, reckless 
in conclusion.3 
llbi d., p . 49. 
2nunning , Truth in History. 
3charles E. Merriam , 11Masters of Social Science : 
William Archibald Dunning ," Social Forces , V (September, 
1926), 6; The American Historical Review, Vola . I - LXV 
(New York: Macmillan Co., 1895- 1960) , XXVIII, 174 (anony-
mous obituary); Dunning, Truth in History, Hamilton ' s 
introduction, p . xvi; J . G. deRoulhac Hamilton, 11 \'lilliam 
Archibald Dunning," Dictionary of American Biography (New 
York: Charles Scribner 1s Sons , 1928- 1958), V, 523- 524. 
Dunning ' s attempt to be judicial and balanced may be 
demonstrated by two contrasting rev iews of his chief 
work , Reconstruction : Political and Economic 1865- 1877 
(1907) . A contemporary review written by a h istorian 
with rather obvious Southern sympathies thought Dunning 
treated both topics and men with fairness and justice 
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but suggested that Dunning had used mostly Northern material 
and thus did not show well enough that freedmen were 
t he cause of the South ' s trouble and did not give sufficient 
a t tention to the triumph of "Southern Saxondom11 over 
e ncroaching barbarism. Still , he admitted that Dunning 
was not Northern in "temper and purpose" and that he 
held the right interpretation of the Lincoln-Johnson 
plan of Reconstruction and the terrible and needless 
sufferings which the Southern people had to undergo during 
Reconstruction. 1 On the other hand , w. E. B. DuBois, 
the Negro his torian, in an evaluation nearly three decades 
after Dunning ' s writing appeared, stated that Dunning 
was basically anti-Negro though much less dogmatic than 
Burgess . He claimed tha t Dunning was deeply influenced 
by the group of young Southern students who gathered 
around him , with whom, according to DuBois, Dunning began 
lE. Benjamin Andrews , Review of Reconstruction : 
Political and Economic 1865-1877, by William Archibald 
Dunning , The American Historical Review, XIII (January, 
1908 ), 371-373. 
to rewrite the history of Reconstruction "in more or less 
conscious opposition to the classic interpretations of 
New England . 11 1 Harry Elmer Barnes declared that Dunning 
was a particularly suitable person to head a school of 
interpretation for the Reconstruction period. 
Dunning was almost perfectly fitted by scholarly 
instincts and mental attitudes to preside over the 
authoritative historiography of Reconstruction. 
He had a rigorous regard for the facta and, ~mile 
a northerner, was without the slightest Abolitionist 
fervor . Though a student of Burgess, he rejecte~ 
all of Burgess ' moral condemnation of the South. 
On the other hand , James Schouler, whose volume on Recon-
struction appeared six years after Dunning's , admitted 
the latter was a keen investigator but believed that 
Dunning inclined "to levity in his conclusions," since 
he had examined the Johnson manuscripts and yet gave 
an unfavorable account of the beleaguered president. 3 
Dunning 's Reconstruction : Political and Economic 
certainly was balanced in judgment and judicious in tone . 
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His interpretation was underlying and subtle, never blatant. 
The book appeared fairly objective, particularly on the 
surface, but present were the basic ideas common to the 
lDuBoia , Black Reconstruction, p . 719 . 
2Harry Elmer Barnes, 11Historical \vri ting and 
Historical Science " (Reprinted from Twentieth Century 
America, ed. Joseph S. Roucek; New York : Philosophical 
Library , n . d . ), p. 787. 
3schouler, Reconstruction Period , p . 4 . 
school--Reconstruction was a bad and corrupt period in 
our history when the South suffered under Radical Recon-
struction until peace finally came with the election 
of Hayes . Dunning made judgments but they were quite 
subdued and conservative in tone exce~t in rare moments 
of petulance , such as when he characterized Stanton as 
having an "amazing record of duplicity LWhicgl strongly 
suggests the vagaries of an opium- eater •••• "1 
Dunning was one member of this school of inter-
pretation who had a degree of admiration for the Radicals . 
The methods they employed in pursuing their goals were 
very efficient and pragmatic and demonstrated political 
wisdom and party discipline of a high degree, but the 
goal of the Radicals was more questionable, according 
to Dunning. From the first the Radicals' aim had not 
been to hastily bind up the nation ' s wounds but to insure 
the rights of life, liberty, and property to the freedmen. 
This original goal constantly deteriorated during the 
Reconstruction period. Soon the chief emphasis swung 
from civil rights for the freedmen to political rights 
for the freedmen--the right to vote and hold office . 
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By the end of the Reconstruction process, the prime concern 
had become permanent Republican control of several Southern 
states . 2 
91. 
1Dunning , Reconstruction : Political and Economic, p . 
2Dunning , Essays , pp . 249- 252, 353. 
There were some mild inconsistencies in Dunning 's 
selection of a topic and in his execution of that topic . 
In his work Reconstruction : Political and Economic , the 
overwhelming emphasis was on the political rather than 
the economic . Secondly, he was torn between treatment 
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of Reconstruction as a process and as a period. In wavering 
between the two types of treatment, he omitted many facets 
of the period while including several incidents which 
were completely unrelated to the process of Reconstruc-
tion;1 thus, he unconsciously posed the important question 
of whether Reconstruction is a period or a process . 
James Ford Rhodes, the third of the old masters 
of Reconstruction historiography , had no cause to waver 
between the treatment of Reconstruction as a period or 
as a process . His writings on Reconstruction were included 
in his eight volume History of the United States from 
the Compromise of 1850 to the McKinley- Bryan Campaign 
of 1896 (1892-1919), and his aim was manifestly to depict 
the whole period, not just the Reconstruction process . 
The tone and attitude which Rhodes demonstrated 
in his monumental workwere greatly influenced by the 
circumstances of his life . Born in Cleveland in 1848, 
he attended for a very short time both New York University 
372. 
l~drews , The American Historical Review, XIII, 
and the University of Chicago but never earned a degree; 
therefore, Rhodes was not only a non-academic historian 
but he was a self-educated historian as well . Despite 
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his lack of academic preparation, he never suffered from 
lack of recognition from the academic world . He received 
honorary degrees from the great universities of the United 
1 States and England, and, at one point in his career, 
he was asked to assist in the teaching of American history 
at Harvard. Rhodes refused the proffered teaching position 
but offered $1000 to the university for the purpose of 
procuring someone else . 2 
After his two years in college Rhodes , the son 
of a well-to-do industrialist family, traveled in Europe 
where he did some studying . Very shortly, however, he 
returned to Cleveland and went into business. The partner 
in his enterorise (and his brother-in-law) was a man 
destined to become a great power in the Republican party , 
Mark Hanna. Rhodes stayed in business until he had made 
enough money to support a life of leisure and study; 
then, at the age of thirty-seven (in 1885) he realized 
lHe received honorary doctorates from Western 
Reserve University (1893), Harvard and Yale (1901), Kenyon 
College (1903), University of Wisconsin (1904), New York 
University (1908) , Oxford University (1909), Princeton 
(1911), Brown (1914) , University of California (1916). 
Who's Who, XI, 2369. 
2charles W. Eliot to James Ford Rhodes, January 
18, 1902; James Ford Rhodes 's Papers, Massachusetts His-
torical Society . 
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a lifelong ambition by retiring from business and entering 
a period of wide study to prepare to write his history of 
the United Stat es , 
Before the first fruits of his labor were published, 
Rhodes , in 1891 , moved from Cleveland to Cambridge, Mass-
achusetts; then, in 1895, to Boston. In Cambridge and 
Boston he lived the life of a gentleman historian , utilizing 
the study facilities of a center of learning and enjoying 
delightful social intercourse with the intelligent and 
well-bred of Boston society . His chief diversion was 
dining and conversing with his large circle of distinguished 
fri ends which included senators, presidents, and academic 
leaders . 1 This genteel background and life influenced 
his writing and his point of view. His works demonstrated 
a deliberation of style and judgment born of an unhurried 
approach made possible by his financial independence. 
His point of view was one common to the upper middle 
class mind . He held high moral sentiments and expectations, 
wanted no radical innovations in the government, wanted 
government to be conducted by men of intelligence and 
property in the community, sympathized with this class 
when they were deprived of their control of the government, 
and insisted upon a sound money policy, 
1M. A. DeWolfe Howe, James Ford Rhodes American 
Historian (New York: D. Appleton & Co . , 1929), passim, 
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Politically, Rhodes might be characterized as 
an "old-fashioned Democrat" and a "Roosevelt Republican ." 
His father had been a good friend of Stephen A. Douglas, 
and the family was a strong supporter of the Douglas 
wing of the Democratic part y . Dr.eaa of Bryan and his 
heretical ideas on money caused Rhodes to support McKinley 
in 1896. Also , his friend and relative, !-1ark Hanna, 
was the political manager of 1-icKinley . Rhodes remained 
a Republican until 1912. He greatly admired Theodore 
Roosevelt both as a person and as a president but felt 
that the former president 's decision to run again in 
1912 was unwise . Due to this and the Democrats' advocacy 
of a lower tariff and an inco~e tax which he favored, 
Rhodes swung back to the Democratic party by voting for 
\'Tilson. He vacillated betvreen the Republican and Democratic 
parties for the next few years . He felt Wilson surrendered 
too much to labor and, therefore, voted for Hughes in 
1916 ; but in the war crisis and the peace effort Rhodes , 
despite his personal friendship with Senator Lodge, favored 
Wilson ' s leadership . l 
Concerning hi s torical research Rhodes decided 
that the best historical evidence was the private correspon-
dence of the men who make history . At the second level 
of value were ne'\lrspapers and congressional records . For 
1ru.£. , p . 232 . 
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gathering much of the newspaper informa tion Rhodes employed 
a research assistant, at least during the early stages 
of his multi- volume work . His assistant for the first 
volumes was Edward G. Bourne, who was to become a notable 
historian in his orm right. 1 For the writing of the 
volumes on Reconstruction Rhodes considered the daily 
newspapers less valuable . The rrork of Reconstruction , 
he believed , was done in Congress whose records \vere 
available , and therefore the historian could be, to a 
large degree , independent of newspapers for that period. 
He did make extensive use of periodicals, ho\'rever , especially 
the Nation;2 in fact , Rhodes admitted tha t he was consider-
ably influenced by E. L. Godkin and the later attitude 
of the Nation to\vard Reconstruction when its policy was 
"condemnation of the negro carpet-bag- governments in 
the South. " The Nation, Rhodes observed, was "on the 
side of civilization and good political morals . "3 
Rhodes also expressed his deep obligations to 
his contemporary, William A. Dunning , whose Reconstruction : 
Political and Economic (1907) had not yet appeared but 
whose Essays on the Civil War and Reconstruction (1897) 
lJames Ford Rhodes to E. G. Bourne, n . d . ; James 
Ford Rhodes ' s Papers, Massachusetts Historical Society . 
2Rhodes , Essays , p . 94. 
3rbid., p . 282 . 
was an important source of information and po int of view 
on Reconstruction for Rhodes . Rhodes suggested tha t "my 
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obligations ••• are much greater than even my many references 
would seem to indicate. 111 The similarity in approach 
and point of view of the two historians is quite interesting. 
Rhodes's two volumes on Reconstruction appeared while 
Dunning was completing 1mrk on his Reconstruction: Political 
and Economic for Albert Bushnell Hart ' s American Nation 
series . Upon receiving and reading Rhodes's volumes 
Dunning wrote to him : 
the 
was 
his 
I have run the volumes through hastily and shall 
no\'! lay them aside and not touch them until I have 
finished my own volume for Hart; for the mere cursory 
reading of yours shows that you have anticipated 
practically every investigation and every conclusion 
on which I had been especially priding myself. My 
little volume in its later parts will create the 
impression of a faithful but inferior summary of 
yours . I am not mourning over the situation, however, 
for nobody will be the loser. It certainly is remarkable 
how many instances struck me in which, not only yo~ 
method, but also your expression anticipated mine . 
Though the tone, temper, and point of view of 
works of Dunning and Rhodes were similar, Rhodes 
a little more ready to make judgments and to a llow 
opinions more free play than was Dunning. The point 
upon which Rhodes was most outspoken was the inferiority 
lRhodes, History of United States, VI, 408n. 
2William A. Dunning to James Ford Rhodes, November 
19 , 1906; James Ford Rhodes's Papers, Massachusetts His-
torical Society. 
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of the Negro and the disaster which necessarily accompanied 
Negro suffrage. What could an inferior race separated 
from barbarism only by a period of slavery know about 
government and the protection of private property? An 
inferior race raised from low to high caste naturally 
falls very easily into corruption. The Negro votes laid 
the foundation for gross corruption , misgovernment, office-
selling , and vote-selling in the Southern states . The 
policy of placing the most degraded Negro on an equal 
or higher level than Southern leaders was ridiculous in 
import, "more partisan than patriotic," and had dire results 
for the country at large. Rhodes pointed out that only 
six of the Northern states allowed the Negro to vote 
at the time Radicals were forcing Negro suffrage on the 
entire South. l 
In part Rhodes's aversion to Negro suffrage stemmed 
from his belief in the inferiority of the Negro race; 
in part , however, it was due to his conservative political 
philosophy . He firmly believed and liberally sprinkled 
his volumes with the indication that government should 
be in the hands of men of property and intelligence . 2 
He intimated that political participation was a privilege , 
1Rhodes, History of United States, VI, 41, 148-151, 
191-192, 200, 416; VII, 168-170; (also see Chapter ~. 
2 Ibid., VII, 171. 
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not a right . Rhodes was an admirer of Edmund Burke and 
quoted him at t1mes, 1 giving the hint that Rhodes's attitude 
to'\'rard the Radicals during Reconstruction was similar 
to that of Burke toward the Jacobina. 
Certainly Rhodes looked upon the Radicals as 
a revolutionary group who got out of hand. 2 Their motives 
were a mixture of humanitarianism, vindictiveness, and 
party interests . 3 Their policy was a disaster for the 
country. Rhodes personally seemed to prefer strongly 
the suggested ideas of Governor Andrew of Massachusetts 
on the Reconstruction problem. Governor Andrew suggested 
that the South be led back into the Union as soon as 
possible by the natural leaders of that area who were 
the only ones that had the education, skill, and popular 
support to do the job successfully. 4 
Rhodes placed the responsibility for Reconstruction 
on individuals rather than on forces or movements. 
Three men are responsible for the Congressional policy 
of reconstruction: Andrew Johnson by his obstinacy 
and bad behavior; Thaddeus Stevens by his vindictive-
ness and parliamentary tyranny; Charles Sumner by 
his pertinacity in a misguided humanitarianism.5 
libid.' VI, 156. 
2Ibid.' p . 158. 
3Ibid.' pp. 158, 311-312 . 
4 Ibid. ' p . 139. 
5Ibid.' p . 158. 
To place the responsibility for historical events squarely 
on the shoulder s of individuals is a common trait of 
the 11Dunning11 historians ; indeed, is a common trait of 
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most historians of the "scientific" school in the early 
t 'tventieth century . To a large measure disastrous historical 
events seemed to them to be the result of negative and 
destructive characteristics in men , while good developments 
in history are the results of men of worth and character 
who become the heroes of the historical work . Since, 
to the "Dunning" historians, Re construction was so disas-
trous , they found few heroes ther e , and most of the char-
a c ters of the period have the heavy scent of villainy 
about them. One of the great differences, which will 
be noted, between the 11Dunning 11 interpretation of Reconstruc-
tion and the later interpretations is the emphasis of 
the former on individuals and their roles; while the 
emphasis of the latter is placed upon powerful forces 
whieh men only symbolize or implement and only to a degree 
modi fy . 
In relation to the "Dunning" historians ' emphasis 
upon the individual and upon important political facts 
is a lack of attention to important economic and social 
factors . For example , Rhodes spent more space on the 
evidence concerning the integrity , or lack of it , of 
James G. Blaine than he devoted to all phases of the 
1 
westward movement during the Re construction period. 
Despite Rhodes's conception of Reconstruction as 
a disastrous period, he approved some aspects of it. 
Certainly , Rhodes contended, Reconstruction was bad and 
mistakes were made, but at least America kept some of 
its good sense . It didn't go in for the prime folly 
of confiscation of private property or the execution 
of leaders of the rebellion. The clemency of the North 
toward the South in matters of execution, confiscation , 
and imprisonment was unparalleled in history as far as 
Rhodes knew. He agreed with Carl Schurz that the United 
States was probably a century ahead of its time in these 
matters . Rhodes regretted, of course, that the nation 
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did not demonstrate a more scientific point of view toward 
Negroes rather than granting them the suffrage . 2 
Another element of sanity which Americans demon-
strated during Reconstruction, according to Rhodes , was 
the handling of the election crisis of 1876. Despite 
the tremendous tension of the time no one appealed to 
force . Incidentally , Rhodes agreed with most historians 
1William Garrott Brown, Review of History of the 
United States from the Com romise of 18 0 to the McKinle -
Bryan Campaign of 1 9 vola . VI and VII , by James Ford 
Rhodes, The American Historical Review, XII (April, 1907), 
683 . 
2Rhodes, History of United States, VI, 169; VII, 174; 
~~----' Massachusetts Historical Societ roceedin s 
(2nd Series , XIX, 36-37. 
of the "Dunning" school that the election morally belonged 
to the Democrats because had the electoral commission 
gone behind the returns from Louisiana and other disputed 
states, Tilden would have obtained the majority . However , 
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Rhodes thought the Hayes election was legal because the 
commission was not bound to go behind the returns. 1 
There is considerable variation within Rhodes 's 
multi-volume History of the United States. While he 
was writing he suggested to his wife that his third volume 
would be better in style than his second. "I expect vola 
3 & 4 will be my chef d'oeuvres: then after these I shall 
be old and grow prolix."2 Rather than verbose, however, 
Rhodes grew old and more concise. Dunning criticized 
him for not giving a proportionate amount of space and 
effort to Reconstruction as to ante-bellum and Civil War 
periods. Rhodes devoted 1350 pages to the ante-bellum 
years, 1850-1861, 1350 pages to the war, and only 850 
pages to the twelve years of Reconstruction. Dunning 
suggested that Rhodes seemed to have lost interest in 
his work when he completed the account of the war years . 
The work as a whole might with some accuracy be 
designated a history of the United States from 1850 
1Rhodes, History of United States, VII, 230, 235 , 
242 , 255, 262 , 282-286 , 294. 
2James Ford Rhodes to wife, August 3 , 1892; James 
Ford Rhodes's Papers, Massachusetts Historical Society. 
to 1865, with supplementary chapters on reconstruc-
tion. l 
Theodore Roosevelt, in conversation \'Ti th Rhodes, 
criticized him for descending from the impartial judgment 
seat of earlier volumes and in his sixth and seventh 
volumes becoming an advocate . Roosevelt suggested that 
while criticism of Reconstruction policy was perhaps 
proper, there were extenuating circumstances which Rhodes 
failed to emphasize . 2 But this was mild criticism in 
comparison to others he received, particularly later 
criticisms of his work. Two years after Rhodes's death 
Henry Steele Commager wrote : 
The critical student is forced to the reluctant con-
clusion that Rhodes saw American history neither 
steadily nor whole, and that he failed to comprehend 
fully what he did see . 3 
The most stinging criticism of Rhodes's volumes 
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has come from Negroes. John R. Lynch, who was a participant 
in Mississippi Reconstruction , thought Rhodes's treatment 
unfair and inaccurate and took it upon himself to clear 
up some of the mistakes which he attributed to Rhodes . 
lwilliam A. Dunning, "Rhodes's History of the 
United States ," Truth in History, p . 186. 
2Howe , Rhodes, pp. 167-168. 
3H . s. Commager, Review of James Ford Rhodes 
American Historian, by M. A. De,'lolfe Howe, Ne,., York Herald 
Tribune, May 5, 1929. 
I regret to say LLynch wrot~ that, so far as the 
Reconstruction period is concerned, it is not only 
inaccurate and unreliable but it is the most biased , 
partisan and prejudiced historical '\·mrk I have ever 
read. l 
W. E. B. DuBois criticized Rhodes on the grounds that he 
was a businessman, not a historian; that he began his 
inquiry convinced that the Negro race was inferior; that 
he selected from vast materials those which supported 
his thesis; that he knew nothing of economic or labor 
history; that he was contemptuousof democratic government ; 
and, finally, that he was the historian of property. 2 
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James Schouler , a chief defender of Andrew Johnson , 
characterized Rhodes as being generally fair-minded and 
painstaking , except in regard to Johnson. He regretted 
Rhodes ' s disparagement of the Reconstruction president 
as egotistical , boastful, inflexible, uncultured, and 
unfit for the presidency; but he noticed that Rhodes 
had written his chapters on Johnson before the Johnson 
manuscripts or Gideon Welles ' s Diary were accessible . 3 
The writer of a biographical sketch of Rhodes agreed 
with Schouler : 
That his comments on Andre1-.r Johnson now seem unjudicial , 
1John R. Lynch , 11 Some Historical Errors of James 
Ford Rhodes , " The Journal of Negro History , II (October, 
1917 ), 345. 
2nuBois , Black Reconstruction , pp . 717- 718. 
3schouler, Reconstruction Period, pp. 2-4. 
and uncharacteristic of Rhodes himself, may doubtless 
be attributed to his lack of information. l 
All the reviews and comments on Rhodes's work, 
however , were not unfavorable . No qoubt many people 
accepted Rhodes's volumes on Reconstruction in the same 
spirit as Dunning, who characterized the work as "the 
only comprehensive narrative covering the years of recon-
struction in a scientific spirit. 11 2 William Garrott 
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Brown , a reviewer of noticeable Southern proclivities, 
called Rhodes ' s volumes on Reconstruction the best history 
of the period yet written. However, he noted at the same 
time that this was not as high praise as the same statement 
made about Rhodes's volumes on the Civil War because 
there was much creditable writing in the Civil War period, 
while there were no commendable works on Reconstruction 
before Rhodes 1 s . Brown felt in Rhodes ' s writing a deep 
sympathy for the Southern people and a sadness at the 
North's oppression of the South. 
This is an attitude LWrote Browri7 which is far less 
likely to provoke criticism at the North than it 
would have been ten years ago . 3 
Brown's judgment that the climate of opinion even in the 
lDictionary of American Biography, XV, 533 . 
2Dunning , Reconstruction : Political and Economic, 
p . 342 . 
3Brown , The American Historical Review, XII, 
680- 684, quote-6 3. 
North , in 1907, was acceptable to an interpretation favor-
able to the South seems to be correct. Reasons for this 
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may be found in the advanced stage which the white supremacy 
ideology had reached by 1907 and the not unrelated desire 
of Northerners for deeper reconciliation bet\'Teen the 
sections despite the contemporary Negro disfranchisement 
movement in the Southern states . (See Chapter 8. ) Even 
two former Carpetbaggers had, by the time of the publication 
of Rhodes's volumes on Reconstruction, readjusted their 
ideas on the Negro and on the nature of Reconstruction. 1 
One of these, Daniel H. Chamberlain, who was placed in 
a category by himself by most "Dunning " historians as 
a "good" Carpetbagger, ''li'ote to Rhodes in appreciation 
of his history. Rhodes's account of Chamberlain as gover-
nor and of the Reconstruc tion of South Carolina were 
accurate and fair, Chamberlain reassured him. 
What is much more important , however, is that I find 
your general conclusions respecting the policy and 
actual outcome in fact of the Re cons truction measures 
to be correct, well-reasoned, conclusive, and admirably 
stated. 2 
In the same letter Chamberlain cast aspersions on a New 
lAdelbert Ames, native of Massachusetts and ex-
governor of Mississippi, admitted in 1900 that he and his 
colleagues had been too optimistic about the mental , moral , 
and self-governing capacities of the Negro . Garner, 
Reconstruction in Mississippi, p . 408. 
2n. H. Chamberlain to James Ford Rhodes , November 
28, 1906; James Ford Rhodes's Papers, Massachusetts Historical 
Society. 
67 
England sympathizer with the Negro as "a double- dyed, 
old-time Abolitionist , ••• on this subject, learning nothing 
& forgetting nothing. 11 1 
Rhodes ' s volumes on Reconstruction seem to have 
been well accepted in the South . The director of the 
Department of Archives and History of the state of Missis-
sippi wrote to Rhodes praising him for the impartial account 
which he had rendered of the period. 
I have carefully read these two volumes with great 
pleasure and profit, and congratulate you on your 
treatment of Reconstruction. You prove very clearly 
that the measures of Reconstruction could never have 
been enacted into laws if the negro had been under-
stood at the North . A want of knowledge was the 
trouble then, and the same condition exists today •••• 
I wish that your history could be placed in every 
Southern home, for it would impress the truth that 
justice finally prevails . We have all along felt 
that the time would come when a Northern historian, 
with the ability to ascertain the truth and the courage 
to write it , would give a true picture of Reconstruc-
tion in the South. 2 
lrbid. 
2nunbar Rowland to James Ford Rhodes , November 
28, 1906; James Ford Rhodes's Papers , Massachusetts His-
torical Society . 
CHAPTER 3 
THE COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY COTERIE 
No one person did more to establish the "Dunning" 
interpretation of Reconstruction t han William A. Dunning 
himself . His o1m writings were supplemented and greatly 
extended by the investigations of his many students , so 
that by the time of his death it was well recognized 
that Dunning had established a school of young i nvesti-
gators and writers in the field of Reconstruction. He 
was a stimulating lecturer and a helpful critical guide 
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to his students, having a charming personality and an 
enthusiastic interest in his subject and his students. 
Dunning•s finest quality was "his power to arouse in 
students sustained enthusiasm for research, and f or high 
standards of investigation and expression."l He directed 
the doctoral programs of twelve students of Reconstruction, 
eight of whom \~ote on Reconstruction in a particular 
state and four of whom wrote on a particular aspect of 
Reconstruction . These students • writines form a major 
part of Reconstruction literature and help to round out 
lMerriam, Social Forces, V, 8; The American Histori-
cal Review, XXVIII, 174 (anonymous obituary); Hamilton , 
Dictionary of American Biography, V, 523-524. 
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the'~ning" interpretation by applying it to more particu-
lar aspects and areas within the larger field. Several 
of these historians became prominent teachers and thus 
influenced a whole new generation of attitudes on Recon-
struction . In this manner the "Dunning" interpretation 
was to spread rapidly and to become solidly established 
as the orthodox interpretation among both scholars and 
the people , both North and South. 
The first of these students was Charles Ernest 
Chadsey, a Nebraskan who completed his undergraduate 
education at Stanford in 1892 and received his Ph. D. 
degree from Columbia in 1897. 1 Chadsey 1 s contribution 
to Reconstruction his tory consisted of a brief study 
of The Struggle Between President Johnson and Congress 
OVer Reconstruction (1896) in which he defended Johnson's 
policy of Reconstruction but not the personality and 
leadership of the president. He believed Johnson's policy 
was basically wise , and had it been adopted it might have 
succeeded in restoring the Union and avoiding the bitterness 
of the follm.;ing years . The policy was doomed, ho,.;ever, 
by blindness and prejudice on the part of both North and 
South, a conflict which was inevitable and for which 
1Who Was Who in America A Comnanion Volume to 
Who's Who in America (2 vola . ; Chicago : The A. N. Marquis 
Company , 1942- 1950), I , 206. 
neither side could be considered completely wrong. 1 
However, in contrast to several later historians of the 
school, Chadsey placed quite a large responsibility for 
Reconstruction upon the South itself. Had the South 
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acted wisely and not enacted the Black Codes, which gave 
real opportunity for cruelty and injustice to the Negro , 
the bitterness of the Congress in its Reconstruction 
program would have been avoided. The North would have 
acted unnaturally had it been willing to allow the Southern 
states back into the Union despite the Black Codes and 
the New Orleans riot. It was natural that fear and hatred 
between the sections did not end immediately. 2 Concerning 
impeachment Chadsey stated that the Radicals ' attempt 
to remove President Johnson was a reaction against the 
great executive po\'ler wielded by Lincoln during the war, 
but the pendulum swung too far in the direction of congres-
sional power . With impeachment the balance of government 
was endangered and it was fortunate that the project failed . 
The Civil War, according to Chadsey, proved that the Union 
was indissoluble; the impeachment proved that the three 
departments of government were equal . 3 
Four years after Chadsey received his degree, 
lChadsey, Johnson and Congress, pp . 44, 126. 
212!£. , pp. 43-46, 53, 59-60, 89-90, 93, 124, 126. 
3Ibid. , pp . 128, 131, 140-141. 
two other students completed their work under Dunning--
Edwin C. Woolley and James Wilford Garner . Woolley was 
a native of Illinois and had obtained his bachelor's 
degree from the University of Chicago . 1 He placed much 
more responsibility for Reconstruction on the North than 
did Chadsey . The South's attitude of sullen and unre-
pentant submission to superior forces was natural at 
the time . The North regarded it as a dangerous attitude 
and, if not disciplined, it might cause another war. 
The North also believed that Negro suffrage was necessary 
for the protection of the Negro and that the Republican 
party needed aid from the Negro . 
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There were thus three classes of men bent on abolishing 
the Johnson government . We may call them the Discipli-
narians, the Humanitarians, and the Republican Poli-
ticians . 2 
Woolley held the common "Dunning" interpretation of Recon-
struction in general and summed it up in this manner: 
In short, reconstruction seems to have produced bad 
government, political rancor , and social3violence and disorder, without compensating good. 
Despite this he contended tha t the Reconstruction state 
governments were not all bad. The conflict was simply 
the struggle between Republicans and Democrats, not a 
lvib.c ;as Woo, I, 1381. 
2 1., ey ;teconstruction of Geore;ia, p . 23 . woo - , -
"l. • ""J'P • 109- 110 , quote-110 • 
..J!Q!,.C... t • 
=----
case of righteousness assailed by wickedness . Reconstruc-
tion was not a time \'Then sharpers "preyed at will on a 
helpless people," although tax rates were higher, the 
government extravagant , the railroads handled badly, and 
some personal dishonesty existed. Woolley tended to 
defend Governor Bullock of Georgia, admitting that he 
acted a little suspiciously but pointing out that dis-
honesty had never been proven. The Reconstruction govern-
mente were hated not so much for what they did but for 
what they ~--governments forcefully imposed by an 
outside power and based on a policy "conceived partly 
in vengeance, partly in folly , and partly in political 
strategy •••• "l 
James Wilford Garner's dissertation was a study 
of Reconstruction in Mississ ippi (1901), a work on his 
native state . Before receiving his Ph. D. degree from 
Columbia in 1902, he received his bachelor's degree from 
Miss issippi Agricultural and Mechanical College in 1892 
and his master's degree from the University of Chicago 
in 1900. In the succeeding years he taught briefly at 
both Columbia and the University of Pennsylvania before 
moving to the University of Illinois, where he taught 
from 1904-1938. 2 In his preface Garner declared his 
libid. , pp. 99-108 , quote-108. 
2Who 1 s vfuo, XI , 1050. 
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view "that it is the province of the historian to relate 
and not to judse . 111 He admitt ed having prejudices but 
declared he had tried to purge himself of any influence 
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of environment or education ~mich might impair his impartial 
narration of the truth. 2 On the whole Garner was successful 
in this attempt and he was, perhaps more than any other 
Columbia product, close to Dunning in his judicious state-
mente and very mild judgments , where judgments were made . 
For example , Garner did not lay emphasis upon the corruption 
during Reconstruction; in fact, he stated that during 
the administration of Governor Ames (whose regime was 
hated by natives of Mississippi) there were only two 
evidences of defaulting state officials . One was caught 
stealing books from the library and the other, a Carpet-
bagger, was short by about $7000. 
The only large case of embezzlement among the state 
offi cers during the post- bellum period was that of 
the Democratic state treasurer in 1866. The amount 
of the shortage was $61 , 962. "3 
The Reconstruction government in Mississippi fell not 
because of its corruption but because of the circumstances 
under which it operated . "The times were ill-fitted for 
the establishment of cordial relations between the con-
1Garner, Reconstruction in M1ss1ssipui, p . viii . 
2rbid. 
3 Jlli. ' p . 323. 
querors and the conquered . 11 1 
Garner tried to be fair to the Carpetbagger and 
the Scalawag. He even suggested that the terms usually 
applied to them are not completely accurate and proper 
by referring to them as "so-called" Carpetbaggers an.d 
Scalawags. Generally, those in Mississippi, he thought, 
were of better character than those of Louisiana and 
South Carolina . Some were personally honest, some were 
plunderers, but on the whole they did not exercise a 
s pirit of economy which expediency demanded at the time . 
It was their alliance with the Negroes, however, which 
caused the whites to finally force redemption by rather 
revolutionary methods . 2 
Garner's greatest attempt at fairness was in his 
treatment of the Negro . Most all his statements on the 
Negro were balanced--some Negr oes were good, some were 
bad ; some were ignorant, some were intelligent. He made 
it plain that the holiday the freedmen took shortly after 
their freedom was only a temnorary impulse and tha t most 
of the Negroes very soon returned to work, though much 
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of the work was of an unreliable nature being on a monthly 
rather than a yearly basis . Southerners soon found out 
that free Negro labor was profitable and that Negro jury 
1 Ibid. , p . 408. 
2rbid . , pp. 187, 414. 
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service and testimony in the courts did not have disastrous 
results , as had been predicted. l Garner's attempt to 
treat the Negro in an unbiased manner was rather remarkable 
for the period in which he wrote . Even Negro historians 
of later decades praised Garner for the degree of fairness 
he achieved . 2 But his efforts were not entirely successful ; 
for example , he felt the crop failures of 1866- 1867 were 
due 
in a great measure to the unreliable character of 
negro labor . Even now, the negro is not a model 
of industry , frugality , and foresight . He was much 
farther from it in 1866. 3 
And at times he became somewhat condescending in his 
attitude toward the Negro , displaying the sentiment of 
a very moderate white supremacist. For example , in speaking 
of John R. Lynch , a very prominent Negro in Mississippi 
politics, he said: "He is one of the most intelligent 
men of his race, is conservative in his views, and dis-
tinctly Caucasian in his habits . 11 4 In an essay on "Southern 
Politics Since the Civil War" included in a group of 
studies edited by Garner and dedicated to Dunning , Garner 
displayed considerably more aversion to the Negro and 
1 Ibid., pp. 133-135. 
2nuBois , Black Reconstruction, p . 720; Taylor , 
The Journal of Negro History , XXIII , 27. 
3Garner, Reconstruction in Mississippi , p . 137. 
4Ibid. , p . 296 . 
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his participation in politics . 
For a long time it was the declared purpose of the 
dominant party at the North to force upon the Southern 
states the rule of a numerical majority when that 
majority was an ignorant race; under these circum-
stances the Southern white people were justified 
in standing together in political matters and in 
sacrificing their individual convictions on national 
questions in order to prevent such a catastrophe. 
To have divided their strength would have been fatal 
to the very existence of their civilization.l 
Reconstruction in Mississippi may \<Tell be con-
sidered one of the outstanding histories of a state during 
Reconstruction , especially as it was written so early 
and in a period so agitated with racial antagonism. 
(See Chapter 8.) The work is better balanced and more 
detailed than the earlier works mentioned. It is not 
strictly political history since Garner took into con-
sideration some of the economic problems and social forces 
of the period. This placed Garner among a small minority 
of writers "'i thin the "Dunning" school who did not confine 
their studies to politics . Politics still formed the 
major part of the work , however. 
Of the other students of Dunning none "1as as 
productive and as influential in propagating the "Dunning" 
interpretation as Walter Lynwood Fleming. Besides his 
dissertation on Civil i'lar and Reconstruction in Alabama 
(1905), Fleming wrote several articles on Reconstruction;2 
lGarner, Studies in Southern History and Politics, 
ed. Garner, pp. 373-374. 
2\.Yal ter Lynwood Fleming, "Ex-Slave Pension Frauds , 11 
edited a valuable two volume Documentary History of Recon-
struction (1906-1907); 1 produced a syllabus and bibliog-
raphy on Reconstruction up to 1905;2 wrote a history 
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of the Freedmen's Savings Bank;3 and what is less important 
in terms of original contribution but more important 
in terms of influence on great numbers of people--he 
wrote the volume on Reconstruction in the popular Chronicles 
of America series.4 Fleming was a native of Alabama 
and received his bachelor's and master's degrees from 
the Alabama Polytechnic Institute before receiving another 
master's and his Ph.D. degrees from Columbia. He was 
a lecturer at Columbia in 1902-1903, then professor at 
West Virginia University 1903-1907. For ten years he 
The South Atlantic Quarterly, IX (April, 1910), 123-135; 
~-=-=~-=--' 11 The Formation of the Union Lea~e i n Alabama," 
Gulf States Historical Magazine, II (1903), 73-89; --------' 
111 Forty Acres and a Mule 1 , 11 The North American Review, 
CLXXXII (May, 1906), 721-737; , 11 Immigration to 
the Southern States," Political Science Quarterly, XX 
(June, 1905), 276- 297 ; , 11 The Ku Klux Testimony 
Rel ating to Alabama," Gulf States Historical Magazine, 
II (1903), 155-160. 
lwalter Lynwood Fleming, Documentary History of 
Reconstruction Political, Military, Social, Religious, 
Educational & Industrial 1865 to the Present Time (2 vola.; 
Cleveland: Arthur H. Clark Co., 1906-1907). 
2~---=~' The Reconstruction of the Seceded States , 
1865-76 (Home Education Syllabus of the New York State 
Education Department; 1905). 
3 ________ , Freedmen's Savings Bank. 
4 
________ , Sequel. 
taught at Louisiana State University before going to 
Vanderbilt University where he stayed from 1917 until 
his death in 1932. During hie years at Vanderbilt he 
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was Dean from 1923-1929. 1 Fleming was the son of a Southern 
planter who had served in the Confederate calvary and 
had been partially ruined by the war. This fact and 
the fact that he spent his life and career in the South 
working with Southern material helped to shape his attitude 
tow-ard Reconstruction. 2 Even Dunning , who was advisor 
to Fleming on his Civil War and Re construction in Alabama, 
stated that this work had "a marked Southern bias in ••• 
interpretation. 11 3 
Civil War and Reconstruction in Alabama ranks 
with Garner 's Reconstruction in Mississippi as one of 
the most competent and complete works written by a student 
lwilliam C. Binkley , "The Contribution of Walter 
Lynwood Fleming to Southern Scholarship," The Journal 
of Southern History, V (May , 1939), 144; Milledge L. 
Bonham, 11 \val ter Lynwood Fleming : Southern Scholar, 11 
The South Atlantic Quarterly, XXXVIII (January, 1939), 
23-30 ; Fletcher M. Green, "Walter Lynwood Fleming: His-
torian of Reconstruction," The Journal of Southern History, 
II (November, 1936) , 498-499; Who ' s Who, XI , 965. 
2Horace Mann Bond, Ne ro Education in Alabama 
A Study in Cotton and Steel Washington : Associated 
Publishers, Inc. , 1939) , p . 23; W. M. Brewer, Review 
of The South Lives in History Southern Hi storians and 
Their Legacy , by Wendell Holmes Stephenson, The Journal 
o f Negro History, XLII (1958), 70. 
3nunning, Reconstruction : Political and Economic, 
p . 353 . 
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of Dunning. Fleming placed a great deal more emphasis 
on the social and economic developments than most historians 
of the early twentie th century, including those of the 
"Dunning" interpretation of Reconstruction. Of course, 
when a book just covered the period in one particular 
state, the author could afford to give more space to 
topics other than the political situa tion; whereas, a 
general history of Reconstruction in the whole na tion 
might well become an overlarge, unwieldy volume if all 
phases were included. But even among the state histories 
written by Dunning's students only three gave significant 
attention to social and economic affairs . 1 Fleming, 
hmvever, was convinced 
that the political problems of War and Reconstruction 
are of less permanent importance than the forces 
which have shaped and are shap~ng the social and 
industrial life of the people . 
Fleming's other major writing on Reconstruction , 
published in 1920, was Jhe Seguel of Appomattox, a brief 
survey of the whole period. Having a large subject and 
a limited amount of space, Fleming used a great number 
of broad generalizations to convey the picture of the 
period. Using this technique Fleming demonstrated perhaps 
even more clearly his Southern background. He was not 
lFleming, Garner , and C. Mildred Thompson . 
2Fleming , Civil War and Reconstruction in Alabama , 
p . vii . 
able to give illustrations which demonstrated conflicting 
points of view; therefore, his statements were made in 
such a way that they seemed to be the only point of view. 
Fleming ' s generalizations and conclusions in The Sequel 
of Apnomattox were quite similar to those of Rhodes, 
whose work Fleming ranked along with Dunning's as the 
best on Reconstruction , except for some gaps which Rhodes 
left in the story . In fact , The Sequel of Appomattox 
could conceivably be a condensation and popularization 
of Rhodes's volume on Reconstruction except that Fleming 
added social and economic problems and consequences to 
his account which Rhodes did not include . 
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This book is so readable and so readily attainable , 
being in wide circulation as are all volumes of the Chroni-
cles of Ameri ca series, that it has obviously had broad 
influence . Although it would be difficult to prove, 
it might not be improper to suggest that this is the 
account of Re construction which more students read than 
any other. The only conceivable competitor for this honor 
among works on Reconstruction would be Claude G. Bowers ' 
Tragic Era. 
The beginning point of Fleming ' s interpretation 
of Reconstruction was the Negro . "The central figure of 
Re construction was the negro . "1 According to Fleming 
libid., p . 761. 
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there would have been no war or, assuming the war, certainly 
there would have been far fewer problems of Reconstruction 
had it not been for the Negro . With his new found freedom 
the once good- mannered Negro became an impudent, unassimil-
able element of society, suspicious of Southern whites . 
Though there were tremendous opportunities for work he 
didn't take advantage of them, being more interested 
in loafing and attending political meetings . Without 
the discipline of slavery and with the misguidance of 
his white "friends," the Negro naturally turned to petty 
or even major crime and felt that stealing from a white 
man was not morally wrong . 1 The freedman was "ignorant, 
helpless , brutal, demoralized and dangerous ."2 
Under t hese circumstances t he Southern states 
passed the Blaclt Codes which were designed both t o lay 
restrictions on the Negroes and to extend them certain 
r ights . According to Fleming by t he Codes Negroes obtained 
rights they never had before. Any laws which discriminated 
against Negroes vrere never enforced because they were 
suspended by the military and the Freedmen's Bureau. 
Of t he two plans for the guidance of the freedmen--the 
Black Codes and t he Freedmen's Bureau--the Codes were 
better suited to actual condi tions, and given a fair 
lFleming , Sequel, pp. 21, 33-34, 42, 44-45, 153 , 274. 
2~------' Documents Relating to Reconstruction , 
No . 8 , p . 3 . 
trial they might have been successful. 1 
The Freedmen's Bureau , in Fleming's opinion , 
demoralized labor, aroused extravagant hopes among the 
Negroes, meddled excessively in private affairs, and 
served to alienate the races . The Bureau was unnecessary 
in Alabama. Hunger and cold '\'rould have forced the Negro 
to 1·10rk and demand for labor was high ; therefore, he 
could have obtained work . Negro mistreatment was rare , 
and the Bureau did not make these few instances any more 
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rare . Actually, in Fleming's opinion , the Negro did 
better in those areas where the Bureau did not interfere . 2 
One bit of good which Fleming admitted the Freedmen's 
Bureau did was to provide immediate short-term relief 
briefly after the war before crops could be produced, 
but the more permanent results of the Bureau were not 
usually good. 3 Most of the high officials within the 
Bureau were men of good standing and who were just in 
their actions, but the majority of lower officers of 
the Bureau , according to Fleming, were less responsible , 
lFleming , Civil War and Reconstruction in Alabama, 
p . 383 ; , Documents Relating to Reconstruction, 
No . 8, p . 3 ; , Sequel, pp. 97, 115. 
2 Fleming , Civil War and Reconstruction in Alabama, 
pp . 444- 450 , 469 , 654. 
3rbid., p . 713 ; Fleming , Documents Relating to 
Re construction, No . 6. pp . 4-5 . 
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were inferior in ability and character, and were either 
corrupt or blind in their partisanship . The Freedmen's 
Bureau, then, became a political agent of the Radicals, 
often used in an oppressive and extremely partisan manner . 1 
Fleming also stated that the Bureau's attempts to educate 
the Negro were mostly bad. Some of the Bureau schools 
lasted, Fleming said, but more schools would have arisen 
if those of the Bureau had never existed. The educational 
attempts of the Radicals during Reconstruction failed 
due chiefly to corruption and embezzlement and the use 
of the school system for political purposes . 11 It was 
not until the turn of the century that the white schools 
were again as good as they had been before 1861 . "2 
The most promising aid to the Negro race during 
Reconstruction, in Fleming 's opinion, was the Freedmen's 
Savings Bank which was designed to instill habits of 
thrift into the freedmen who had never had to worry about 
such things before. But this attempt ended in disastrous 
failure for several reasons, among them the carelessness 
of the managers, the neglect of Congress, the depression 
of 1873, the dishonesty and i ncompetency i nvolved, and 
1Fleming , Freedmen's Savings Bank, p. 14; 
Sequel , pp . 98-108, 113-116. --------' 
2Fleming , Sequel , pp. 216-220 , quote-219-220 ; 
________ , Civil War and Re construction in Alabama, pp. 
466-467. 
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chiefly the corrupt use of the bank resources by a District 
l 
of Columbia ring of officials . 
Parallel to the work of the Freedmen's Bureau 
and in conjunction with it was the work of the Loyal 
League, the political tool of the Radical Republicans . 
According to Fleming the Loyal League used threats, propa-
ganda, and sometimes violence to control the Negro population 
for the purposes of the Republican party . For more effective 
control of the Negro the League had to separate him politi-
cally from the white population and teach him that the 
Southern white was his worst enemy; thus, the permanent 
result of the League's work in the South was to antagonize 
race relations and alienate the ~mite from the Negro . 
Thus , these Reconstructionists made the racial situation 
in the South much worse than it had ever been, since 
the estrangement of the races and the social-equality 
teachings of the reconstructionists have made it 
much less safe than in slavery for whites to reside 
near negro communities , and the negro is more exposed 
to impositions by low whites . 2 
Secret protest organizations, such as the Ku 
Klux Klan and the Order of the White Camelia, were, according 
to Fleming, the natural and inevitable outgrowth of the 
conditions which were developing in the South, including 
lFleming, Freedmen's Savings Bank , p. 99 . 
2Fleming, Civil War and Reconstruction in Alabama, 
pp. 564-568, quote- 803; , Documents Relating 
to Reconstruction , No . 3, p. 5; , Sequel, pp. 188-
195, 236 . -
Radical antagonism of race relations and state governments 
being run by alien groups based on Negro suffrage. Klan 
activity was a method as old as history for relieving 
the per secutions of aliens or of unjust law; that is, 
throv,ring off "revolutionary governments by revolutionary 
means . 111 The Klan began as harmless amusement and ended 
in criminal elements taking over the organization or 
operating under the guise of the organization, as will 
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inevitably happen to a secret society, according to Fleming ; 
but in its middle years the movement was very useful and 
successful . It regulated the activities of bad Negroes; 
it punished criminals who were not taken care of by the 
law; it dispatched the worst of the Reconstruction offi-
cials, subdued the activities of Northern teachers and 
preachers, broke up threatening gatherings of Negroes, 
and kept the Negroes quiet and peaceful. The Klan brought 
a halt to the burning of houses and stores and mills 
and made the people of the South feel more secure. Labor 
became more organized and the Carpetbaggers and Scalawags 
1-rere forced to moderate their position. The Klan helped 
greatly in holding society together during the Radical 
revolution of 1865-1869, in Fleming's opinion. 2 
lFleming , Civil War a~d Reconstruction in Alabama , 
p . 689 . 
2Ibid., pp . 568, 660-662, 668, 674, 689 , 691, 
709; Fleming , Documents Relatin~ to Reconstruction, No . 1, 
p . 507; , pequel, pp. 2 6-247, 257-259, 264. 
Concerning the plans of Reconstruction Fleming 
f avored the presidential design and declared that it 
deserved a better trial and more success t han it had. 
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The state governments formed under Presidential Reconstruc-
tion were fair and were run by respectable men , and under 
them the social and economic conditions of t he South 
had improved. The presidential plan was cons titutional 
rather than a flouting of the Constitution; it aimed 
at punishing only individuals , not uprooting a whole 
society; it concerned itself more with the emancipated 
white man than with the emancipated Negro . Also, Fleming 
believed , the people of the countr y were in favor of 
the Lincoln-Johnson plan of Reconstruction. 1 The congres-
sional plan was of doubtful constitutionality--it aimed 
at uprooting the civilization in the South and concerned 
itself principally with the Negro and not with the welfare 
of the white man; it was based on the idea that war con-
ditions still existed in the South; and it changed the 
basic theory of why the war was fought . 
The war had been fought upon the theory that the old 
Union mus t be preserved; but the basic theory of the 
reconstruction was that a new Union was to be created. 2 
In 1904 Fleming admitted, along with Burgess, 
that Stevens' concept of treati ng the South as a conquered 
1Ibid., pp. 53, 8o, 87-88, 118-119, 141-142. 
2rbid., pp. 88, 146, 173 , 282, 286, quote-139 . 
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territory might have been the correct theory as far as 
public law was concerned. He \·rrote: 
It was more in accord with historical facts . It 
recognized the great changes ~~ought by war in the 
structure of the government . It was frank, explicit , 
and practical . Unfortunately, the statesmanship 
necessary to carry to success such a plan \~as entirely 
lacking in its supporters . l 
However , in 1921 Fleming, like Rhodes before him, expressed 
the opinion that the proposals of John A. Andrew on Recon-
atruction \'/ere the most statesmanlike and the most likely 
to achieve rapid restoration. Governor Andrew's suggestion 
\-Tas that the South be organized with the active co-operation 
and participation of the natural white Southern leaders, 
who were the only ones having the talents and the following 
to bring about a successful restoration. 2 
According to Fleming the Radicals in their program 
of Reconstruction hoped to limit t he pm~ers of the president , 
to permanently remove political po,<~er from Southern leaders , 
and to enfranchise the Negro 11 as a measure of revenge 
and to assure the continuation in pm.,er of the Republican 
party . 11 3 In order to gain these ends the Radicals inaugu-
rated a campaign of misrepresentation against the South 
1Fleming , Civil War and Reconstruction in Alabama, 
pn. 339-340. 
2Fleming, Sequel, pp . 61-62. 
3Fleming, Civil War and Reconstruction in Alabama, 
p . 341 . 
and made no attempt to learn the true situation which 
existed there . l 
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The agents who actually carried out Radical Recon-
struction in the Southern states were, at least in Alabama , 
"the most "VTOrthless and incompetent of \'lhi tea-- alien and 
native--and negroes . "2 Among the Carpetbaggers \'/ere 
a few able leaders, but most of them were political soldiers 
of fortune who had no conscience in their political dealings ; 
only about half '\'Tere personally honest . All \'/ere unscrupu-
lous in their political activities . The Scalawags were 
usually less able and respectable than the Carpetbaggers 
and even those who ''~ere honest were usually narrow and 
vindictive persons . 3 Fleming strongly condemned the 
state governments established by these unsavory elements 
as extravagant and corrupt; they increased the debts and 
taxes of the Southern states by great amounts and caused 
bitter consternation among the Southern people . 4 
In addition to the permanent racial antagonism 
caused by Reconstruction , Fleming described other effects 
lFleming , Sequel , pp . 82 , 126. 
2Fleming , Civil War and Reconstruction in Alabama, 
p . 656 . 
3Fleming , Sequel , pp . 153, 224 , 288-289 . 
4Fleming, Civil War and Reconstruction in Alabama, 
pp . 552, 656 ; --=----- ' Documents Relating to Reconstruc-
tion , No . 4, p . 3; , Seauel , pp . 221- 222 , 230- 237. 
of Reconstruction on the South . One was the fusing of 
all of the whites of the South into one conservative 
or Democratic party ; that is, the creation of the "Solid 
South. " Another was the fear which Southern whites had 
of progressive legislation lest it should disrupt the 
Compromise of 1877. Of a more subtle character, but 
no less real, were the moral and intellectual results 
of Reconstruction. According to Fleming Reconstruction 
helped to take some of the graciousness and hospitality 
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ouf of Southern living and make it more severe . Reconstruc-
tion placed the South on a more businesslike basis and 
on a more strict economy . It reduced the amount of 
individuality and produced more homogeneity in the white 
society . l 
It is interesting to note that Fleming was one 
of the few \'Tri ters of the "Dunning" interpretation who 
continued to severely criticize Andrew Johnson after 
the publication of Gideon Welles's Diary in 1910-1911 . 
Indeed, his was the most severe indictment of Johnson 
which appeared within the bounds of the school after 
this new material appeared. In 1920 Fleming agreed with 
Dunning and Rhodes that Johnson i•.ras crude, narro'\'l, obstinate, 
and possessed few qualifications for the presidency. 2 
libid., pp. 87 , 138 , 278-281, 303. 
2Ibid. , pp. 71-73, 87, 121-122, 128-131, 173. 
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This seems to demonstrate both the indebtedness of Fleming 
to Rhodes ' s work and the strength of Dunning's influence 
over his students . 1 
Historians ' opinions of Fleming generally were 
contingent upon their own point of view. Fello\i "Dunning" 
historians extended him high praise ; Negro historians 
expressed grave doubts about the value of his work despite 
the vast amount of materials he presented. Ellis P . 
Overholtzer condoned and defended Fleming in the following 
manner : 
We have no higher authority on this theme and may 
likely not see another who shall approach it with 
his devotion. That he is a part isan he never tried 
to conceal, but none can come out of any investigation 
of Southern conditions after the war, no matter how 
cursory, without a disgust which will be reflected 
on the written page . To justify such abomination 
would completely condemn one ' s historical instincts 
as \'Tell as the moral sense •••• 2 
Negro reviewers condemned Fleming for his attitude tm-;ard 
the Negro and consequent interpretation of Reconstruction. 
They criticized him for using his materials 
in an effort to prove the righteousness of slavery, 
the innate inferiority of the Negro , the noble purposes 
lor the four major 11 Dunning 11 historians who were 
adversely critical of Johnson after 1911 , three were 
graduates of Dunning' program at Columbia--Fleming , Paul 
L. Haworth, and Benjamin B. Kendrick. 
2Ellis P. Oberholtzer, Review of The Sequel of 
Appomattox A Chronicle of the Reunion of the States, 
by Walter Lynwood Fleming, The American Historical Review, 
XXV {April , 1930), 520 . 
of the white South, and the deleterious effects of 
Reconstruction . l 
Horace Mann Bond did not condemn Fleming for his point 
of view but for his attempt to fix blame . 
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We enjoy, today, an advantage in perspective over 
Fleming, who was himself the son of a planter partially 
ruined by the War, and whose thesis, in some degree, 
was the expression of a class-attitude deeply affected 
by the events of the Civil War and Reconstruction, 
thinking in terms of ethical evaluations, and seeking, 
as even historians will, to fix blame. It is pertinent 
to remember that Fleming wrote, and published , less 
than thirty y~ars after the occurrence of the events 
he described. 
This Bond published; but, in a more private manner , he 
has revealed that he found in Fleming "the most astonishing 
examples of bias, that I had ever encountered. 11 3 He 
made an analysis of Civil War and Reconstruction in Alabama 
and reported that the first five chapters were written 
according to good historical canon but that the remainder 
of the book was completely biased and that frequently 
the documentation was actually faked--some comments and 
1Robert D. Reid , Review of reprints of Civil War 
and Reconstruction in Alabama and Documentary History 
of Reconstruction Political , Military, Social , Religious , 
Educational & Industrial 1865 to the Present Time, by 
Walter Lynwood Fleming, The Journal of Negro History, 
XXXV (October, 1950), 453; Anonymous, Review of The Freedmen's 
Savings Bank A Chapter in the Economic History of the 
Negro Race, by Walter Lynwood Fleming, The Journal of 
Negro History, XIII (January , 1928), 106-108. 
2Bond , Negro Education in Alabama, p . 23 . 
3Letter from Horace :t-lann Bond to the author, 
June 2, 1960. 
references being ascribed to non- existent sources, other 
statements being twisted and distorted. 1 
The most extensive study of the disputed election 
of 1876 was undertaken by Paul Leland Ha1trorth as his 
dissertation at Columbia. Haworth, a native of Indiana, 
was one of the three Northern students of Reconstruction 
\'tho wrote doctoral dissertations under Dunning; and, 
like the other two, Chadsey and Woolley , he seems to 
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have been influenced somewhat by this Northern nativity . 
With Chadsey he placed more responsibility upon the defiant 
Southerners for bring Radical Reconstruction upon themselves 
than did most "Dunning" historians . 2 In a later work 
he wrote that though Reconstruction was a dark era, "speaking 
comparatively, it cannot be said that the treatment of 
the South was harsh. 11 3 In addition he quoted Rhodes's 
relieved statement that at least the Radicals did not follow 
a program of confiscation. 4 
Concerning the election of 1876, Haworth, by 
study chiefly of the t\venty thousand pages of congressional 
libid. 
2Haworth, Hayes-Tilden • •• Election, p . 304; --------' 
Reconstruction and Union 1865-1 12 (New York: Henry 
Holt & Co., 1912, pp. 16-17. 
3Ibid., p . 81. 
4Ibid . , pp. 81-82. 
reports , came to a conclusion quite different from most 
"Dunning" historians : 
Had there been a free election in these states LLouis-
iana , Florida, and South Carolin!l, there is every 
reason to believe that all would have returned sub-
stantial majorities for Hayes . l 
Haworth considered the Electoral Commission a 
very wise method of handling the dispute , and he condoned 
the Commission for not going behind the returns of the 
state electoral boards on the grounds that it would have 
taken too long and would have been an encroachment on 
states' rights . Not only was the correct method used 
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but the results were proper , both legally and ethically. 
Americans must have agreed with this judgment, Haworth 
pointed out , because they voted Republican in 1880. 
Ha'\'lorth , in agreement with other adherents to the "Dunning" 
persuasion , was pleased '\<Tith the results and thought 
Americans deserved genuine credit for the good sense 
of f inding a peaceful solut ion to a crisis which could 
have ruined the nation. 2 
Haworth ' s study of the disputed election did not 
alter the prevailing interpretation of the Bargain of 
1877. Until the economic emphasis became prominent in 
the 1930 ' s , the arrangement '~s considered to be an agree-
ment on the one hand by Southern congressmen that they 
lHaworth , Hayes-Tilden ••• Election, p . 330. 
2Ibid. , pp . 333-343 . 
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would not block the completion of the electoral count 
and would guarantee good government and peace in the 
South; 1-vhile, on the other hand, high-ranking Republicans 
promised that Hayes would remove t he remaining troops from 
the South, thus ending Reconstruction. 1 Bargain or no bar-
gain, however, in Haworth 1 s opinion , Hayes would have been 
obliged to do just as he did . Attempts to maintain Republi-
can claimants in offices in Southern states would have 
ended in failure .· All the president could do 1.,ras to 
gracefully wi thdra'\'1 , and this policy of withdrawal was 
basically good. True , the Republican party became weak 
in the South and the Negro lost most of his political 
rights, but he retained his civil rights 11 and he lived 
under a better government than when he himself had assisted 
in making and administering the lai'IS. u2 
Charles William Ramsdell, the historian of Texas 
Reconstruction, 1.,ras a native of Texas and has been closely 
associated with the University of Texas since his under-
graduate days . He received his bachelor 1 s and his master 1 s 
degrees from that university and began teaching there 
in 1906. Four years later he received his Ph. D. degree 
from Columbia and in the same year was to begin a long 
career as associate editor of the Southwestern Historical 
lrbid. , p . 270 . 
2Ibid., pp . 303-304 , quote-304. 
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Quarterly; and he served f or a short time on the editorial 
board of the Mississippi Valley Historical Revie'"· He 
was a member of the Democratic party . l Being a lifelong 
Texan and a Democrat , he had no trouble sympathizing 
with the Southern people of the Reconstruction era. 
I n the preface to Reconstruction in Texas (1910) , Ramsdell 
expressed the opinion that a person is naturally drawn 
into sympathy with people whose society and government 
are being reconstructed and that a historian must be 
sympathetic with them in order to clearly understand 
their motives , problems, and actions . 2 
Ramsdell ' s treatment of Reconstruction in his 
home state was limited in time and scope . Like most 
of the historians of the "Dunning" school , he only attempted 
to present the political picture of the period and did 
not treat the underlying social and economic conditions . 
In point of time Ramsdell's work was limited to the period 
up to the restoration of Texas to the Union--when her 
representatives were admitted to the Congress in 1870--
not through to the return of conservative government 
to Texas in 1873. The latter period is only briefly 
discussed in an epilogue . 
After the war there was a considerable amount 
lWho's Who , XIX, 2008. 
2Ramsdell , Reconstruction in Texas, p . 7. 
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of violence in the state of Texas , but Ramsdell declared 
that this violence was not directed against the agents 
of the federal government or against members of the Reuubli-
can party; r ather it was indiscrimi nate crime that was 
natural in an immediate post- war situation , particularly 
on the frontier . Moreover, the gover nment under the 
auspices of President Johnson was making great strides 
in overcoming this lawlessness and violence . If Congress 
had left well enough alone, Texas would have restored 
the peace in its own way and therefore the chief excuse 
for Congressional Reconstruction-- the disorder existing 
in Southern states--was not valid , at least in the state 
of Texas . 1 The Congress , in establishing Radical Reconstruc-
tion in the South , assumed that anarchy, or near anarchy , 
existed and that for the protection of people and the 
freedmen the federal government must intervene . 
Never , perhaps , was punitive legislation founded 
upon a more distorted array of evidence, upon a 
worse misrepresentation as to facts . 2 
With the inauguration of the provisional Radical 
government in Texas , violence and lawlessness increased, 
though not so much due to native opposition to the govern-
ment as to the fact that the military authorities removed 
the real basis for an orderly sort of government; for 
lrbid., pp . 68 , 141. 
2 1£!£., p . 148. 
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example , the jury system and the civil courts were disrupted. 
Nith the resumption of her place in the Union under Radical 
rule , local control \'las resumed but "ras still in the hands 
of a minority- -
the most ignorant and incapable of her popula tion 
under the domination of reckless leaders •••• Recon-
struction had left the pyramid upon its apex; it 
must be replaced upon its base again . l 
Under the Radical state governments the power of the 
executive was greatly increased in Texas . This '\'Tas, 
according to Ramsdell, one of the methods by which the 
Radicals hoped to retain control of the government . 
The governor had such vast powers of appointment of officials 
on a local level that there \;ere flagrant violations of 
the principle of local self-government; many actions 
were of doubtful constitutionality. In addition to this 
expansion of executive power, the Radical government in 
Texas was extravagant and corrupt . Ramsdell did not place 
emphasis upon this corruption, as do many his torians of 
the "Dunning" school , but he simply pointed out its exist-
ence . 2 
Ramsdell ' s account of the Freedmen's Bureau was 
slightly different from that of most of the "Dunning" 
school. Though he said the Bureau had needless and arbi-
lrbid. , pp. 172, 175-176, 188, quote-292. 
2Ibid., pp . 298, 300, 302, 312, 317. 
trary powers often wielded without discretion and honesty , 
he stated that in Texas the Bureau did a good job in 
trying to get the freedmen to work steadily. The Bureau 
encouraged the freedmen to sign labor contracts with 
white plantation owners and to stick to them. l The value 
of immediate relief work was about all most historians 
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of the 11 Dunning 11 school were willing to accord the Freedmen ' s 
Bureau. 
A historian who had little good to say about 
the Freedmen ' s Bureau was William Watson Davis , who pub-
lished his Civil War and Reconstruction in Florida 
in 1913. He admitted the good in the relief work of 
the Bureau but thought its handling of contracts quite 
often unwise , arbitrary , and dishonest . In general the 
creation of the Freedmen's Bureau was unfortunate to 
the cause of social tranquillity and un- American in its 
nature . 
In its operation it affords an example in American 
history of arbitrary , bureaucratic government from 
a remote center--a form of political a~avism suggestive 
of ancient Babylonia or modern Russia . 
Davis appeared to be a strong supporter of states• rights . 
One of the chief faults he found '\'Ti th the Bureau was its 
role as a federal agency superior to local authorities 
libid., pp. 76 , 121, 129. 
2Davis, Civil War and Reconstruction in Florida, 
pp . 384-385, 402 , 597, 606 , quote- 377-378. 
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in certain matters . His aversion to federal authority 
was further demonstrated in his attitude toward the Enforce-
ment Acts of 1870 and 1871 as presented in an article 
which he wrote for the book of essays inscribed to Dunning 
by his students . These laws, he said, were inimical to 
democracy. 
There is considerable similarity between the arbitrary 
orders and mailed fist in the South during the seventies 
and the past oppressions of Ireland by England, of 
Bohemia and Italy by Austria, of Finland and leland 
by Russia, of Alsace and Lorraine by Germany. 
Most of Davis 1 work was political in nature and 
conformed to the general outline of the "Dunning" inter-
pretation , but in one case he did treat an important 
social development which had political repercussions . 
He devoted two chapters to lawlessness in Florida in 
which he discussed the outbreak of violence and the disre-
gard for la\'r during the period of Radical Reconstruction. 
He emphasized the activity of the native Southern whites 
in this violence and gave more space to their part in 
the violence than did the other historians of Reconstruction 
in particular states . But he still, along with his col-
leagues, placed tacit blame for the outbreak of this vio-
lence on the situation created by Radical rule. The 
whites in Florida felt that they could not obtain justice 
lnavis, Studies in Southern History and Politics, 
ed. Garner, pp. 205-228, quote-205. 
in the courts and therefore formed the habit for personal 
punishment , which, of course, led to brutality by some 
unscrupulous whites.l 
Davis demonstrated that in Florida the Radicals 
maintained their control over the state government not 
only by imposing their will upon the ignorant voter but 
also by using their domination of the electoral procedure 
to control the vote. The Southern conservative whites , 
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on the other hand, in each election in Florida used intimi-
dation and threat of violence and sometimes violence 
itself in order to try to win the election. Therefore, 
each side used illegal methods in attempting to gain 
control or maintain control of the government. This was 
never so important as in the election of 1876. In this 
year , according to Davie, the Democrats, perhaps due 
to their intimidation methods, won a alight majority 
in the election of both state and federal officials, 
but the Republicans who controlled the returning boards 
were able to cast out enough of the Democratic votes in 
order to give the federal election to Hayes rather than 
to Tilden. The Republi can election officials followed 
an inconsistent policy of self-interest in manipulating 
the vote--if a precinct vote were questionable, the officials 
either threw out the whole precinct vote or purged it 
1Davis, Civil War and Reconstruction in Florida, 
pp. 557f~, 586, 595. 
of its Democratic vote , depending on the need of the 
party. l 
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Though Davis felt that 11 Florida's government was 
degraded at the hands of the United States" during Recon-
struction, he admitted that the Radicals established the 
public school system in Florida. At the time the Radicals 
took over the state, the field of elementary education 
was virgin--more than a third of the population over 
ten years of age was illiterate. By the end of Radical 
rule the Republicans had established 676 public schools 
attended by 28,444 students, including both Negro and 
white; but Davis qualified this success by pointing out 
that the terms were short, the teachers ill-trained, 
and the facilities poor. In addition to these factors 
the system had to be paid for by white conservatives who 
had little voice in directing it. 2 
A book on the specific subject of education in 
the South during Reconstruction was published the same 
year as Davis' work by Edgar Wallace Knight . Knight 
was a native of North Carolina who received his Ph.D. 
degree from the Teachers College of Columbia University 
in 1913. (Though Knight was a student at the Teachers 
College, his manuscript was read and commented upon by 
1 Ibid., pp. 694-705, 715, 727. 
2~., pp. 683-684. 
Dunning. ) Subsequently , he became a teacher of education 
at Trinity College, Durham, North Carolina, then at the 
1 University of North Carolina. His study concentrated 
102 
on the educational development in North Carolina and South 
Carolina with only brie~ comparisons with other Southern 
states . Knight emphasized the similarity of Northern 
and Southern school systems before Reconstruction began. 
He admitted that the constitutions inaugurated under 
Congressional Reconstruction contained provisions for 
education which '\'Tere so·newhat more advanced than the 
South had yet developed . These included a mandatory 
provision for education, uniform systems of taxation 
for support of schools, and Negro education; however, 
these were ideas which l'lere just being adopted in the 
North , and Southern leaders would have been accepting 
them even without Radical intervention. 
And the evidence seems on the whole to indicate that 
had there been no outside interference, practically 
the same educational policies would have been outlined 
as were made by the reconstruction regime . 2 
Therefore, Radi cal Recons truction had only slight influence 
on Southern education, according to Knight. A basic 
contention of most 11 Dunning11 historians was that any progress 
1Who's Who, XIV , 1129. 
2Edgar Wallace Knight , The Influence of Reconstruc-
tion on Education in the South (New York City : Teachers 
College, Columbia University, 1913), pp. 94 , 99-100, 
quote-100. 
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which was admittedly brought about by Congressional Recon-
struction i'lould have taken place under local Southern 
rule uithout so much sectional and racial conflict. 
Another special phase of Reconstruction treated 
by a Columbia student was the activity of the Joint Commit-
tee of Fifteen on Reconstruction, Stevens 1 poi'lerful agency 
for planning and executing an alternative to Presidential 
Reconstruction. Benjamin Burks Kendrick, a Georgian 
and a Democrat,l published the very rare journal of the 
committee and made it the center of his study. In his 
introduction to the journal Kendrick emphasized the impor-
tant role which the document had played in Supreme Court 
decisions concerning the Fourteenth Amendment. Roscoe 
Conkling had brought it to the attention of the Court 
in 1882 in order to persuade the judges that the intention 
of the authors of the amendment had not been just to 
protect Negroes from discriminatory state legislation 
but to protect ~ legal persons, including corporations . 
This introduction appeared as though Kendrick 
were going to explore the economic considerations which 
went into the making of the amendment; hoi'lever, this 
was not the case. Instead, after presenting the text 
of the j ournal (ninety-seven pages, approximately one-
fourth of the book), he gave an account of the Reconstruc-
1Who 1s Who, XXI, 1454. 
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tion policy as developed by the committee . In Kendrick ' s 
opinion the committee was not controlled by the most 
statesmanlike and able men in Congress , and therefore 
Reconstruction policy was determined by "mere politicians 
who acted almost entirely from motives of party advantage. "1 
The authors of the Fourteenth Amendment were neither 
statesmanlike nor magnanimous because they asked the 
Southern people to vote for something in which Southerners 
didn't believe and which would weaken the South's position 
in the na tion . In addition , Kendrick claimed, the amend-
ment was not a real plan of Reconstruction offered to 
the South,because the Radicals did not guarantee that 
this would be all that was required of them; therefore , 
the Southern people could not be blamed for not ratifying 
the amendment,because they didn ' t believe in it, they 
had no guarantee that ratification would fulfill the 
requirements of their states' acceptance back into Congress , 
and they didn't know the dire consequences which were 
to follow. "Those writers who attempt to shift upon 
the South a part of the blame for the evils of reconstruc-
tion are hardly justified. "2 The writers he referred 
to were chiefly the pre- twentieth century authors, but 
pp. 348- 353 , quote- 351. 
he also criticized his contemporary, James Woodburn, 
for a tendency to do this in his biography of Thaddeus 
Stevens . 1 
In one respect Kendrick's view of Reconstruction 
differed sharply with that of other "Dunning" historians . 
~fuile all other members of the school expressed relief 
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that at least the Radicals did not make the supreme blunders 
of execution of rebel leaders and confiscation of property , 
Kendrick expressed the opinion that these procedures 
would have left less bitterness among Southerners than 
Reconstruction as it happened. Execution and confiscation 
woul d have affected only a few rather t han subjugating 
the masses . To have allowed each male Negro forty acres 
of land would have been of much greater value to him 
than was the ballot. And Southerners woul d have conceded 
the Negro a right to l and much easier t han a right to 
the franchise . In addition grants of land would have 
given the Negroes a sound basis of approach to voting 
power l a ter since disfranchisement in Southern states 
was due more to economic dependence than to color. 2 
Kendrick's attitude toward confisca tion and his 
brief reference to the importance of economic factors were 
1Ibid., 350n. ; see Chapter 4 for discussion of 
vloodburn . 
2 Ibid., pp . 369- 370. 
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precursors of later interpretations of Reconstruction 
from an economic point of view. At Columbia, as a lecturer 
as well as a student, he was associated with Charles A. 
Beard whose help, in addition to Dunning's, he acknowledged 
in his preface . The economic aspects of Kendrick's atti-
tudes became more fully developed, and by the 1930's 
his textbook writing demonstrated an essentially economic 
interpretation. 1 
J . G. DeRoulhac Hamilton was one of the earlier 
students of Dunning receiving his Ph. D. degree in 1906, 
but his history of Reconstruction in North Carolina was 
not published until 1914, eight years after Hamilton 
had begun his long teaching career at the University 
of North Carolina. Hamilton followed the example of 
Garner by stating in his preface that he would take an 
unbiased position in his writing and advance no thesis,2 
but he did not fulfill his aim nearly so well as Garner 
did. His belief in the inferiority of the Negro and 
his faith in white supremacy and Anglo-Saxon institutions 
was not hid under a bushel . 3 He was one of the strongest 
1Louis M. Hacker and Benjamin B. Kendrick, The 
United States Since 1865 (New York: F. s . Crofts & Co., 
1933), pp. 32-42 (Kendrick wrote the section on Re con-
struction). 
2Hamilton, Reconstruction in North Carolina, p . v. 
3rbid., pp. 156-157, 199-200, 420, 422, 453, 663. 
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defenders of the Black Codes and the Ku Klux Klan and 
showed strong contempt for Congressional Reconstruction. 
According to Hamilton the so-called Code of North 
Carolina applied equally to both races and "was character-
ized by justice and moderation . 111 In an article on the 
Black Codes written for the honorary volume for Professor 
Dunning , Hamil ton reported that they vrere in large part 
natural and necessary results of the circumstances in 
the Southern states . The Codes vrere not drawn up in a 
spirit of defiance of the North or unkindliness toward 
the Negro . The Southern whites knew the Negro, his character , 
and his ability better than anyone . Knowing this and 
observing the manner in which the freedmen acte~ considering 
the bitterness of the war and the nearness of the institution 
of slavery , the Southerners showed remarkable restraint 
and fairness . Admittedly , wrote Hamilton, some of the 
laws were indefensible but these were very fe't'r . 
Viewed to-day, at the distance of nearly half a century , 
they seem not only to have been on the whole reasonable , 
temperate , and kindly ; but , in the main, necessary. 2 
Due to the fact that Congressional Reconstruction 
was "a form of government, wickedly, illegally , and uncon-
stitutionally imposed upon the people ••• ,n3 the Southerners 
ed. 
libid., p . 156. 
2Hamilton, Studies in Southern History and Politics , 
Garner, pp. 137- 158, quote- 156. 
3Hamilton , Reconstruction in North Carolina , p. 453 . 
were justified in the methods they used to overthrow it. 
The Ku Klux Klan was a natural response to the post-war 
chaos, Radical Reconstruction , and especially the Union 
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League . The methods of the Klan '\iere illegal, violent, 
and its secret nature was an inherent evil; but, according 
to Hamilton, no one could deny that such a remedy was 
needed for the conditions of the period. Radical state 
government did not offer adequate protection for life 
and property . The "lower race" could be controlled only 
by force; therefore, 
The responsibility for it must ultimately rest upon 
those who planned and put into effect for partisan 
purposes the congressional plan of Reconstruction. l 
The methods used by Southerners to overcome Recon-
struction '\'tere such as to blunt the political and moral 
sense of the Southern '\'mites, and political morality 
had been high in North Carolina before Reconstruction, 
according to Hamilton. This was one of the heritages 
of Reconstruction under which Southern states still suffered. 
Hamilton, more than any other "Dunning" historian save 
perhaps Fleming, attempted to relate the facts of Recon-
struction to his o~~ situation. In his era he saw in 
the South a solid political phalanx, a dislike for federal 
intervention, an aversion to taxes even for vital public 
facilities, a strong insistence on states' rights, and 
lrbid. , pp . 452-454, quote-454. 
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continued sectional and racial antagonism. All these 
factors of Southern life in the early part of the twentieth 
century Hamilton attributed to the tragedy of Reconstruction, 
which he, in turn, blamed on the North.l 
The existence of the "Solid South" seemed a particu-
lar shame to Hamilton. His study on North Carolina empha-
sized the Whig element in the state which would naturally 
have gone into the Republican party had that party's 
policies been more palatable. Certainly the Whigs did 
not want to join their old enemies, the Democrats, and 
even insisted for many years on being called conserva tives 
rather than Democrats, though they usually were forced 
to co-operate with the Democrats . 2 Though a member of 
the Democratic party, 3 Hamilton seems to have had a 
slight Whiggish or Republican bent; and one of his ch ief 
regrets about Reconstruction was tha t the Republican party 
chose the Negroes rather than the former Whigs as their 
allies--thus, by this and other policies, ruining Republi-
canism for North Carolina~ 4 
libid., pp. 618-619, 662-663. 
2Ibid. , pp. 662-663. 
3Who 1 s Who, XI, 1213. 
4This emphasis on the strong Whig element and 
its na tural proclivities toward the Republican party 
was to receive even greater emphasis from h istorians 
such as c. Vann Woodward, Hesseltine , and Alexander and 
was to become a basic element of their interpreta tion. 
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Of the twelve studies on Reconstruction directed 
by Dunning at Columbia University , only three gave any 
considerable attention to events and developments outside 
of politics . The first two were Garner and Fleming, as 
has already been pointed out, and the other was Clara 
Mildred Thompson,whose Reconstruction in Georgia ~conomic , 
Social , Political 1865-1872 was published in 1915. 
Thompson was a native of Atlanta, educated at Vassar 
and at Columbia where she received her Ph. D. degree in 
1907, and after which she embarked on a long teaching 
career at Vassar . 1 Thompson ' s concept of the proper 
realm of history and her concept of Reconstruction were 
broader than that of any other student of Dunning. Her 
tone was more moderate and objective than any other person 
within the school with the possible exceptions of Garner 
and Dunning himself. 
Thompson , more clearly than any other in the "Dun-
ning" school , described Reconstruction as being only a 
part of a greater period, a period which marked the begin-
ning of social and economic transformations which continued 
well into the twentieth century . The only distinguishing 
factor in Reconstruction was Republican control of the 
state governments in the South. 2 
lWho ' s Who, XXIV, 2355 . 
2Thompson, Reconstruction in Georgia, pp. 395-396. 
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Thompson emphasized the social rather than the 
political results of Reconstruction. The political results 
were of least importance , in her opinion, since Negro 
part icipation and Republican control were the only inno-
1 
vations , and both of these had almost entirely been undone . 
Reconstruction brought about greater social democracy 
in the South due to its consummation of emancipation . 
A society in ''lhich half the people i'lere slaves could 
not be considered democratic, and the extension of the 
rights of citizenship to Negroes as ,.,ell as whites was 
a great forward step toward democracy . 
If the revolution of Civil War and Reconstruction 
wrought anything of enduring value , it w~s in the 
advance toward greater social democracy . 
The greatest genuine achievement of Reconstruction was 
the establishment of the Negro's freedom; however, the 
Republican governments failed to obtain for the Negro 
a permanent basis of equality with the wh1tes . 3 This 
social revolution was carried out in spite of the white 
planter who shortsightedly tried to resurrect the old 
and lacked initiative for the creation of a new system. 4 
The social revolution begun during Reconstruction helped 
1Ibid., pp. 399-400. 
2 rbid., p . 401. 
3Ibid. 
4rbid., pp. 68- 69 . 
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to bring about a shifting in class dominance in the South 
in the years following Reconstruction. The former leaders 
(mostly, but not all, from the planter class) were set 
aside by war and Reconstruction allowing the rise of 
the middle class to dominance . The economic supremacy 
of the planters was weakened s o that land and slaves 
were no longer the only basis of social prestige. 1 
Thompson recognized that the racial problem was 
not a new one in the United States (it had existed since 
1619), but emancipation naturally generated some racial 
antagonism because it removed one method of adjustment 
between the races . In addition to this the Republican 
control in Southern states greatly intensified the racial 
antagonism which, in turn, caused an increase in social 
disorder in the South after 1867. 2 The Radicals felt 
it was their job to protect the Negro and give him the 
vote, while the Southern whites wanted to keep the Negro 
working and to keep him conscious of his i nferior social 
position . In Thompson's opinion the Radicals may have 
done the ideal thing by trying to protect the Negro and 
give him the ballot, but it was very impractical since 
it went against the will and sense of right of the white 
people . Also, in actuality, the ballot was not successful 
libid. , pp . 400-401. 
2 Ibid. , p . 399. 
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in giving Negroes any more freedom . In Georgia Negroes 
had very little more freedom in 1872 at the end of Radical 
Reconstruction than they had experienced in 1866. 1 
Reconstruction was quite moderate in Georgia, 
according to Thompson . The Radicals carried out the 
acts of Congress but did not try t o impo se extreme radical-
ism. This, she believed, was quite different from the 
Reconstruction process in other states and was due to 
the fact that Negroes did not preponderate in population , 
that many of the leaders were respectable men ''~i th years 
of residence in Georgia rather than fresh-from-the- North 
adventurers, and that ex-Governor Brown exercised a great 
influence of moderation. 2 While some of the personnel 
of Georgia Reconstructionwere not honest, much of it 
was, in fact, quite good in the opinion of Thompson , 
who did not believe this was true of all the states . 
"This praise, faint as it is, is more than can be given 
to most of the governments of the Southern states in 
1868."3 
During Radical Reconstruction remarkable steps 
were made toward the erection of a public school system 
in Georgia . The Radical government ''~as particularly 
lrbid., p . 394. 
2 Ibid., pp . 197-199. 
3rbid., p . 225 . 
responsible for providing for Negro education; but in 
general it only provided for legal enactment concerning 
the school system, then handled the funds in such a "''fay 
that educa tion suffered. Therefore, it remained for 
the Democratic administration after 1872 to put into 
effect the education laws passed by the Republicans . 1 
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The points on which Thompson differed from most 
historians of the "Dunning" interpretation were those 
which l a ter would be magnified and emphasized by histo-
rians who sought to revise that interpretation. Recogni-
tion of Reconstruction not as a limited and isolated 
period but as a part of a larger period, observation 
of some good as well as some bad in the Radical governments, 
the recognition of a great impulse toward social democracy 
during Reconstruction--all were precedents for revisionist 
historians . 
The last product of Dunning ' s seminar at Columbia 
University was Thomas Starling Staples who was, like all 
the Reconstruction his torians who studied under Dunning 
except Chadsey, Woolley, and Ha"''rorth, a native of the 
South. Born in Georgia he received his bachelor's degree 
from Emory College, master •s degree from Central College 
of Missouri, another mas ter •s degree from Columbia, and 
finally his Ph. D. in 1918. From 1908 he "'·ras a professor 
libid. , pp. 342-343. 
of history at Hendrix College in Arkansas. There he 
became Dean of the College in 1928. 1 The last of this 
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remarkable series of historical studies was quite similar 
to the work of Dunning himself in moderation of tone 
and balance of statement. Like most of the other studies 
politics was the focus of interest of the work. It included 
one chapter called "Reconstruction , Social and Economic," 
but, even within this, most of the material was directly 
related to the political situation . Not much is to be 
learned from the book about how the people lived, what 
they did, and how the aftermath of the war affected the 
personal lives and social relationships of the people, 
except that Staples indicated that the purely social 
life of the masses was not greatly disturbed during the 
period. 2 What Staples noted concerning social conditions 
in Arkansas, Allan Nevins was later to find true in the 
nation as a whole; thus , earlier than Nevins, he began to 
cast some doubt upon the general conception that Recon-
struction was completely disruptive socially as well as 
politically. 
Under Presidential Reconstruction the Arkansas 
legislature enacted "many wholesome measures for rehabili-
tating the industrial and social life of the state," 
lWho 1 s Who, XXIV, 2244. 
2 -
Staples, Reconstruction in Arkansas, p. 337. 
among them being relief act s, cr edit to railroads, a 
public school system for whites, and a law "regula ting 
the labor system by rigid provisions •••• "1 Failing to 
ascertain the facts of the situation and acting instead 
on suspicion, Congress established military rule in the 
South, including Arkansas. According to Staples the 
legitimate results of the war were not in danger and 
the unnecessary action was taken in order to secure what 
the Republicans wanted--Negro suff rage and Republican 
control in the South and in the nation. 2 The Radical 
government was controlled by Carpetbaggers who l'iere inex-
perienced men of mediocre capacity and Scalawags who '\'lere 
likewise non-entities and inexperienced but who had a 
s t ronger sense of moral integrity. (Staples was one of 
the few historians of the "Dunning" school who found 
integrity in the Scalawags.)3 The Republican officials ' 
116 
promises of fairness in el ectoral procedure were insincere , 
Staples judged. Though they registered all males who 
would take the oath, they were kno\m at times to erase 
enough names to assure a Republican majority in certain 
areas ; but the native white opposition also used question-
able methods . 
lrbid. , p . 114. 
2Ibid., p . 124. 
3Ibid. , p . 334. 
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Election judges and clerks stuffed ballot boxes and 
rejected votes very largely at will, while the opposi-
tion in many cases practiced intimi dation . l 
Notice the balance of statement '\tThich was characteristic 
of the more moderate "Dunning" historians . 
The Radicals hastened to complete the restoration 
of Arkansas in 1868, but this was not for the sake of 
Arkansas, according to Staples, but in order to have 
two more senators for use in the impeachment proceedings . 2 
Despite their shortcomings the Radicals made some contri-
butions to the state . They helped to establish an educa-
tional system, and by stimulating speculation they con-
tributed to the flow of cash and capital and the revival 
of business enterprise . 3 These developments, however , 
had their beginnings under conservative control in 1866, 
according to Staples . 4 
Staples was quite fair to the Negro . He engaged 
in no derogatory remarks nor did he divulge openly a 
belief in Negro inferiority . He did suggest that separate 
s chools for Negroes and whites were necessary. 5 Contrary 
to most "Dunning11 historians he complimented the Negroes 
lrbid. , pp. 286-287, quote-383. 
2 Ibid., p . 267. 
3rbid. , PP· 335-336. 
4Ibid., p . 114. 
5Ibid. ' p . 331. 
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on their participation in the constitutional convention 
of 1868. 
The negro delegates showed less inclination than 
their radical white friends to squander the people's 
money and indulge in party schemes . On one occasion, 
when the interests of the party and the party leaders 
sought to use negro delegates in the perpetration 
of fraud, their sense of honor proved too strong 
for the most subtle persuasions of the radical whites . 1 
Staples' account of the Freedmen's Bureau was 
quite balanced. The Bureau, he said, worked against 
great odds and its results l'Teren 1 t spectacular, but it 
was a vital agency for introducing the Negro into citizen-
ship . On the other hand, it was a chief tool of the 
Republicans for imposing Congressional Reconstruction 
on Arkansas.2 
Another Columbia graduate, of 1903, who wrote 
on Reconstruction in Arkansas may well be considered 
at this point, though his dissertation was on an entirely 
different subject. David Yancey Thomas did not write 
Arkansas in War and Reconstruction 1861-1874 (1926) 
until after the publication of Staples' study, which 
Thomas acknowledged as the source of most of his material 
on the post-war period. Actually, Thomas gave very little 
attention to Reconstruction,as the "tar was his overwhelming 
emphasis. The book was written under the auspices of 
lrbid. , p . 220. 
2IQ!£. , pp. 211, 215-216. 
the Arkansas Division of the United Daughters of the 
Confederacy and was not directed at mature scholars . 
Thomas ' treatment of the topic demonstrated the circum-
stances of the book's production . His interpretation 
was similar to that of Staples ', but Thomas was leas 
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restrained in his judgments and more critical of Carpetbag 
rule. 1 
The twelve students of Reconstruction, excluding 
Thomas , who studied in the seminar of William A. Dunning 
and produced their dissertations under his guidance pre-
aented to Americans a great amount of information and 
a whole school of interpretation on the Reconstruction 
period. 
There was no more productive seminar in America than 
this of Professor Dunning and its output constitutes 
a monument to him as a scholar and a teacher . 2 
lDavid Y. Thomas, Arkansas in War and Reconstruction 
1861-1874 (Little Rock: Arkansas Division, United Daughters 
of the Confederacy, 1926), p . 426 . 
2Anonymous , Review of Reconstruction in Arkansas 
1862-1874, by Thomas s . Staples, The American Historical 
Review, XXIX (April, 1924), 574. 
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CHAPTER 4 
ADAPTATIONS AND VARIATIONS OF THE "DUNNING" INTERPRETATION 
In addition to the three "old masters" and the 
group of Columbia students , there were more than twenty-
five other historians who fell within the category of 
the "Dunning" interpretation. Some of these were trained 
historians whose writings include dissertations produced 
at various universities; others were historical writers 
outside the academic realm, including journalists and 
popular writers . Some of these loom as important figures 
in Reconstruction historiography while others are rela tively 
insignificant. Six of them followed the lead of many 
"Dunning" students by writing on the Reconstruction period 
in one particular state. Several turned their attention 
to special phases of Reconstruction , either on a national 
or on a state level; four wrote on the Reconstruction 
period in general; the remainder engaged in biographical 
study of the prominent men of the period. 
One of the multi-volume histories of the United 
States which included in its scope the Reconstruction 
period was Ellis Paxson Oberholtzer's five volume work. 
His first three volumes include the years from 1865 to 
1878. Oberholtzer, who received his Ph.D. from the University 
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of Pennsylvania in 1893, and studied in Berlin, Heidelberg, 
Freiburg, Paris, and Vienna,l was a follower of John 
Bach McMaster. His history, which is essentially a straight 
chronicle of events including a great number of facts 
without any attempt to explain the facts or relate them 
to underlying economic and psychological forces, might 
be called a continuation of McMaster's multi-volume history 
of the United States through the Civil War; however, 
Oberholtzer is not usually considered so impartial as 
was McMaster. Oberholtzer tried not to give interpretation 
to events, but he did pass moral judgment on the leading 
historical figures . A member of the Pennsylvania state 
board of motion picture censors, 2 Oberholtzer was a 
survivor of the reformers of the 1880 's whose standards 
for the conduct of public men were puritanical and old-
fashioned but whose strength rose from their definite 
principles. By the time he completed his five volume 
work in the 1930's, Oberholtzer was a stranger in the 
midst of more cynical writers who were less prone to 
make severe moral judgments.3 
lWho's ~fuo , XIX, 1843. 
2~. 
3Barnes, Twentieth Century America, ed. Roucek, 
p. 788; Theodore Clarke Smith, Review of A History of 
t he United States Since the Civil War (Vol . IV), by Ellis 
Paxson Oberholtzer, The American Hi storical Review, XXXVII 
(April, 1932), 569-570. 
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Negr o sympathizers noticed that most of Oberholtzer's 
secondary sources were products of Dunning 's seminar; 
therefore, they claimed, his account could not help but 
be unbalanced and negative in approach. 11Any history 
built upon such authority cannot be considered trust-
worthy. "l Oberholtzer made few outright commitments 
but usually allowed quotations from contemporary sources 
to show his point of view. In his volumes he showed his 
distaste for the whole process in the South. 2 Carpetbaggers 
he condemned in an open manner and Scalawags he pronounced 
even worse . 3 Andrew Johnson he considered a hard worker 
and a patriotic person but one who was unwise and distaste-
ful in his speeches and unbecomingly undignified for a 
president. 4 Despite Johnson ' s ill- fitted personality for 
the presidency, according to Oberholtzer, he received 
notices from former soldiers and officers that he could 
have military aid any time he needed it if his conflict 
with the congressional branch of the government became 
acute enough. 5 
lAnonymous , Review of A History of the United 
States Since the Civil War (Vol . II), by Ellis Paxson 
Oberholtzer , The Journal of Negro History , VIII (October, 
1923), 458- 461, quote-46o. 
2oberholtzer, History of United States, II, 1-62. 
3Ibid. , pp. 24-25. 
4Ibid. , I , 143, 167, 179, 4oo-4ol~ 
5Ibid., pp. 491- 492. 
Oberholtzer was opposed to Negroes' voting and 
holding office because he felt them to be too childish 
and gullible . They were easily taken advantage of by 
tricksters and demagogues because of their simplicity. 
Never had such a weak and ignorant race been given the 
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tools of democracy. What the Negr oes should have done, 
according to Oberholtzer, was to stay on the old plantations 
where their masters would have been fair to them as laborers. 1 
Though very unfriendly to Negroes, Oberholtzer indicated 
that he was in favor of education for them and believed 
that the chief value of the Freedmen ' s Bureau was its 
indispensable work in education among Negroes in the 
South. 2 Also , though he expressed no definite opinion 
on this subject, he d~d not seem to condone the actions 
of the Ku Klux Klan . He described the atrocities of 
the Klan in some detail rather than emphasizing the condi-
tions which produced the Klan , which '\tas what most "Dunning" 
historians emphasized. 3 The Enforcement Acts, Oberholtzer 
thought, had some value in controlling Ku Klux activities, 
but they were used mostly for partisan political reasons . 
11 They were invoked for the 'protection' of the black 
1Ib1d. , pp. 85-87, 105, 139; II, 14-21 , 38-46. 
2Ibid., I, 89 . 
3Ibid., II, 340-368. 
man in voting the Republican ticket. "1 
Oberholtzer was similar to Rhodes in his belief 
that government should be by the intelligent and the 
propertied of the community , stating specifically that 
"Citizens of worth and usefulness ••• " should be dominant 
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in the government. 2 He judged that intelligent and judicious 
men all over the country prai sed Hayes's policy of removing 
federal troops from the South and thus abolishing the 
corrupt centers of government which the Republican party 
had created there . As '\'Tas a common trait among the histo-
rians of the "Dunning" school , Oberholtzer found the 
final results of the election of 1876 to be quite pleasing 
and honorable to the country. 3 
An important study of a specific aspect of Recon-
struction was Paul Skeels Peirce ' s Freedmen's Bureau 
A Chapter in the History of Reconstruction (1904), a 
dissertation prepared under Professor Edward G. Bourne 
at Yale University . Bourne had earlier been a research 
assistant for James Ford Rhodes , as has been seen . William 
A. Dunning also read Peirce's manuscript and made comments 
and criticisms. 4 The "rork is in many ways much like 
libid. , III , 195. 
2Ib i d., II, 36 . 
3Ibid., III , 327- 330. 
4peirce , Freedmen's Bureau, preface. 
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that of Dunning. It is calm and dispassionate and objective 
appearing, yet with an underlying distaste for Congressional 
Reconstruction.l Despite the indication of his belief 
in the inferiority of the Negro,2 his appraisal of the 
work of the Freedmen's Bureau was balanced--some good , 
some evil. The Bureau had good effects ,.,here well-administered 
and bad effects where poorly or corruptly administered. 
The educational attempts of the Bureau varied in quality 
and effectiveness with the different local areas, but 
in general the practice was to give the Negro an education 
of too theoretical a nature to fit his practical situation. 
Also, the Southern public school systems, Peirce contended, 
did not grow out of the Bureau's attempts at education, 
as had been claimed by some early Northern writers. A 
public school system was established in many states under 
Carpetbag rule, but there was little or no relation between 
this system and the earlier Bureau schools . The best work 
of the Bureau, according to Peirce, was in institutions 
of higher education.3 
The work of the Freedmen's Bureau in settling 
labor problems between whites and freedmen was quite 
successful, in Peirce's judgment, since it was an important 
lrbid., pp. 86, 167. 
2rbid., pp. 2, 8 , 46. 
3rbid., pp. 84-86. 
temporary "plank in the bridge from slavery to freedom . 111 
Peirce believed the Bureau accomplished much more in this 
area than one would think such an abnormal organization 
in such tumultuous times would be able to do . 2 
Despite the good Peirce saw in the Bureau, he 
also sa'\'r it as a practical disregarding of the limitation 
on governmental authority since it gave one man almost 
dictatorial power over four million persons . The tempta-
tions for corruption and abuse of po1..,rer were abundant 
and relatively safe . The higher officials , according 
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to Peirce, were usually honest, but there was much misuse 
of power and much unwise, unjust, and extravagant adminis-
tration in the lower ranks . Peirce had some doubt about 
the principle of government and philanthropy upon which 
the Bureau was based and some question as to whether the 
organization produced more good than bad. It was apparent 
to him that the Bureau was used widely for political 
purposes by the Republicans for controlling the Negroes 
and maintaining the Republican party in office3 and that 
t he political activities of the Bureau served to widen 
the chasm between the Negroes and the whites and thus 
to draw the party lines in the South essentially along 
libid.' p . 160. 
2rbid. 
3Ibid., pp. 46, 66, 170. 
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racial lines . l In summation of the work of the Bureau, 
hol'rever, Peirce said: 
Notwithstanding abuses and extravagances, the bureau 
did a great , an indispensable work of mercy and relief, 
at a time when no other organi~ation or body was 
in a position to do that work. 
A dissertation on The Secession and Reconstruction 
of Tennessee was written at the University of Chicago 
by James Walter Fertig in 1898. This slender volume 
(108 pages) does not include the whole Civil War and 
Reconstruction periods in Tennessee but only the period 
from secession to the restoration of Tennessee to the 
Union in 1866. Despite its chronological limits the 
work is still not a detailed account. Fertig paid more 
attention to political ideas than to details of events . 
He discussed the different constitutional positions taken 
by various groups, and in his opinion the interpretation 
that the states had never been out of the Union was the 
only one warranted by the Constitution. Perhaps ~he 
theory of the Southern states being conquered provinces 
fitted the facts best, 
but it was contrary to the Constitutional view of 
the war, since it in fact a~serted the doctrine of 
the advocates of secession. ) 
libid . , pp . 159, 171. 
2rbid. , p . 104. 
3Fertig, Secession and Reconstruction in Tennessee, 
pp . 81-83, quote-83. 
The Reconstruction position adopted by Congress was a 
"re-creation" of the states rather than a "restoration" 
128 
since the states were not restored as they were but were 
allowed into the Union on different terms; therefore, 
according to Fertig, the Congress unconsciously and tacitly 
recognized the acts of secession of the Southern states . 1 
Fertig thought the Radicals a poor group to carry 
out the program of Reconstruction. \~ile directing the 
government through the war, the party had become accustomed 
to follm'ling its feelings rather than the law in considera-
tion of certain problems and had overstepped the bounds 
of the Constitution. Being accustomed to absolutism, 
Fertig contended, the Republican party was least fitted 
for the solution of the problems ; but, since it was the 
party in po\'ler, it had to make the attempt. In doing so 
the Republicans aggravated the situation~ 2 The motives of 
the Radicals were security of rights for the Negro and 
security of power for the Republican party. 3 Of all 
the Radicals, to Fertig, Governor Brownlow was the chief 
offender in Tennessee . He accused the preacher , editor, 
and governor of being a vindictive, obstinate, partisan 
politician without real ability or real knowledge of 
1Ib1d. 
2Ibid.' p . 10. 
3Ibid. ' p . 103. 
the situation. 
He was therefore wholly unfit for the position to 
which he had been elected. His only redeeming trait 
was his uncompromising Unionism •• • • "l 
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But at least , Fertig stated , Tennessee's Radical government 
was run by natives; therefore, Tennessee "escaped the 
ignominy and burdens of ' carpet-bag government' and military 
reconstruction •••• n2 
Virginia's experiences i n Reconstruction were 
chronicled by one of her native sons , Hamilton James 
Eckenrode , who received his Ph. D. degree from The Johns 
Hopkins University in 1905. 3 The Political History of 
Virginia During the Reconstruction (1904) was a 128 page 
attempt to account for the Reconstruction efforts during 
the war and up to 1870 when conservative government returned 
to Virginia ; therefore, the account could not be very 
detailed and, as ~~e title indicated, it covered only 
political events . Eckenrode described Reconstruction 
as 
the attempt of the majority in Congress to compel 
the Southern States to recognize !he civil and politi-
cal equality of the colored race . 
libid., p . 62 . 
2Ibid., p . 12. 
3Who 1 s Who, XIV , 644. 
~ckenrode , Virginia During Reconstruction , p . 53. 
That such a policy was bound to be a failure could not 
be seen because of the enthusiastic humanitarianism of 
130 
the period. Although Eckenrode believed that some Radicals 
had lower motives, he established as their chief motive 
a somewhat misplaced or impossible humanitarian urge . l 
Though Eckenrode demonstrated an adherence to 
the main features of the "Dunni ng" interpretation, he 
held some ideas which were to be emphasized by the revision-
1st historians . He judged the Virginia constitution 
drawn up by the Radicals to be a good one which was to 
be used for over forty years , despite Carpetbag participa-
tion. 2 He recognized the educational accomplishments 
of Radical Reconstruction . 
The credit for the establishment of popular educa tion, 
therefore , rests with the Republican party and this 
great service rendered to Virginia out't'leighs mych 
of the extravagance of the radical propaganda. ) 
In addition Eckenrode told of the activities and politics 
of the former Whigs and of their attempts to make an alliance 
with the Negroes and more conservative Republicans . The 
fusion government resulting from this alliance served 
to restore the state to the Union in 1870 and to help 
Virginia escape some of the worst features of Reconstruc-
libid. , p. 127. 
2rbid. , p . 1o3. 
3Ibid. , up . 93-94. 
tion.l The impact of the former Whigs as a group on 
Reconstruction politics '\'Tas noticed by Ec1cenrode and 
Hamilton in Virginia and North Carolina, but this impact 
was to be emphasized much more by those later historians 
who believed that they found in economic conflicts a 
key t o understanding the Reconstruction period. 
Eckenrode also wrote a biography of Rutherford 
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B. Hayes in which his agreement with the "Dunning" school 
was more pronounced. He demonstrated a highly developed 
Anglo-Saxon point of view from which he described slavery 
as bad for whites but beneficial to Negroes. The basic 
inferiority of Negroes was well revealed, he thought, 
by the governments which ~hey established and supported 
during Reconstruction. Had they been equal in abilities 
their governmentsshould have been equal to those created 
by whi tea. 
But the governments run by negroes and carpetbaggers 
with the support of negro voters not only showed 
mental inferiority, ••• but moral inferiority •••• The 
negro and carpetbag governments were not only incom-
petent but dishonest almost beyond anything kno'\'m 
before in American life.2 
Concerning the election of 1876, Eckenrode agreed 
with all the "Dunning" historians except Haworth that 
Tilden was entitled to the victory. He found quite sound 
lrbid., pp. 74-75, ll0-111, 114-128. 
2Eckenrode, Hayes, pp. 105- 108, quote-107. 
Haworth's conclusions that Louisiana and South Carolina 
belonged in the Hayes column but felt the historian of 
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the disputed election was on shaky grounds in his decision 
on Florida where William Watson Davis, by deep research 
and inescapable logic, had determined Tilden to be the 
rightful winner . 1 Eckenrode chided Haworth for not accepting 
Davis' conclusions, which seems a little strange since 
Davis ' book was published seven years after Haworth's 
study . 
Though Eckenrode judged the election to be unfairly 
won, he thought Hayes's title as good as several other 
presidents'~ He rather cynically announced that the results 
of several presidential elections were in question . For 
example , Garfield's election was better secured than 
Hayes ' s simply because it was 11bought and paid for"; 
McKinley won only by virtue of unparalleled intimidation 
and bribery; and, in order to demonstrate fine impartiality , 
Eckenrode suggested tha t the Democratic elections of 
1844 and 1884 might h ave been carried by corruption and 
that Hughes might actually have been the legitimate victor 
in 1916. 2 
Despite the method of Hayes's selection, the 
!!£!of his selection was fortunate, in Eckenrode's opinion , 
1Ib1d. , pp. 192-194. 
21Ei£. , pp. 230-232. 
because the needed solution of Southern problems could 
be accomplished more safely by a Republican than by a 
Democrat. Though Tilden was a great leader, had he been 
inaugurated and removed the troops from the South, the 
likely result would have been renewed civil war. Hayes 
brought the blessings of peace to the nation . In doing 
so he deserted the Negro, but this was a wise policy , 
according to Eckenrode, because the Negro had failed 
as a governing element. 1 
Eckenrode ' s biography was entirely appreciative 
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of Hayes and depicted him as the 11 first modern President. " 
The author thought Hayes not at home in his ovm age--
that he would have better suited the nineties, the days 
of civil service reform and the gold standard. But Ecken-
rode's chief admiration for Hayes seems to stem from 
Hayes's lack of hatred for the South, which was unlike 
most of the president's Republican associates who baited 
the South and waved the "bloody shirt" in order to gain 
popularity and povrer . To Eckenrode, Hayes was both the 
champion and symbol of peace who saved the country from 
the drift tovrard social revolution which Grant had allowed. 2 
Reconstruction in Louisiana had two early histo-
rians--one who carried the story to the beginning of 
1Ib1d. , pp . 224-233. 
2Ibid., pp . 1, 298 , 343-344. 
radically controlled state government in 1868 and one 
who finished the story to the restoration of home rule 
in 1877. The first of these was John Rose Ficklen, a 
native of Virginia , who was educated at the University 
of Virginia and became a professor of history at Tulane 
University . Ficklen died before he '\'Tas able to finish 
the history of the whole period; therefore, his History 
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of Reconstruction in Louisiana (Through 1868) was published 
posthumously in 1910. 1 In this work he demonstrated 
sympathy with the native whites of Louisiana and regret 
for the troubles they had to endure during Reconstruction. 
He believed the Negro to be of an inferior race t o whom 
the gift of political power was improper and disastrous . 
He feared political equality but , even more , he feared 
what he felt poli t ical equality would inevitably bring--
social equality . Extending political equality to this 
"lawless class 11 would result , he thought, in the establish-
ment of mixed schools , miscegenation, and social equality 
in general. 2 Ficklen 1 s basic conservative attitude to\'lard 
the political franchise was sho'm by his statement that 
the sound thing for the legislature to have done during 
Presidential Reconstruction was to 11deny the ballot to 
l~iho 1 s Who, I, 394. 
2Ficklen , Reconstruction in Louisiana, pp . 127, 
178-179. 
ignorant and incompetent whites and thus forestall any 
blame for not granting it to freedmen . 111 
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The famous New Orleans riot of 1866 F1cklen blamed 
on the minority Radical gr oup who encouraged and inflamed 
the Negro toward a riot atmosphere . Besides, this was 
the natural exasperation of the New Orleans whites at 
the attempt of a small group to place the freedman in 
political domination over his former master . 2 
The Freedmen's Bureau fai l ed to establish good 
relations between employer and employee, according to 
Ficklen; therefore , the Black Codes were needed. He 
pointed out that the black laws of Louisiana made no 
distinction between the races, as some states did. In 
fact, the vagrancy laws were based on those of the North, 
e specially Massachusetts; therefore, the Louisiana legis-
lature did not deserve the odium placed upon it by the 
North for pas sing the Blacl{: Code. 3 
Although Ficklen's work covered Reconstruction 
in Louisiana only up to 1868, he didn ' t hesitate to state 
his opinion of the phase of Reconstruction \'Thich began 
in that year. " ••• Reconstruction of the congressional 
1Ibid., p . 144n. 
2Ibid., pp. 146-179. 
3Ibid., pp. 137, 141-142 , 145. 
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type was a gigantic blunder--if not a political crime . "1 
The historian who concerned herself with this phase 
of Louis iana 's Reconstruction was Ella Lonn, whose Recon-
struction in Louisiana After 1868 (1918) was partially 
written as a dissertation for the University of Pennsylvania. 
Her work , an intricately detailed political account of 
these eight years, was based chiefly on primary sources . 
More objective than the average historian , Lonn presented 
documented details with very little interpretation added. 
In a recapitulation of the Presidential Reconstruc-
tion period , Lonn indicated agreement with Ficklen 1 s 
judgment of the Freedmen's Bureau as serving only to 
complicate and confuse matters rather than straightening 
out the labor situa tion . In .despair , therefore, the 
whites turned to the Black Codes as a system of directing 
their labor system. She admitted that the Code of Louisiana 
tended to place unusual restrictions upon the Negro which 
did not apply to whites and which were similar to the 
slave laws , but she contended that the Negroes in Louisiana 
were of a particularly v i cious sort since criminal elements 
among the slaves had traditionally been sold South; therefore, 
Louisiana apparently needed these restrictions . 2 Lonn 
saw the Negroes as a densely i gnorant people who felt 
lrbid., p . 7. 
2Lonn , Reconstruction in Louisiana, pp. 12-13 . 
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they could obtain land without labor , education without 
study, and social equality with the whites . She suggested 
that when the Negroes became insolent and careless in 
their work , t he hanging of a Negr o had "a salutary effect. "l 
Lonn 1 s work included innumerable tales of extrava-
gance , corruption, bribery, and fraud in the government 
of Louisiana. The corruption became excessive under 
the Republican government . 
The subject of corruption in legislation has been 
worn threadbare. Let it suffice to say that, under 
Kellogg as under Warmoth , nearly every bill was a 
swindle , even harmless- looking measures which have 
seemed too insignificant to merit ~ention •••• Every-
where the honest citizen suffered . 
But the corruption was not confined to one party or to 
one class . No one group had a monopoly on integrity and 
"reputable men of both sides were among the persons who 
offered bribes . "3 
Louisiana was a critical state in the election 
of 1876. Lonn revealed that the crucial election board 
in Louisiana ''~as made up of men of very questionable reputa-
tions . rfuen it appeared that the presidential election 
hinged on the vote in Louis i ana, the r e turning board , 
despite being Republican , offered to sell the vote to 
lrbid. , pp . 12-13 , 170, 347. 
2rbid. , p . 349 . 
3rbid., p . 88. 
the Democrats for $200 ,000 in greenbacks . 1 When this 
offer was refused, the board threw out over 10,000 Tilden 
votes in order to give the Republican party a majority 
in excess of 3,000 votes . The Democrats were accused 
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of violence and intimidation in the election, but apparently, 
according to Lonn, the Democrats had a fear of being 
accused of intimidation as they had in past elections 
and therefore had scrupulously avoided intimida tion in 
those parishes where the Republicans \'Tould expect it. 
The Republican board had already decided before the election 
was held \'1hich parishes would normally be more heavily 
Democratic and thus which ones would have to be thro'~ 
out if the election were close and warranted it; therefore , 
Lonn cast her ballot with those who declared that Tilden 
was the rightful winner of the election of 1876. 2 
There are several accounts of Reconstruction in 
South Carolina and special phases of this subject which 
fall within the "Dunning" category . John Porter Hollis , 
a native of South Carolina and a graduate of Wofford 
College in that state, received his Ph. D. degree from 
The Johns Hopkins University in 1904 , and the follm·ring 
year published The Early Period of Reconstruction in South 
lrbid., p . 457. 
2rbid., pp . 443, 448-449, 457, 46o , 472. 
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Carolina. l In the preface he expressed his apprecia tion 
to William A. Dunning of Columbia University and to Sena tor 
Tillman of South Carolina. Hollis' point of view which 
labeled him as a member of the "Dunning 11 school was not 
blatant and his argument was not labored, but it was 
a little more than suggestive . He was convinced that 
the people of South Carolina did all that could reasonably 
have been expected of them during Presidential Reconstruc-
tion. Complete repentance and change of principle because 
of military defeat was too much to ask and respect for 
Union officers was too much to expect. 2 Congress, on 
the other hand, acted without trying to learn the real 
situa tion in South Carolina. The congressional investiga-
tiona were superficial, those for South Carolina being 
held in Washington with no natives selected for questioning--
only Freedmen's Bureau officials were consulted . The 
action l'lhich Congress took was incons istent ''~i t h t he 
offici a l gove rnment pos ition that the states had never 
been out of the Union, Hollis contended, and t hus he 
was in agreement on this point vTith Fertig 's evaluation 
of the Tennessee s i tua tion. The constitutionality of 
the policy was questionable since Congress assumed the 
lHollis , Reconstruction in South Carolina, vital 
data on the author inside the back cover. 
2Ibid. , p . 56 . 
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right to establish qualifications for voting in a particular 
state , a function which was traditionally and constitution-
ally a state's right. On the other hand, Congress acted 
inconsistently with its own policy that the Southern states 
were without legal governments by submitting to these 
state governments for their approval the Fourteenth Amend-
ment . In Hollis' opinion, if the states were able to 
a ct sovereignly on the matter of constitutional amendments , 
they should have been allowed to retain their traditional 
rights in all other matters also~ l 
John s. Reynolds ' work on Reconstruction in South 
Carolina covered the whole period and was more complete 
than that of Hollis' but with less scholarly ·pretention. 
Reynolds had lived through the Reconstruction period 
and, being greatly interested in preserving the history 
of South Carolina, he wrote a series of newspaper articles 
on the period for The State . The book consisted of these 
newspaper articles edited and rearranged2 and appeared 
in 1905, the same year as Hollis '. Reynolds agreed with 
the latter that the Reconstruction process imposed by 
Congress was unconstitutional . He felt the Southern 
people were justified in maintaining their opinion that 
libid . , pp. 54, 66. 
2Letter from Joan Schreiner Reynolds Faunt (a 
granddaughter of Reynolds) to author, May 10, 1960. 
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the congressional acts enfranchising the Negro were "beyond 
the scope of its po\·Ters, revolutionary, null and void. "1 
In Reynolds' opinion the course of Congressional 
Reconstruction was corrupt from one end to the other 
and from top to bottom. Congress imposed the system 
under the false pretense of establishing a free government 
when actually it planned only to insure Republican control 
and to humiliate the Southern whites . The method of 
accomplishing these purposes was to enfranchise the Negroes 
and place them in power over the whites . Having dishonest 
motives and deplorable methods , the Reconstruction govern-
ment naturally attracted corrupt and irresponsible agents . 2 
Reynolds laid great emphasis on the corruption and extrava-
gance of the state government of South Carolina, describing 
in detail ho""Vr money was lavishly spent for trivial and 
personal items. 
No excuse can be found for the folly of these leaders. 
The explanation of their course lies in the fact that 
they were all corrupt. 3 
Besides their corruption these Radicals tried to establish 
social equality, and Reynolds described with horror the 
1Reynolds, Reconstruction in South Carolina, 
pp . 502-503, quote-503 . 
2Ibid. , pp . 497-500. 
3Ibid., pp. 463-465 , 473-474, 476-486, quote-506. 
associa tion of Republicans with the Negroes on an equal 
basis . l Because of the se unsavory practices the whites 
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were jus tified in their me t hod of regaining t he government 
of South Carolina . He stated that whites have been criti-
cized for t he method by ~rhich they regained control , 
but actually the conduct of the Negroes and Republicans 
was qu ite as bad. There was more intimidation of colored 
Democrats than of colored Republicans in the election 
of 1876. Reynolds was convinced that if al l fraudulent 
votes had been rejected , Hampton would still have been 
elected governor in tha t year . Bes~des, he wrote : 
Which is the worse-- to maintain a corrupt, oppressive 
and inefficient government by a free ballot , or to 
establish an impartial , honest and efficient govern-
ment by enforcing the supremacy of the white race?2 
Reynolds' account of the election of 1876 and 
the return of Southern white government was used as the 
basis for Henry T. Thompson's Ousting the Carpetbagger 
from South Carolina (1926). Thompson was even more pos itive 
than Reynolds in his advocacy of white supremacy and the 
virtue of na tive Southern white government. The tenor 
of his book is demonstra ted by his dedication to the 
Red Shirts of 1876 , 
to whose unceasing vigilance , tireless energy and 
exalted patriotism, was due the overthrow of Republican 
1Ib1d., pp . 498- 502. 
2Ibid., pp. 503- 504, quote-504. 
misrule and the Ousting of the Carpetbagger from 
South Carolina. l 
Thompson contended that the Reconstruction scheme of 
Stevens and Morton, a scheme of sectional and racial 
antagonisms, was doomed to failure . The super i or white 
race was bound to exert its supremacy. v~ites should 
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be responsible and treat the Negro with kindness as Hampton , 
the great leader of both races, proposed and practi ced, 
but the Negro should not be allowed too much. 
The lesson which the white people of the South learned 
at such bitter cost, and which they should take to 
their hearts forever, is that the negro must never 
again be allowed to gain an ascendency in politics; 
and that, to prevent such a calamity, the whites 
must ever stand with a united front, no matter what 
political differences they may have among themselves . 2 
Another South Carolinian who greatly admired 
Hampton and his leadership of the movement to overthrow 
Reconstruction in South Carolina was Edward L. Wells, 
who had ridden with Hampton's cavalry during the war.3 
Having been a participant in the times , Wells claimed 
he had a better grasp of the truth. 4 He expressed a 
racist doctrine which is perhaps the most extreme of 
lThompson, Ousting the Carpetbagger, p . iii. 
2Ibid., pp. 165-166, quote-166. 
3wells, Hamoton and His Cavalry in '64, handwritten 
sketch by Wells in the flyleaf of Widener Library's copy. 
4wells, Hampton and Reconstruction, p . iv. 
any writer on Reconstruction. l Wells wrote his book 
for a 11present-minded11 purpose--to warn that the evils 
which took place during Reconstruction could possibly 
recur. In order to prevent this, posterity must forever 
declare Stevens and Morton and their accomplices guilty , 
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and likewise any similar leaders who might arise in the 
future . Wells warned that the present and future generations 
must keep the Negro out of politics and must retain control 
of the Negro problem in Southern hands . 2 
Another book on Hampton and Reconstruction with 
a point of view similar to Wells's was Alfred B. Williams• 
Hamnton and His Red Shirts South Carolina's Deliverance 
in 1876 (1935). The book was published posthumously; 
however, the material had previously been published in 
serial form in two South Carolina newspapers over a period 
of seven months in 1926 and 1927--a half century after 
the events described. Williams began his long journalistic 
career as a young reporter who followed Wade Hampton's 
campaign for the governorship. He thus wrote "from personal 
observation and knO\'fledge" as well as \·Ti th the aid of 
South Carolina newspapers . 3 
libid. , pp . 79-83, 95-100~ 
2Ibid. , pp. iii-iv, 202-208. 
3Alfred B. Williams, Hampton and His Red Shirts 
South Carolina's Deliverance in 18 6 (Charleston: Walker, 
Evans & Cogswell Co., 1935, preface and brief biographical 
sketch of the author at beginning of book--pages unnumbered. 
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Williams opined that the successful method of 
Hampton's 1876 campaign was not a conscious plan of an 
individual or faction but a fortunate mixture of conflicting 
ideas and programs for the conduct of the campaign . 
Hampton believed too strongly in the ability to reason 
with Negr oes and was inclined to promise them too much. 
On the other hand , Martin W. Gary had no faith in the 
possibility of appealing to the r eason or conscience 
of the Negro and advocated ruthless measures . Each faction 
modified the plan of the other just enough so that 11 The 
net result was precisely the right mixture of soft speech 
with display of the big stick •••• 11 1 The execution of 
the campaign was virtually flawl ess . 2 The results of 
the campaign saved the people caught 11 in plight as fearful 
and danger as dire as any civilized land ever has known. "3 
The Radical Reconstruction gover nment had led directly 
toward barbarism. 4 
The man whom Hampton defeated in 1876 and turned 
from office was Daniel H. Chamberlain who lived into 
the twentieth century and wrote on Reconstruction in 
South Carolina. Chamberlain was a native of Massachusetts , 
1 Ibid., p . 83 . 
2Ibid., pp. 82-84. 
3Ibid. , p . 150 . 
4rbid., p . 171. 
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a graduate of Yale , and a student of law at Harvard. 
He had served during the Civil War as lieutenant of a 
colored regiment . After the war he settled in South 
Carolina and there became the reform candidate for governor 
in 1874. He set his face against the corrupt elements 
of his own Republican party and obtained co-operation 
from Democrats for a time during his administration from 
1874 to 1876. Although he gained some praise from South-
erners, the Democrats decided to stand Hampton as their 
own candidate in 1876. Chamberlain lost his position 
in the hard-fought and disputed election. 1 In an article 
in 1901, Chamberlain declared the Republican policy in 
Reconstruction a mistake carried out for party purposes 
and based on the false assumption that the Negro had 
political capacity . He sharply criticized Stevens and 
Morton particularly for their vile work in the Reconstruc-
tion, ascribing to them only selfish party motives . He 
described them as being blind to facts and ruthlessly 
determined to place the Negro over the white in the South. 
All Republicans weren't of this sort, Chamberlain declared, 
but the others were misguided philanthropists who didn't 
know the actual situation and went along with Morton and 
Stevens . The former Carpetbag governor criticized most 
l DuBois, Black Reconstruction, pp. 414-415; Haworth, 
Reconstruction and Union, p . 53; Randall, Civil War and 
Reconstruction, p . 866. 
Carpetbaggers as adventurers who had an even lower moral 
consciousness than the Negro . By 1901 he was convinced 
that the reform Republican faction which he led in South 
Carolina in 1876 probably could not have brought good 
honest government even if it had been allowed to continue 
in office; for there was a lack of material in the party, 
there was too much ignorance, and too much dishonesty. 
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The Negro , Chamberlain said, was misused during Reconstruc-
tion and given , for party purposes, powers he could not 
handle . The charity of those who didn't know and understand 
the Negro had hurt the race, and the Negro should be 
left alone to shift for himself, according to Chamberlain. 
Also, the Negro should stick to simple manual tasks which 
are his lot established by a decree from a higher being.l 
Chamberlain's article was part of a series written 
by several different authors for The Atlantic Monthly. 
The editors of Atlantic felt by 1901 the Reconstruction 
period could be studied calmly and without prejudice. 
They indicated that the writers of the articles, who were 
from different parts of the country and from different 
occupations--some former politicians, some literary men, 
and some historians--had the greatest amount of liberty 
to present their own views; however, the editors also 
lchamberlain, The Atlantic Uonthly , LXXXVII, 
473-484. 
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stated their views . They felt Reconstruction to have 
been a period when important mistakes '\'Tere made; extending 
the suffrage to freedmen had been an unwise and dangerous 
policy imposed for political purposes . Universal suffrage 
before the Negro was ready for it proved disastrous and 
confusing to the issue; indeed , it cast doubt upon the 
efficacy of equality . However , the editors still held 
to the 'bld- fashioned American doctrine of political equality , 
irrespective of race or color or station . "l What now 
must happen was that the Southern states, in the process 
of disfranchising the Negro legally , must be left alone 
by the federal government to work out their own solution. 
However , the editors urged Southern leaders to use good 
sense and to enfranchise the intelligent and propertied 
Negroes who showed value to the community, and they urged 
the Negroes to progress along the lines laid down by 
Boelter T. Washington . Qualifications for voting should 
be equally applied to both races ; then , men of character , 
intelligence, and virtue of whatever race would run the 
government. 2 
The introductory article in the Atlantic series 
was a survey of Reconstruction by \'loodro\'l Wilson in \'lhich 
l"Reconstruction and Disfranchisement," The Atlantic 
Monthly , LXXXVIII (October , 1901) , 435- 436 . 
2Ibid. 
he demonstrated, though in moderate and balanced tones, 
that Congressional Reconstruction was deplorable, that 
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Negroes were children, and Carpetbaggers were unscrupulous 
self-seekers.l Wilson 's tone and point of view was similar 
to that of Dunning himself; in fact, Wilson 's contention 
that Congress treated the Southern states in a fashion 
unequal to the other states since it dictated what the 
suffrage policy of the Southern states should be and 
required that the policy never be changed was the same 
argument made by Dunning in his article, "Are the States 
Equal Under the Constitution?"2 
Wilson emphasized the changes 'vrought by Reconstruc-
tion. One great effect was t he forging of the federal 
union into a unified national government. Under this 
government with a na tional temper and point of view, 
national citizenship was established parallel to state 
citizenship . Suffrage and individual rights were made 
to a degree subject to national regula tion. In this 
transition the forms of the Constitution were not observed 
clo sely . Congress did several things by statute which 
could properly be done only by constitutional amendment; 
then, it put these statutes into the constitutional amend-
1\Vilson, The Atlantic 1-ionthly, LXXXVII, 1-15. 
2william Archibald Dunning, 11Are the States Equal 
Under the Constitution?, 11 Political Science Quarterly, 
III {September , 1888), 425-453. 
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menta which weren't approved by free will but by compulsion. 
New and irregular me thods, the methods of majorities rather 
than the methods of law, according to Wilson , were learned 
1 
and used during Reconstruction and were not yet forgotten . 
Wilson found himself in 1901 in an age of nationalistic 
spirit and the urge to expand on the part of the American 
people . He also found a strong national government with 
the ability to build an empire. The revolution which 
explained the existence of such a situation took place 
in the blast furnace of Civil War and the fusion process 
of Reconstruction. Reconstruction was growing more interest-
ing to study because it marked the beginning of the real 
dominance of a strong national government with the means 
of compulsive effect on the internal affairs of the land 
and the means of expansionist impulse on the external 
affairs . Wilson felt that since Reconstruction was so 
crucial in producing the situation present in 1901, it 
was particularly worthy of study . 2 In a "present-minded" 
fashion he urged the study of all the details of Recon-
struction in order to explain the present. 
The second article in the series was by Hilary 
A. Herbert, who wrote on "The Conditions of the Reconstruc-
tion Problem. " His over,'lhelming emphasis among the condi-
lwilson, The Atlantic Monthly, LXXXVII, 13-15. 
2 Ibid., p . 15. 
151 
tions was the Negro . Herbert contended that at emancipation 
the Negro had no traditions except those of bondage or 
barbarism. The Southern whites had more foundation than 
mere prejudice in their refusal to accept Negro equality 
at the ballot box. Herbert follo'\-Ted Burgess in saying: 
"The negro had nowhere sho'\m himself capable of self-
government. 111 The only ques t ion involved in Negro suffrage 
should have been competency, but it \-Tas made a political 
question because of the Republicans 1 love of po,rer, preju-
dice , passions , and their phi l anthropic sentiments toward 
the Negro . Herbert suggested that Lincoln and Johnson's 
plan of a very limited suffrage to Negr oes should have 
been adopted by the Southern states . These few Negroes , 
he said, could do no harm. 2 Also , Herbert suggested, 
like Chamberlain, that the Negro should wor k for industrial 
progress , not for political a chievement. 3 
The only article in the series which did not 
conform to the "Dunning" interpretation of Reconstruction 
was the study of the Freedmen 1 s Bureau by the Negro historian 
and sociologist , W. E. B. DuBois, who emphasized the 
great achievements of the Bureau in the fields of trans-
portation , education, and relief of physical suffering. 
lHerbert , The Atlantic Monthly , LXXXVII, 149. 
2 ~., pp. 150- 151. 
3Ib1d., p . 157. 
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The greatest success of the Bureau was in education because 
"it founded the free public school in the South. ul But, 
according to DuBois, more should h ave been done by the 
Bureau. The Negroes should have been given land and 
the Bureau should have become a permanent organization; 
only then would a sound basis have been laid for solving 
the Negro problem. 2 
William Garrott Brown wrote the article on the 
Ku Klux Klan for the Atlantic series . Bro~m , a Southerner, 
declared the Ku Klux Klan necessary as the only type of 
resistance which would have worked in the si tue.tion. He 
declared the Klan successful as it helped to rid the 
South of Reconstruction rule, and he justified the Klan 
on consideration of the whole picture of the South's 
plight during the period, although he felt the narrower 
aspect of terror and violence might be condemned. The 
goal the white Southerners sought was worth fighting 
for, and it was obvious there ~ere no pleasant means 
of attaining it. One unfortunate aspect of Klan activity , 
however, Brown thought, was the heritage of its methods 
which survived in the Southern mind and life. Having 
seen the law used to support tyranny, the Southerners, 
lw. E. Burghardt DuBois, "The Freedmen's Bureau ," 
The Atlantic Monthly, LXXXVII (March, 1901) , 358 , quote-
363. ' 
2Ibid., pp . 361, 364. 
therefore, set men above political principles and good 
government above freedom of thought. Thus, the South 
overcame its conquerors but stillwas not free. 1 
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s. w. McCall's article "Washington During Recon-
struction" was not a study of \vashington life and society 
as the title might suggest. It was simply a brief survey 
of Reconstruction legislation and maneuvers in the national 
capitol . He recounted the problems and the evils which 
Reconstruction legislation provoked but concluded that 
perhaps any other path would have produced different 
evils of a worse nature . At least the way Reconstruction 
turned out the nation had peace and the Negro was making 
some progress. The disturbances of Reconstruction were 
to be expected because when a nation persists in an evil 
for a very long time and then suddenly uproots it, some 
social disruption is inevitable. 2 This attitude is a 
little like Rhodes's comment that Reconstruction, though 
bad, could conceivably have been worse , but it is even 
more similar to the idea which revisionist historians 
later proposed. 
Albert Phelps in his article on "New· Or\leans 
lvlilliam Garrott Brown , "The Ku Klux Movement," 
The Atlantic Monthly, LXXXVII (May, 1901), 634-644. 
2samuel W. McCall, "Washington During Reconstruc-
tion," The Atlantic Monthly, LXXXVII (June, 1901), 817-
826 . 
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and Reconstruction" gave a sketch of New Orleans from 
its Spanish days to 1900 with an emphasis on Reconstruction 
troubles, corruption, and injustices . He considered 
the Reconstruction governments to be a system of plunder 
imposed upon the sta tea . Ne'of Orleans, because of its 
wealth , was a special mark of the adventurers and plunder-
ers who operated under protection of a vindictive and 
ill- informed federal government. 
After the ruthless harvest of Butler and his fellows, 
there had followed a swarm of gleaners through long 
years of riot , oppression, confiscation , and robbery. l 
Reconstruction was a time when bad government 
and corruption triumphed under the watchful care of the 
federal government, according to Thomas Nelson Page , 
the Southern novelist who l·Trote the next to last article 
in the Atlantic series . Page claimed that Reconstruction 
was responsible for any fraud in Southern electoral pro-
cedures, for any lynching of Negroes. These were not 
parts of the great civilization destroyed in the South 
and therefore were creations of the trauma of Reconstruc-
tion. He also expressed his faith in local self- government. 
Concerning race Page stated that Congress was foolish 
in trying to contravene the facta of race since the inevi-
table was bound to happen. 
1Phelps, The Atlantic Monthly, LXXXVIII, 121- 131, 
quote- 128. 
That intelligence , virtue, and force of character 
will eventually rule is as certain in the states 
of the South as elsewhere; and everywhere it is as 
certain as the operation of the law of gravitation. 
Whatever people wish to rule in those states must 
possess these qualities . 
The final article of the Atlantic series was 
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11 The Undoing of Reconstruction" in which William A. Dunning 
described the Southerners• attempts to rid themselves 
of the Reconstruction governments and the innovations 
they had made in the Southern state institutions . He 
discussed this in three stages . The first stage was 
during the Reconstruction period itself when the Southerners 
exerted all efforts toward overthro'\'Ting the Radical govern-
ments. He described the situation as being so bad that 
questionable means were no longer questionable even to 
the most respectable of Southerners. Thus, Ku Klux Klan 
activity and the 11Mississipp1 Plan 11 of intimidation were 
enthusiastically used to re-establish conservative govern-
ment. The second period was from 1877 to 1890, a time 
when the Republican party was still fairly strong in 
the South and the Negro had lal'lful political rights . 
During these years the courts undermined the Ku Klux 
Klan Acts and the Civil Rights Act which were so unpopular 
with Southerners . The Southerners themselves engaged in 
ballot manipulation and district gerrymandering in order 
lpage, The Atlantic Monthly, LXXXVIII, 289-304, 
quote-304. 
156 
to maintain white control . By the end of this period 
equal Negro rights were only law but not practice, accord-
ing to Dunning. The third period of the undoing of Recon-
struction was from 1890 to 1901, during which the Republi-
can party in the South became a mere shadow and the Southern 
states began to alter their constitutions in such a way 
as to make the disfranchisement of the Negro legal. 
With these constitutional arrangements the undoing of 
Reconstruction was approaching completion. 1 
Dunning gave vent to his personal opinion on 
the Negro and Reconstruction much more clearly in this 
article than he did in his books . He contended that 
with the failure of Negro suffrage to do what was expected, 
Americans, both North and South, were coming to realize 
the truth that great statesmen like Jefferson, Clay, 
and Lincoln had tried to tell them--that chattel slavery 
was not the basic problem. The real problem was the 
existence of two unequal races in one society . Slavery 
was a 11modus vivendi" which made co-existence between 
the races possible . With slavery gone some system had 
to replace it which, though perhaps more humane, would 
"in essence express the same fact of racial inequality . 112 
Dunning noticed that the North had come to accept this 
1Dunning, The Atlantic Monthly, LXXXVIII, 437-449. 
2Ibid. , p. 448. 
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idea more and more as the South proceeded with the destruc-
tion of Reconstruction innovations . In addition, with 
the new American experiences with dark races in other 
parts of the world, it seemed to Dunning that the process 
of rendering the Negro politically impotent would not 
soon, if ever, be reversed. l 
Of the nine writers who contributed to the 
Atlantic series on Reconstruction, four besides Dunning 
and DuBois had other writings which dealt with the Recon-
struction period. Perhaps the most prominent of these 
in academic circles was Woodrow Wilson, professor of 
jurisprudence and politics at Princeton University. 
Wilson was a native of Virginia, had received his bache-
lor's degree from Princeton, and had studied law at 
the University of Virginia before turning to history 
and political science and receiving his Ph. D. degree 
from The Johns Hopkins University in 1886~ 2 His chief 
historical wo~k, which was published in 1902, was 
A History of the American People in five volumes . 
His story of the Reconstruction period formed the 
first third of the final volume . The account was 
chiefly political despite the title of the work, and it 
was a his tory of the whole period and not just the Recon-
1~. , p . 449~ 
2Who 1 s Who, I, 1364. 
struction process . Most of his account did deal with 
Reconstruction , but other domestic and foreign matters 
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such as "Grantism," the movement west, the Alabama settle-
ment, and the Mexican affair were all neatly sandwiched 
in with the history of the Reconstruction process . His 
account of Reconstruction was quite spare, as it had to 
be within the scope of his work , and it contained little 
interpretation; however, his justification of the Black 
Codes , l his emphasis on the partisan and vindictive motives 
of the Radicals (though admitting that some were philan-
thropists) , 2 his dislike for the bulk of Carpetbaggers,3 
and his emphasis on the corruption, extravagance, and 
incompetence of the Reconstruction state governments4 
leave no doubt as t o his adherence to the "Dunning" inter-
pretation. 
"The Ku Klux Movement" w·as one of a group of 
essays which vlilliam Garrott Brown collected in his Lo'\'rer 
South in American Histor~ which was published in 1902. 
Some of the essays in this book dealt with subjects before 
the war and some after the war. Besides the article 
lwoodrow Wilson, A Histor~ of the American People 
(5 vols . ; New York: Harper & Brothers, 1902), V, 22 . 
2rbid. , pp . 6, 38. 
3Ibid. , p . 63. 
4Ibid. , pp. 46ff~ 
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on the Klan the chief one of interest was "Shifting the 
White Man's Burden. " In this essay he demonstrated a 
Southern white supremacist attitude, writing that Negroes 
are "the representatives of a race which has never, unaided , 
shown itself capable either of civilization or of self-
government. "l In light of this fact Brown suggested 
that less attention be paid to the Negro and more attention 
paid to the white; for instance, in the field of education--
educating the Negro is fine but the chief emphasis should 
be placed on educating the white because what educa tion 
will do for the white race is well known but no one is 
so sure what it will do for the masses of blacks . Educate 
all the whites, Brown pleaded, and the Negro question 
will be solved. 2 
Brown was a native of Alabama who was educated 
at Howard College in that state and at Harvard. He engaged 
in library work for several years, lectured on American 
history at Harvard one year, and ended his life as a 
regular editorial writer for Harper's Weekly . He was 
an active member of the gold wing of the Democratic party . 3 
Hilary A. Herbert was another active Democrat. 
lBrown , Lower South, p . 251. 
2Ibid. 
3Who's 11ho , I, 152. 
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Reared and educated in the South, Herbert had been convinced 
of the economic and moral efficacy of slavery and had 
fought as a Confederate soldier. After Appomattox, however , 
he became convinced that slavery had been wrong. He 
served in the Congress from 1877 to 1893, when he became 
Secretary of Navy during President rCleveland 's second 
term. 1 Herbert's writings on Reconstruction other than 
his Atlantic article were contained in his Why the Solid 
South? or, Reconstruction and its Results (1890) and 
in The Abolition Crusade and its Consequences Four Periods 
of American History (1912). The former, a group of essays 
on Reconstruction by various authors, was published at 
a time when the Republican party , having control of both 
Congress and the presidency, was considering a new force 
act. The purpose of the book as stated by practical- minded 
Herbert was to demonstrate what had resulted from inter-
ference by the federal government in the affairs of the 
Southern states. 
A thorough comprehension of the facts we attempt to 
portray will , it is believed, at least aid the reader 
in deciding2what ought not to be done by the Federal Government. 
lHilary A. Herbert, The Abolition Crusade and 
its Conse uences Four Periods of American Histor (New 
York: Charles Scribner a Sons, 1912 , p. viii prefatory 
note by James Ford Rhodes). 
2 et al., Wh the Solid South? or Recon-
struction and its Results Baltimore: R. H. Woodward 
& Co., 1890}, p . xvii. 
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The essays, three of which were written by Herbert, were 
all from the Southern point of view. They all demonstrated 
the darkness of Reconstruction and the great strides of 
progress made by the South since the end of Radical rule~ 
Herbert again showed his utilitarian outlook on 
history in The Abolition Crusade and its Consequences . 
The book was written for the "present-minded" purpose 
of pointing out the mistakes made in the sectional contro-
versy in the past so that they might not be made again. 1 
According to Herbert the Negro, an inferior race, was the 
chief problem of Reconstruction. At the end of the war 
the South had faced the danger of armed bands of Negro 
veterans and of freedmen who didn ' t want to work and 
whose idleness led to crime. The South had tried to 
achieve peaceful relations through the Black Codes, but 
these laws were viciously attacked though they were 
based on Northern vagrancy measures . Lincoln, Herbert 
thought, would have sympathized with the South, but the 
Radicals needed party allies; therefore, they gathered 
inflammatory materials to give a false picture of the South 
to the nation in order to impose their already matured 
plans of Negro suffrage on the yet unwilling North. 
The Reconstruction governments of the South Herbert des-
cribed as extravagant and ignorant, accompanied by an 
lHerbert, Abolition Crusade, p. xiv. 
extreme debasement of the suffrage since Negroes were 
using and abusing the voting privilege . The South was 
being trans formed from a white to a Negroid civilization, 
according to Herbert , and this forced whites to take 
measures to save their civilization. 1 
Since the re-establishment of Southern white 
government in the South, the peace and prosperity "of 
both whites and bla cks has been wonderful ••• • 112 There 
had been no race wars and there would be none, Herbert 
contended, if outside interference were not attemp ted. 
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The South mus t restrict the political participation of 
the Negro and maintain the purity of the ballot. The 
federal government, on the other hand, must not intervene . 
The mistakes of the past mus t not be repeated . Herbert 
believed there were direct connecting links between the 
past and the present; for instance , Reconstruction was 
the result of the war, the war in turn was the result 
of abolition agitation . Herbert saw a direct connection 
between a lynching in the twentieth century and Garrison ' s 
burning of the Constitution in the 1850 ' s and deemed 
the latter more dangerous because it defied the fundamental 
laws of the natioo , while the former violated a state 
statute . It was apnarent that Negroes had been the basis 
libid. , pp . 215-227 , 232 . 
2rbid. , p. 23o. 
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of sectional problems and conflicts in the past; the nation 
mus t learn f r om experience not to allow the Negro to be 
a disrupting factor in the fUture . 1 
In addition to his Atlantic article Samuel W. 
McCall v~ote a biography of Thaddeus Stevens . Biographers, 
in many cases , tend to favor the ideas and personalities 
of the men of whom they write . Biographers who wrote 
favorably of Radi cal politicians did not, of course, 
conform to the "Dunning" interpretation; ho\vever, since 
they did agree to some extent with the "Dunning" hi s torians 
and since they wrote at t he same period , several will 
? be considered at this point. -
McCall a greed with John W. Burgess that the Wade-
Davis plan of Reconstruction was better thought out and 
more complete than tha t of Lincoln. Had the president 
accepted the Wade-Davis plan, he would have prevented 
the much more extreme and unfortunate measures taken 
later. Had Lincoln lived, his tact and moderation would 
have prevented the serious rupture between the president 
and Congress, and Congress would not have become all-
lrbid., pp . 230-244. 
2This procedure is for convenience's sake . These 
biographers do not properly form a part of the "Dunning" 
interpretation but , rather, might be considered as present-
ing a minority report during a period when the majority 
of writers did conform to the "Dunning" point of view. 
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powerful . l McCall thought the immediate effects of Recon-
struction bad and very regrettable; however, he denied 
that this meant the initiators of Reconstruction I'Tere 
unwise and suggested that perhaps it was the only course 
they could have taken under the circumstances . 2 Stevens 
he described as a great and true democrat . "Equality 
was the animating principle of his life . "3 However, 
McCall thought Stevens ' proposal for the confiscation 
of rebel property was unwise and showed little states-
manship . 4 He also regretted the attempts of the Congress 
to curtail the powers of the president and to expel Johnson 
from office , despite the fact that McCall believed Johnson 
unfit for the office. 5 
A second biography of Thaddeus Stevens, l'~itten 
fourteen years after McCall's , was the work of James 
Albert Woodburn. Woodburn ' s book showed an even 
closer affinity of the author to the ideas of 
Stevens than did that of McCall . He was favorable to 
Stevens and to the Radicals and to attempts to bring 
lsamuel W. McCall , Thaddeus Stevens (Boston: 
Houghton , Mifflin & Co . , 1899) , pp. 238- 243. 
2 Ibid., pp . 306-308. 
3rbid., p . 353. 
4 Ibid.' pp. 324-326 . 
5Ibid. , pp . 244-246, 328-348. 
about equality of all men . He agreed with the principles 
of the Civil Rights Bill and the Fourteenth Amendment 
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and defended them as being in agreement with democracy, 
morality , and good fundamental law, "since civil equality 
is the first principle of public justice."1 Woodburn 
regretted that Congress did not accept Stevens' proposal 
of basing the proportion of representation from each 
state on the number of voters rather than on the population. 
This would have made the representation s tipulation of 
the Fourteenth Amendment self- enforcing. Without it , 
however , this part of the amendment had not been enforced 
and Negroes had been disfranchised with impunity. 2 Woodburn 
favored a broader interpretation of impeachment powers 
than was demonstrated in 1868. If the president were 
more readily impeachable , Woodburn suggested, America 
could move toward a more parliamentary and responsible 
type of government which would be more democratic . 3 
Woodburn presented Stevens ' argument for confiscation 
and redistribution of land as a natural, logical, and 
moderate proposition for the time , but the proposal did 
show that Stevens allowed his ~~ath from the war to linger 
lJames Albert Woodburn , The Life of Thaddeus 
Stevens (Indianapolis : Bobbs-Merrill Co ., Inc., 1913), 
p . 382. 
2Ib1d., pp. 392-393. 
3Ibid. , pp. 491- 494. 
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perhaps too long. The proposal shm'led no generosity 
or magnanimity or willingness to rapidly heal the wounds 
which the war had brought; however, Woodburn maintained, 
public men must be judged by their own time and Stevens ' 
belief that the leaders of the rebellion should be punished 
was held by most of the people in the North at that t1me . 1 
Woodburn's book had a very interesting point 
of view for one written in 1913. It had no overtones 
of the "Dunning" school and was perhaps largely a carry-
over of the abolitionist point of view on Reconstruction. 
It might perhaps well be considered a bridge between the 
pre-1900 writings of participants and partisans who favored 
Stevens 1 plan of Reconstruction and some mid-t\'lentieth 
century ~~iters who have approached this point of view 
again. This approach was kept alive only in the biographies 
of Radicals during the decades of dominance by the "Dunning" 
interpretation. There appear to be no other types of 
writing, either on a particular phase of Reconstruction 
or a general history of Reconstruction , which maintained 
this point of view. 
In the first decade of the twentieth century 
three biographies of Charles Sumner were written. The 
earliest of these was by Moorfield Storey, whose point 
of view was very close to that of Woodburn. He was of 
libid., pp. 521-535 . 
the abolitionist tradition as his later presidency of 
the National Association for the Advancement of Colored 
People demonstrated. l He favored Sumner 1 s position on 
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Reconstruction and civil rights and believed Sumner deserved 
more credit than anyone save perhaps Lincoln for the 
emancipation of Negroes and the degree of equal rights 
which they had in 1900. 2 Storey opposed Johnson 1 s plan 
of Reconstruction as dangerous to the results of the 
war and destructive to Negroes and loyal whites in the 
South who would have been left in the hands of disloyal 
men . 3 Storey feared that the failure of impeachment of 
an unfit and obstinate president set quite as dangerous 
a precedent as conviction would have set. 4 Grant was 
a political enemy of Charles Sumner, and perhaps this 
was the reason Storey treated him in much the same way 
as the "Dunning" historians--as a president who abused 
his appointing powers, who used his official position 
to help his friends and relatives , and who allowed more 
corruption and scandal to invade his administration than 
lsee Chapter 10. 
2Moorfield Store~ , Charles Sumner (Boston: Hough-
ton, Mifflin & Co., 1900), pp. 431-432. 
3rbid., pp . 294, 300-301. 
4 Ibid. , pp. 350-351. 
America had ever seen before . 1 Though Storey admired 
Sumner the bookwasnot a eulogy or a defense brief for 
the senator but a moderate and sympathetic exposition 
of his point of view. 
In 1909 George H. Haynes claimed that Sumner 
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was almost a forgotten man by the contemporary generation 
of Americans. According to a survey held at the time, 
students entering colleges had only the vaguest notions 
about the man. In addition textbooks gave very little 
information about him. Haynes admitted that Sumner was 
certainly not without his faults , but Americans needed 
to remember him better; thus, a new biography was justified. 2 
Haynes, a native and resident of Massachusetts with a 
Ph . D. degree from The Johns Hopkins University, was favor-
able to Sumner but not quite so much as Storey had been. 
He found a few more faults with Sumner than Storey and 
was not quite as denunciatory to his enemies. Haynes 
saw his subject as a man of great intellectual powers 
but "not of the highest order : they were acquisitive 
ti »3 rather than crea ve • • •. He described him as a man 
of pure life, free from self-seeking, courageous, and 
magnanimous, a sympathizer with oppressed peoples anywhere . 
1Ib1d. , p . 4lo . 
2Haynes , Sumner, pp . 5- 6. 
3Ib1d. , p . 384. 
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Sumner was idealistic while Thaddeus Stevens was practical ; 
their aims happened to coincide successfully during Recon-
struction--Sumner's to give the Negro full civil rights 
and Stevens ' to retain the Republican party in power . 1 
Yet in Sumner's career there were at least two 
major mistakes, according to Haynes. One was his part 
in extending the suffrage to an inferior race. The Negro 
vote protected neither the Negro nor the white as Sumner 
had wished, and it created an orgy of misrule in the South. 
Southern leaders' response to this intolerable situation 
caused the development of the "Solid South ," and by 1909 
even Negro leaders admitted that the suffrage was not 
a great gift , Haynes maintained. 2 The other great mistake 
Sumner made was his rabidly partisan support of impeach-
ment.3 Haynes was rather restrained in his judgments and 
statements but many of his opinions coincidedwith those 
of the "Dunning" school, including those on Negro suffrage 
and impeachment. His account of Negro suffrage seems 
to have come from Rhodes, and, like Rhodes, he quoted 
Louis Agassiz in opposition to Negro suffrage on scientific 
grounds .4 
lrbid., pp . 384- 411, 443-444. 
2 Ibid. , pp . 444-448. 
3rbid., pp . 322-326. 
4 Ibid. , pp . 444-468. 
The third biography of Sumner to appear in the 
first decade of the twentieth century was written by 
Walter G. Shotwell, the judge of the Court of Common 
Pleas of Ohio . 1 The book is almost completely narrative 
with very little judgment involved , although Shotwell 
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seemed to be sympathetic to Sumner and slightly antagonistic 
to Andrew Johnson. 2 
The only biography in the twentieth century of 
Stevens ' and Sumner's fellow Radical, Zachariah Chandler, 
was a dissertation written by Wilmer c. Harris concerning 
only the years of Chandler's life in politics, 1851-1875. 
Harris shovred admiration for Chandler as a great uncom-
promising champion during the war whose type helped to 
defeat the South, but he shows a critical attitude toward 
Chandler's part in Reconstruction because he felt the 
statesmanlike position after the war was a position of 
conciliation. Chandler could not give up his readiness 
to fight and his unwillingness to compromise as he should 
have once the war was over, according to Harris . Still, 
Chandler was representing his people since the Northwest 
was crying for vengeance . 3 The "Dunning11 school maintained 
lWilliam G. Shotwell to Librarian of Harvard Univer-
sity, March 3, 1924. 
2walter G. Shotwell, Life of Charles Sumner (New 
York : Thomas Y. Crowell & Co., 1910), passim . 
3wilmer c. Harris, Public Life of Zachariah Chandler 
1851-187g (Lansing : Michigan Historical Commission, 1917), 
pp . 95- 9 • 
171 
that the true course of the Congress after Appomattox 
should have been to restore the Union as quickly as possible 
in a conciliatory and forgiving manner. This attitude 
is reflected in Harris' work . 
The Radicals were intent on maintaining the Republican 
party in power though the price were Negro suffrage 
and frequent violation of rights vested by the Con-
stitution . The Conservatives were the liberals who 
rose above a desire for vengeance and sought only 
to heal the wounds left by the conflict. l 
During the first three decades of the twentieth 
century, six biographies of Ulysses s. Grant were published. 
Owen Wister's pocket size volume had only ten pages on 
Grant's post-Appomattox career. These years, according 
to Wister, were not representative of Grant since he 
had difficulty understanding the presidency and allowed 
many improprieties in his administration . Wister l-rould 
have Americans forget the post-war years of Grant and allow 
the man of Appomattox to emerge . 2 Wister believed the 
Negro to be an inferior race . 3 The Fifteenth Amendment 
was a "deplorable blunder" whose evils caused bloodshed 
and promoted barbarism; however , Wister suggested that 
the Fourteenth Amendment was perhaps a good flexible 
lrbid., p . 96 . 
2owen Wister , Ulysses s. Grant (Boston : Small , 
Maynard & Co., 1900), pp . 130- 131. 
3owen Wister to J ames Ford Rhodes, November 19 , 
1906 ; James Ford Rhodes's Papers, Massachusetts Historical 
Socie ty . 
solution to the problem of Southern representation . l 
Shortly after Wister's biography, ~valter Allen 
published his Ulysses s . Grant (1901), which is favorable 
to Grant's military exploits, but , like Wister, Allen 
seemed to believe the presidential years of Grant mi ght 
well be forgotten. During these years Grant seemed a 
different man from the soldier , and the tone in official 
life steadily declined under his administration . Grant's 
obstinacy, his surrender to the influence of flatterers 
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and speculators, his lack of attentiveness to wise counsel- -
all served him badly. 2 However, by his allusions to the 
Reconstruction process, Allen appears to hold essentially 
the Radical point of view. 3 
A soldier's biography of Grant was Charles King ' s 
The True Ulysses S. Grant (1914) which, as was na tural, 
gave aJ..moS:t all space t o Grant's army career. King was 
very favorable to Grant as a military leader and quite 
favorable to him as a president. 4 At the same time, as 
might be expected by an admirer of Grant, he expressed 
Mifflin 
phia: 
lwister, Grant, pp . 132-133. 
2walter Allen, Ulysses s. Grant 
& Co., 1901) , pp . 130-131 , 133. 
3rbid. , pp. 116-122. 
(Bo s ton : Houghton, 
4charles King , The True Ulysses S. Grant (Philadel-
J . B. Lippincott Co . , 1914), p . 370. 
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anti-Johnson sentiments . 1 
Franklin Spencer Edmonds declared a "present-
minded" purpose for his biography of' Grant . He wanted 
the book "to bring the message of the past to bear on 
the present. "2 Like Grant 1 s earlier biographers Edmonds 
was favorable to the general but not entirely uncritically 
so . He admitted the failures of Grant as president3 
but declared that Grant left office in the good will 
and affections of the American people . 4 iihile holding 
essentially to the 11Dunning11 interpretation of Congressional 
Reconstruction, Edmonds nevertheless emphasized that the 
Radicals were motivated by a wish to give the Negro a 
fair chance as well as by a desir e to perpetuate the 
Republican party in power . 5 
The only biographer of Grant to devote more attention 
to the post-war period than to the war years was Louis 
A. Coolidge . In like manner he was the only one to bestow 
unmitigated approbation on Grant the president. He admitted 
that the fashion was to degrade and denounce Grant as 
lrbid. , p . 334. 
2Franklin Spencer Edmonds, Ulysses s. Grant 
(Philadelphia : George W. Jacobs & Co . , 1915), p . 31. 
3rbid. , pp . 293- 316. 
4rb1d . , p . 316. 
51£1£. , pp. 287, 306. 
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president, but he felt that the accomplishments in that 
office were almost as significant as those of the general . 1 
Grant as president had a firm, consistent foreign policy, 
and he established the principle of arbitration in inter-
national problems . 2 He gave an impetus to reform in the 
civil service but was stopped by Congress . His administra-
tion was economical so that taxes could be lowered and 
the national debt reduced.3 
In constructive achievements, coming as it did directly 
after the demoralization of the war and the upset 
of traditions due to Lincoln's military measures 
in that imperative emergency, Grant's Administration 
ranks second only to that of Washington, who had 
to se~ the Government in motion under the Constitu-
tion. 
Despite his admiration for Grant, Coolidge accepted 
most aspects of the "Dunning" interpretation of Reconstruc-
tion.5 He accepted Dunning ' s and Rhodes's criticisms 
of Johnson, as would be natural for an admirer of Grant. 6 
He deplored the "tragedy of immediate universal negro 
suffrage ."7 
1coolidge, Grant, p. vii . 
2 Ibid., pp. 522 , 530. 
3Ibid., p . 528. 
4 Ibid., pp. 532-533. 
5Ibid., pp. 208-210, 225. 
6 Ibid., pp. 215-217. 
7rbid., p . 219. 
Among biographers there are the magnifiers and 
the modifiers--those who seek to enhance the reputation 
of the subject and those who intend to limit it. The 
five biographers of Grant heretofore mentioned fall into 
the former category, while W. E. Woodward belongs in 
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the latter category . He claimed that men are less important 
than social forces and, therefore, national heroes have 
little efficacy . 
National heroes are day-dreams of the human race . 
They are the symbols of the common aspiration, of 
the common desire . No man is great enough to live 
up to the reputation of a national hero- -and we must 
consider men like Grant as chips flowing on the current 
of dynamic socia! forces , riding the wave instead 
of directing it. 
Woodward commended Grant as a soldier because he developed 
the great strategy which won the war, but it '\'Tasn 1 t a 
conscious creation of Grant's mind , Woodward contended , 
but an instinctive plan developed from the circumstances . 2 
As president , Grant was completely out of his element , 
lost, and unable to understand the intricacies of politics . 
During his eight years in office he learned very little 
about life and affairs . He had energy, perseverance, 
and sincerity, but he was slow-moving and inflexible and 
imperceptive . The latter qualities helped Grant to make 
lv/oodward , Grant, p . 456. 
2 Ibid., pp. 202- 204. 
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a hopeless mess of Reconstruction, according to Woodward. l 
Wood\'Tard 1 s references to Reconstruction demonstrate an 
orthodox "Dunning" interpretation of the process . 2 
Woodward contended that social forces were more 
important than sections or individuals or heroes, but 
his account of Reconstruction didn't demonstrate this 
point . He still emphasized the corruption of individual 
Carpetbaggers and the control of Reconstruction by mean 
and perverse men . 3 Woodward was expressing a cliche which 
economic historians were popularizing in the 1920's, 
but his popular biography of Grant did not demonstrate 
a consis tent application of the idea. 
Perhaps the most controversial figure of the Recon-
struction per iod was Andrew Johnson . There was more 
profound disagreement among the "Dunning" historians 
over the personality and ability of Johnson than over 
any other issue involved in Reconstruction . The range 
of opinion on Andrew Johnson within the "Dunning" school 
may be demonstrated by the fact that Burgess believed 
that both the president4 and his plan of Reconstruction 
1rbid. , pp. 394, 398 , 455-456. 
2Ibid. , pp. 378-383, 427-436. 
3Ibid., pp. 381-383. 
~urgess , Reconstruction and Constitution, p . 191. 
were bad;l Rhodes and Dunning thought Johnson unfit for 
the presidency2 but thought his plan of Reconstruction 
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was the correct one;3 while there was a group of historians 
who defended both Johnson, as man and president, and 
his Reconstruction policy. 
The Andrew Johnson papers were acquired by the 
Library of Congress and made accessible to historians 
in 1905.4 In 1910 and 1911 the Diary of Gideon Welles 
was published.5 These sources opened up great new oppor-
tunities for students of Reconstruction and for the defenders 
of Johnson. This was particularly true of the Diary of 
Gideon Welles since the Secretary of Navy had been very 
favorable to Johnson, and his Diary made a good brief 
on the president's behalf. Welles had earlier published 
some of his extraordinary Diary in magazine articles, 
but these portions had to do with the war era. His 
1 Ibid., p . 13. 
2Dunning, Reconstruction: Political and Economic, 
p. 82; Rhodes, Essays, p . 217; ________ , History of United 
States, VI, 72-75, 103. 
3Dunning, Essays, p . 139; , Reconstruction: 
Political and Economic, pp . 49-50; Rhodes, History of 
United States, VI, 53. 
4Letter from David c. Mearns (Chief, Manuscript 
Division, Library of Congress) to author, June 29, 1960. 
5Gideon Welles, Diary of Gideon Welles (Boston: 
Houghton, Mifflin & Co., 1911). 
Diary for the Reconstruction period had not been tapped 
by historians until the whole work was published in 1910-
1911 . 1 
The first person to take full advantage of these 
new resources and turn them to the defense of Andrew 
Johnson was James Schouler, who had to his credit a six 
volume history of the United States from its birth as 
a nation through the Civil War. Schouler had intended 
to make the sixth volume on the Civil War the last of 
his work; but when he read the Johnson manuscripts in 
the Library of Congress and especially when he read the 
Diary of Gideon Welles, he became convinced that Johnson 
had been mistreated by historians and a mistaken picture 
of his administration drawn. 
I now carefully studied the whole record of that 
term for myself, and as a result felt deepl y that 
this much maligned President needed a vindication, 
as against other hi s torical writers ; and furthermore, 
that the vindicator ought to be myself. 2 
So Schouler was enticed into writing a seventh volume 
covering the years 1865-1877. 
178 
Schouler admitted that Johnson was at times tactless 
and intemperate in speech. There was no doubt in Schouler ' s 
mind that these outbursts hurt Johnson politically, but 
their condemnation by historians had also been intemperate . 
lschouler, Reconstruction Period, p. 2. 
2 Ibid. , p . iii . 
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The accusation that Johnson was intoxicated during some 
of these speeches was cruel and untrue, excep t for the 
unfortunate occasion of his inauguration as vice-president. 
Also, Schouler wondered why historians considered Johnson 
so undignified and indecorous when very recently one 
of the presidents had been 
vituperative to the last degree in denunciation and 
abuse of those opposing him, and yet all the stronger 
for it with the people, because1they believe him honestly indignant and sincere . 
Johnson was a scrupulously honest president, according 
to Schouler 1 s findings, and his use of the patronage 
shone as an illustrious example in comparison to Grant's 
use of it. Congressional committees eagerly looked for 
the slightest trace of Johnson's use of his office for 
personal or corrupt purposes and they found none . 2 
Schouler's picture of Johnson was of a president 
who had courage to do what he thought right despite the 
political results . 3 The Reconstruction president was 
a strong, self-poised administrator. 
He \'Tas stubborn in political opinions vrhere he thought 
himself right, defiant, ready to fight for them; 
yet those opinions \'lere just, enlightened, and such 
as only4a sound and independent statesman could have formed . 
1 Ibid . , pp . 64 , 73, quote-75 . 
2rbid. , p . 131. 
3Ibid. , pp . 52-57. 
4rbid., p . 142. 
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Schouler periodically broke his narrative political 
account of the Reconstruction period to interject a personal 
recollection . At the time of which he wrote, Schouler 
had been a mature man. Before Reconstruction he had been 
educated at Harvard and admitted to the Massachusetts 
bar. He was admitted to the Supreme Court bar in 1867. 
He became a professor of law at Boston University in 
1882 , where he remained for twenty years, then finished 
his teaching career at The Johns Hopkins University. 
Though a professor of law he was honored for his work 
in history by being made president of the American Histori-
cal Association in 1897. 1 
Schouler was conservative on monetary, racial, 
and political matters, advocating sound money, limited 
suffrage, and rule by the men of "intelligence and pro-
perty," as James Ford Rhodes would say. His tone and 
approach is very similar to that of Rhodes; in fact, 
the treatment of Johnson was Schouler's only basic disagree-
ment with Rhodes, and this is the only part of the volume 
\'Thich presented any new material. The two-thirds of the 
volume concerned with the Grant era was taken very largely 
from Rhodes's longer account of the same period . The 
1Who Was Who, I, 1090- 1091. 
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selection of facts and the point of view are quite similar. 1 
This Schouler readily admitted. 
I have relied greatly upon the judicious and accurate 
recital of Mr. Rhodes, with whose general views I 
find myself in harmony. 2 
Though Schouler was the first historian to make 
full use of the new materials on Johnson, he was not 
the first twentieth century historian to give a favorable 
account of Andrew Johnson. A dozen years earlier than 
Schouler's seventh volume, James s . Jones, an east Tennes-
sean like Andrew Johnson, published a biography of the 
president. For this book Jones had access to all the 
papers and data which Johnson's daughter could furnish 
him , and she recommended the book to the public . 3 Jones 
was favorable to Johnson but did not erect a partisan 
defense of him as some writers did later. He was not 
abusive of the Radicals or unfair to the Negro except 
that he agreed with Johnson that universal suffrage was 
lsee Schouler , Reconstruction Period, pp . 19, 
34, 87- 88, 105- 106 , 130, 175, 252 , 257 for his opinion 
on the Negro and limited suffrage; pp . 173, 244 , 293 
for his opinion on sound money; pp . 104, 179 for his 
opinion on Reconstruction policy ; pp. 104-106, 170, 252ff., 
307 for his description of corruption due to Re construc-
tion ; pp. 121- 122 for his opinion on impeachment; pu . 344-
345, 352 for his opinion on the election of 1876--all 
of which are either derived from Rhodes or are very similar 
to Rhodes. 
2Ibid., pp. iii-iv. 
3Jones, Johnson, p . 3. 
not proper. l Jones wrote in a rather objective tone 
except that his sentimental attachment to the hometown 
boy who made good was noticeable . His book abounded with 
long quotations from Johnson ' s speeches or state papers . 
To Jones, Johnson was the conscientious student 
of the Constitution and its defender for the people . 
The Constitution was Johnson's chief reference, and he 
knew that many acts being passed by Congress were uncon-
stitutional . Since Johnson was the representative of 
all the people , it was his duty , according to Jones, 
to veto such acts and expose their illegality. 2 Jones 
believed Johnson's plan of Reconstruction was the same 
as Lincoln 1 s and was the wise policy. 3 He '\'Tas convinced 
that conviction of Johnson on the impeachment charges 
would have created more chaos than already existed. 
Conviction would have been a dangerous precedent whereby 
the president would be made controllable by a majority 
party . 4 
The second pre-Schouler appreciative account 
of Johnson was a study of the impeachment made by a New 
1 Ibid., pp. 200-201. 
2Ibid. , pp. 231-232. 
3Ibid., pp. 200-201. 
4 Ibid. , p . 278. 
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Jersey lawyer and member of the Democratic party. l David 
Miller DeWitt took this int rinsically interesting subject 
and enhanced its interest through a keen sense of drama 
and through beautiful succinct characterizations of several 
individuals involved in impeachment proceedings . DeWitt ' s 
chief underlying conviction was that the impeachment 
and trial was a court procedure despite what the Radicals 
might have thought it was . Since this was true, the 
Radicals had no real case against Johnson. They were 
not attempting to remove a treasonous or criminal official 
but were trying to rid themselves of a mighty political 
antagonist; therefore, many of the speeches made against 
the president were not sincere or solid in their legal 
foundation but were ridiculous, scandalizing, and sensation-
ally vituperous . 2 Also, since the impeachment trial was 
was a court procedure, the political pressures used by 
Radical senators on their wavering fellows were shocking. 
That it took place openly and unashamedly made it all 
the more shocking. Such attempts in regular judicial 
cases would have been dealt with very harshly . 3 DeWitt 
emphasized the political nature of the attack on Johnson 
by noting that the Tenure- of- Office Act was enacted simply 
lWho Was Who , I , 319. 
405 . 
2DeWitt, Impeachment ••• of Andrew Johnson, pp. 363, 
3rbid. , PP · 545-549 . 
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to snare the president and was renounced and amended almost 
out of existence during Grant's administration . 1 
DeWitt criticized Radicals as schemers and clever 
political maneuverers who tried to put across their programs 
by veiling their real meaning from the public. 2 Some 
of the acts they put through Congress ,.;ere in flagrant 
violation of the Constitution. 3 The Radicals' removal 
of the McCardle case from the jurisdiction of the Supreme 
Court demonstrated, in DeWitt ' s opinion, their lack of 
confidence in the validity of their own legislative pro-
gram. 4 But perhaps the greatest blunder of the Radicals, 
in DeWitt's opinion, was the granting of Negro suffrage 
which proved 
a curse to both races, ••• a stumbling block to good 
government and a deadly taint to · the social order, 
which even the fifteenth amendment should be suffered 
no longer to perpetuate . 5 
As this opinion tends to indicate, DeWitt showed no favor 
to the congressional policy of Reconstruction or the 
state governments established under that policy. 6 
lrbid. , pp. 609-610. 
2rbid. , pp . 64, 79, 110, 159, 174. 
3rb1d . , pp . 201-202. 
4rb1d. , pp. 402-403. 
5 Ibid. , p . 626. 
6rbid. , p . 625. 
DeWitt defended Johnson against those historians 
who emphasized Johnson's lack of dignity especially in 
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his impromptu campaign speeches. The undignified aspect 
of these speeches was exaggerated by those reporters 
interested in showing that Johnson was degrading the 
presidential office . Besides , Johnson's utterances demon-
strated "his devotion to his cause and his indomitable 
determination to stand by it to the last. "1 
Andrew Johnson was to have his strongest defense 
in two biographies published in the late 1920's. One 
of these was quite moderate in its sympathy to Johnson; 
the second was a lawyer's brief. The author of the former, 
Robert Watson Winston, was a native of North Carolina 
who received his education for the legal profession at 
the University of North Carolina. He was a Democratic 
politician in the 1880's; he served on the superior court 
bench of North Carolina from 1889 to 1895, when he resigned. 
At the age of sixty he went back to college to prepare 
himself "to interpret the New South to the Nation and 
the Nation to the New South. 112 
Winston portrayed Johnson as a man who though 
stubborn at times was extremely loyal and who placed 
country above personal success. Johnson was the soul 
lrbid., pp. 124-125, quote-125. 
2,Vho Was Who , II, 587. 
of virtue and \iholesomeness and simplicity . He was 11a 
kind and a forgiving man" and was not a drunkard as some 
have suggested. l Johnson was a great defender of the 
Constitution, in Winston ' s opinion. The Reconstruction 
president's vetoes of certain measures extending civil 
rights were not due to animosity toward the Negro but 
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to his respect for the Constitution. 2 Winston pointed 
out that most historians and certainly the courts of the 
United States by 1928 agreed with President Johnson about 
the Reconstruction legislation. 3 Winston suggested that 
Johnson belonged in the ranks of national heroes as "a 
plain , rugged , two-fisted American President, striving 
to do the right thing as best he could. "4 
Though Winston gave a very calm report of the 
impeachment, his tone was definitely one of opposition 
to the proceedings. He suggested that the Republicans 
who voted against conviction would be remembered long 
after their critics were forgotten and that the country 
had a narrow escape when the unscrupulous Ben Wade nearly 
became president. 5 
lwinston , Johnson, pp . 371, 373, 387, 390, quote- 387. 
2rbid., p . 379. 
3rbid. , p . 510. 
4 Ibid . , p. 512. 
5 Ibid. , pp . 428-454 , 480. 
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In his interpretation of the Reconstruction process 
itself, Winston depended heavily on the writings of Burgess, 
Dunning, and Rhodes . He believed the presidential plan 
of Reconstruction the proper one . 1 He felt the Black 
Codes justified2 and that conditions did not warrant 
the drastic measures taken by the Congress . These measures 
were meant to coerce the South, were passed for political 
purposes, and were unconstitutional . 3 Winston's attitude 
toward the Negro was the same as Rhodes ' s, whose quotation 
of Agassiz Winston requoted. He condemned Congress for 
its monstrous attempt to v~ench power from the whites 
and place it in the hands of an ignorant and untrained 
population. 
In the light of recent years and of racial conflicts, 
the world over, it must be recognized that racial 
instincts and antipathies are ineradicable . Lincoln 
and Johnson appreciated this fact . Congress over-
looked it. Lincoln and Johnson knew that a civilization 
could not be4uprooted overnight; that it must grow and develop. 
Winston seemed to have vaguely noticed some imper-
sonal forces in the Reconstruction conflict. He mentioned 
that the struggle between Johnson and Congress was the 
struggle between a strict interpretation of the Constitution 
libid., pp. 329-330. 
2Ibid. , p. 379 . 
3rbid., pp . 341, 377 , 379, 395-396, 492, 510. 
4 Ibid. , pp. 515-517, quote-517. 
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on one hand and the modern nationalistic spirit on the 
other hand, and about the whole process he asks: 
Was not reconstruction a struggle between the individu-
alism of ante-bellum days and the governmental and 
industrial concentration, unification and cooperation 
of our own timea?l 
He did not elaborate on such ideas, however, and indeed 
they didn't seem to greatly affect the rest of the narrative . 
It seemed that, much like W. E. Woodward , Winston was 
acknowledging a nodding acquaintance with the new school 
of historiography being developed by Charles A. Beard 
and others but that the yeast had not yet leavened the 
whole loaf.2 
Despite the works of Schouler and Winston, Lloyd 
Paul Stryker felt that Andrew Johnson had not received 
his due vindication at the judgment bar of history. This 
New York la~~er's biography of Johnson, published in 
1929, was designed to redress the balance and once and 
for all do justice to this man who was crucified in Abraham 
Lincoln's place . 3 Stryker's biography was an elaborate 
advocate's defense of Johnson which upheld and justified 
the subject at all points in the most lavish terms, while 
it viciously attacked and vilif~ed the enemies of Johnson. 
lrbid., pp. 393-394. 
2 Winston listed Charles A. and Mary R. Beard's 
Rise of American Civilization in his bibliography. 
3stryker, Johnson, p. vii. 
Stryker defended Johnson as being a temperate man , as 
an honest man, and as the great defender of the Cons t1tu-
t1on. 1 The president ' s impromptu speeches so criticized 
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by his detractors were sometimes a little indiscreet, 
according to Stryker, but mostly they were strong , direct, 
courageous stands on important public matters . 2 Johnson ' s 
course on Reconstruction Stryker declared to be the correct, 
the honorable, the constitutional, the magnanimous course--
the course of Abraham Lincoln. 3 
Congressional Reconstruction to Stryker was a 
horrible, tragic, unconstitutional regime forced upon 
the South unnecessarily. He believed with Dunning that 
the Black Codes were an honest attempt on the part of 
Southerners to bring order out of chaos, and therefore 
Congress was not justified in its retaliation against 
them. 4 He agreed with Burgess that Reconstruction was 
a dark period of tyranny and corruption which was worse 
than the most awful experiences of the Civil War.5 The 
motives of the Radicals were to impose vindictive punishment 
upon the South and to keep the Republican party in permanent 
libid. , pp. 166-168 , 209, 329, 454. 
2Ibid. , pp. 279-285, 341-372. 
3rb1d. , pp. 214-220. 
4 Ibid. , pp. 250-252. 
5Ibid.' p . viii . 
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domination. Their method was to ignore the fact of race, 
enfranchise the Negro, and place his heel on the neck of 
his rormer master , who had surrendered 1n all good fa1th . 1 
The Congressional Reconstruction Acts were unnecessary, 
unconstitutional, hypocritical, reckless, malicious , 
and violated that good faith in which the Southerners 
had surrendered . "Infamy had been enacted into law! The 
blackest page that ever disgraced our statute books was 
written!"2 
Stryker, like Winston, took his evidence on the 
Negro from Rhodes . He quoted Louis Agassiz from Rhodes 's 
quote to the effect that the Negro was inferior and too 
many rights should not be given to an inferior race . 
The Negro, Stryker declared, was three thousand to four 
thousand years behind the white man and still curtailed 
by his African habits . These are the people to whom 
Radicals gave the rule of the South while taking it away 
from "the descendants of the Revolutionary patriots and 
the founders of the Constitution. n3 Along ld th the Negroes, 
thieves and gangsters and Southern renegades ruled and 
plundered the helpless Southern people. The dregs of 
society, the worst of the camp-followers , fugitives from 
1 Ibid. , pp . 294-303, 788-792. 
2 Ibid., pp. 441-456, quote-455. 
3Ibid., pp. 293-299 , quote-294. 
Northern justice held sway in the Southern states . 1 
Stryker was convinced that not yet had the real 
history of Reconstruction in ~1e Southern states been 
written . This chapter of "our criminal annals" had not 
received full exploitation; however , he believed that 
eventually a master his torian would come 
to paint the dreadful picture of the aftermath of 
Appomattox , - - the crimes against the state, the crimes 
against the home, the larcenies, the rivalries, and 
the rapes , political and domestic , the prostitution 
of public virtue, the domination of the negro and 
the adventurer . And when the awful masterpiece is 
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done, there , against a flaming background of desolation, 
the hopes, the aspirations, the struggles, the character 
and the life of Andrew Johnson will stand fort~ like 
an unscathed cross upon a smoking battlefield. 
At the time of impeachment Stryker pointed out, 
as had Oberholtzer, that Johnson received numerous offers 
from former soldiers to defend him in the crisis. Therefore, 
Stryker contended that Johnson, had he chosen, could 
have started another civil war in which the forces of 
honor and respect for the Constitution would have been 
on his side, and the forces of dishonor and hypocrisy 
would have been on the Radicals' side. 
No one can read Johnson's story without the temptation 
to regret that he did not put that bugle to his lips, 
and fight that war upon hypocrisy with bayonets . 
1rbid. , pp . 788-792. 
2 Ibid. , p . 797. 
Stevens and Sumner had reveled long enough in their 
sadistic persecution orgies!l 
But, according to Stryker, Johnson chose the road of 
higher courage--the hemlock, if necessary. 2 
Thus, in highly colored, spectacular style did 
Stryker marshal the case for the defense of both Johnson 
and the South. Stryker was criticized by historians as 
partisan and faulty in his judgment, as readable but 
unscholarly.3 He was accused, in attacking the Radicals , 
of choosing the Radicals 1 mm methods which were under 
attack at that time by historians . 
When he picks up their tone and lards his pages with 
vindictive adjectives he moves himself backward into 
192 
a chapter ~f American historiography which, fortunately, 
is closed. 
In his revie'\v of James Ford Rhodes 1 s volumes on 
Reconstruction, William Garrott Brown stated that though 
Rhodes's history was plain and undramatic with a little 
stiffness and clumsiness, 
One can hardly believe that ••• Lthe Reconstruction 
stori7 will not some day be told after a fashion 
1~., p . 585. 
2 Ibid., p . 586. 
3Howard K. Beale, The Critical Year A Study of 
Andrew Johnson and Reconstruction {New York: Harcourt, 
Brace & Co., 1930), p. 429 (Bibliography) . 
4N. w. Stephenson, Review of Andrew Johnson A 
Study 1n Courage, by Lloyd Paul Stryker, The American 
Historical Review, XXXV (October, 1931), 139. 
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that will take it into literature •••• 111 
Perhaps it would not be amiss to conclude this discussion 
of the individuals "'Ti thin the "Dunning" interpretation 
with an account of Claude Gernade Bowers• attempt to 
accomplish just what Bro\m had in mind. It is also fitting 
to consider Bowers as the climax of the "Dunning" movement 
because he has taken most of the features of that inter-
pretation and exaggerated and enhanced them. He emphasized 
politics to a much greater degree than Rhodes and Dunning; 
he placed even more emphasis on personalities rather 
than forces and movements ; he highlighted the corruption 
of the neriod to an even greater extent than most members 
of the 11Dunning11 school; he denounced the Radicals more 
vehemently; he ridiculed the Negro more relentlessly; 
he defended the Southerners ar.d their point of view more 
openly and with more assurance; and he joined with Stryker 
in placing the capstone on the exaltation and defense 
of Andrew Johnson. 
BO"'/ers was a native of Indiana who ,.,orked as a 
journalist from 1901-1933 before he began a twenty year 
span of service as ambassador, first to Spain, then to 
Chile . He was an active member of the Democratic party , 
serving as chairman and keynote speaker of the Democratic 
National Convention in Houston in 1928, the year before 
1Brown, The American Historical Review, XII, 383 . 
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the publication of The Tragic Era. 1 His work on Reconstruc-
tion reflected his Democratic background. 
The Radicals , according to Bowers, were interested 
only in the perpetuation of their power, and in order to 
accomplish this goal they forced a revolution in the 
politics and society of the South and a revolution in 
the federal government. "Principle everywhere was yielding 
to expediency . Patriotism was bowing to party. 112 In 
the South the Union League and the Freedmen's Bureau 
were used as instruments of the Radicals to gain ·control 
of the Negro and his vote through persuasion, intimidation, 
and coercion. 3 The Carpetbaggers, according to Bowers , 
were largely corrupt men who pillaged the Southern state 
treasuries and elevated stealing to a virtue. They used 
the state militia as an instrument of the party, they 
produced fraudulent votes and rigged elections, they 
fed propaganda to the North about Southern white outrages 
on the innocent blacks in order to divert attention from 
the monstrous conditions of scandal and corruption within 
the Carpetbag governments . 4 Bowers gave caustic caricatures 
l\iho 1 s Who, XXX, 300. 
2Bowers, Tragic Era, pp. 93 , 104, 115, quote-120. 
3Ibid. , pp. 198, 202- 203 , 307. 
4rbid., pp. 201, 307, 353 , 356 , 363, 369- 370, 
392, 424,~, 438 , 448, 514, 539 . 
of the Negroes in government and positions of authority. 
He demonstrated little respect for their intellectual 
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ability . "Those on the coast and rivera were little above 
the intellectual level of the mules they drove . "1 The 
ones who were a little more intelligent were used by 
the Carpetbaggers to control the ignorant mass of Negro 
population which dominated some Southern states . 2 
The governments which these elements established, 
Bowers contended, were forced upon the South and \'Tere 
penetrated with bribery , corruption, and ignorance . 
Corruption in state bonds mounted into millions; money 
was was ted on expensive luxuries for Carpetbag , Scalawag , 
and Negro leaders . Radical leaders did not hesitate to 
use intimidation and "the bayonet was the master of the 
ballot."3 The state constitutions which established these 
governments "sounded the death- knell of civilization 
in the South. "4 Such a situation justified, in Bowers ' 
mind , the development of an organization such as the Ku 
Klux Klan . He characterized the Klan as a group composed 
of men of character and substance , the best men of the 
community , and having as its purpose 11 the protection of 
libid., p . 358. 
2Ibid., pp. 354, 358 , 414. 
3rb1d., pp . 316- 317, 356- 362 , 414, quote- 359. 
4 Ibid., p . 218. 
women, property, civilization itself. "1 Not until the 
Klan began its work did the white women of the South 
gain some sense of security. 2 Finally, however, as was 
inevitable for a secret organization, the Klan fell into 
the control of a lower group , according to Bowers--the 
ignorant poor whites who caused great damage in many 
places . Not only this, but Radicals committed crimes 
196 
in costume in order to cast blame on the Klan and strengthen 
the position of the Radical government. 3 The Enforcement 
Acts passed by Congress to control Klan activity were, 
in Bowers' opinion, unconstitutional because destructive 
of states' rights . He felt they were "a dastardly conspiracy ••• 
manipulated by the officials of the Federal Government!"4 
Although Bowers considered the Enforcement Acts a con-
spiracy against the South, he declared the election of 
1876 to be the greatest conspiracy in United States history. 
The election should have gone to Tilden by a considerable 
majority but Republican electoral boards transferred 
sufficient votes to elect Hayes . 5 
Bowers was an admirer and defender of Andrew Johnson. 
libid., p . 309. 
2 12.19:· ' p . 308. 
3 Ibid. , pp. 308-311, 345. 
4 Ibid., pp. 342 , 345-346, quote-345. 
5Ib1d., pp . 523-527, 535-536 . 
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In contrast to many of the earlier members of the "Dunning" 
school, Bowers praised Johnson ' s swing around the circle 
of 1866. 
Never in history had a president gone forth on a 
greater mission--to appeal for constitutional govern-
ment and the restoration of union through conciliation 
and common sense; and never had one been so scurvily 
treated . l 
Bowers described Johnson as being of complex nature--
honest, inflexible, tender, able , forceful, and tactless . 
But it was fortunate for the United States that he had 
two passions-- the Constitution and the Union . Bowers 
proclaimed Johnson to be one of the nation's greatest 
servants . 2 
It is interesting to note a slight difference 
of Bowers from the other members of the "Dunning" school. 
He suggested that during the Reconstruction period a 
revolution transpired which transformed the government 
from the instrument of an agricultural society to the 
agent of an industrial society. The basis of power in 
the country changed hands . The old controversy between 
Hamiltonianism and Jeffersonianism would continue, but 
after Recons truction Hamiltonianism had the advantage. 
However, Bowers just suggested this meaty subject and 
did not pursue it, nor did he explain the history of 
1Ib1d., p . 138. 
2Ibid., pp. 44 , 460. 
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the period in terms of it. Like Winston's and Stryker 's 
recognition of some vague impersonal forces in Re construc-
tion, Bowers recognized but did not exploit that quality 
which Charles A. Beard had just the year before declared 
to be the principal fact about the period. Bowers still 
wrote his history in terms of personalities rather than 
social forces . 1 
The Tragic Era was a popular success, selling 
approximately 140,000 volumes by 1960. 2 However , among 
reviewers, the book was accepted more critically. One 
agreed with Bowers' point of view but thought he went 
much too far, protested too much, and used a style too 
sweeping and strident. 3 Howard K. Beale had hooed for 
a definitive work on Reconstruction in Bowers ' volume 
but was disappointed . "The book is amazingly partisan 
fhe wrot~, better as a Democratic campaign document 
than as sober history. 114 A. M. Schlesinger quarrelled 
with Bowers' whole thesis that the Reconstruction period 
1Bowers did not list Beard's Rise of American 
Civilization in his bibliography. 
2Letter from Houghton, Mifflin & Co. to author, 
April 22, 1960. As far as I have been able to determine, 
this is by far the largest sale figure for any book on 
Reconstruction. 
3Charles R. Lingley, Review of The Tragic Era 
The Revolution After Lincoln, by Claude G. Bowers, The 
American Historical Review, XXXV (January, 1930), 382-383. 
4seale, Critical Year, p . 428 (Bibliography) . 
was so completely disastrous. Despite all the misdeeds 
and the threats of the era, Schlesinger claimed, 11 the 
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process of Reconstruction was, as a matter of fact, excep-
tionally mild as such things go in history. 111 
Bowers drew his most scathing reviews from Negro 
readers. w. E. B. DuBois described The Tragic Era as 
an excellent and readable piece of current newspaper 
reporting, absolutely devoid of historical judgment 
or sociological knowledge. It is a classic example 
of historical propaganda of the cheaper sort. 2 
The three reviews of the work which appeared in The Journal 
of Negro History were all very unfavorable. The reviewers 
condemned the work as propaganda and misrepresentation, 
as unhistoric history and melodrama; and they predicted 
for it a sinister influence among the uninformed of the 
country.3 
The purpose of this chapter and the preceding 
lA. M. Schlesinger, Review of The Tragic Era 
The Revolution After Lincoln, by Claude G. Bowers, The 
New Republi c, LX (October 9, 1929), 210. 
2DuBois, Black Reconstruction, p . 721. 
3Anonymous, Review of The Tragic Era The Revolution 
After Lincoln, by Claude G. Bowers, The Journal of Negro 
History , XV (January, 1930), 117-119; Sterling A. Brown, 
11Unhistoric History," The Journal of Negro History, XV 
(April, 1930), 134-161 (156-158 on Bowers); John R. Lynch, 
Letter concerning The Tragic Era The Revolution After 
Lincoln, by Claude G. Bowers, The Journal of Negro History, XVr (January, 1931), 103-120. 
one has been to demonstrate the differences in opinion 
and emphasis among the many writers of the 11Dunning11 
school. In addition an attempt has been made to point 
out some factors in the personal lives of the historians 
which may have affected their point of view. This has 
been difficult or impossible in some cases because of 
the obscurity of the individual. \'Ti thin the 11 Dunning11 
school itself there were opinions and emphases which 
foreshadowed the changes revisionists would try to impose 
upon this interpretation of Reconstruction, which was 
easily the dominant interpretation in the first three, 
if not the first six, decades of the twentieth century. 
Most of these prescient factors have been pointed out , 
and they will be reiterated as the revisionist historians 
are discussed. 
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PART II : REVISION- -EMPHASIS ON ECONOMIC 
AND SOCIAL FACTORS IN RECONSTRUCTION 
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CHAPTER 5 
THE 11BEARD-BEALE11 INTERPRETATION 
While the "Dunning" historians were producing their 
'\'forks on Reconstruction and adhering to the scientific 
historiography dominant in the early twentieth century, 
a small group of historians was beginning to make inroads 
into the concept of scientific history and was signaling 
the beginning of vast changes which were to take place 
in American historiography in the succeeding decades . 
This group of pioneering scholars attacked the scientific 
school with its profession of objectivity and its concen-
tration on political and institutional matters . The heretics 
felt that the newly established historical profession 
had become too rigid and that it too closely adhered 
to English and German models . They felt that the scientific 
school's emphasis on the establishment of facts rather 
than the conscious interpretation of facts was a dis-
advantage to the historian. The limited range of the 
school's accepted subjects did not leave the historian 
liberty to use ne'\'l tools and new methods in understanding 
the economic and social problems which were developing. 
The innovators '\'ian ted to broaden the historical concept 
to include economic, cultural, intellectual, and religious 
203 
aspects of the past as well as the political and constitu-
tional factors. These were new ideas, and most historians 
were loyal to the traditional concept of history as exempli-
fied in the scientific school; consequently, when, after 
1910, Carl Becker, Charles A. Beard , James Harvey Robinson , 
Lynn Thorndike , Frederick Jackson Turner, and others 
began to employ new tools and exploit new interests , 
they caused great controversy. Most professionals took 
this as an attack on everything they stood for despite 
the fact that the group of innovators declared it was 
only a natural expansion of historical horizons. As 
the traditionalists clung to their concepts the critics 
had to exaggerate the claims for their new type of history. 
They had to convince the majority that what they wrote 
was still history. 
What were the concepts these critics of the scien-
tific school were trying to advance? One was their skep-
ticism about the historian's ability to arrive at objective 
truth about historical facts . They claimed that a historian's 
interpretation of the past was not decided strictly by 
the historical data with which he dealt but was tremendously 
influenced by his personality, by his circumstances , by 
his education, and by the climate of opinion of the era 
in which he lived. Since historical facts were relative 
to the historian's circumstance, the truth could better 
be gotten at by the historian's frank recognition and 
admission of his frame of reference . Any historian , even 
the scientific historian, wrote within a personal frame 
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of reference whether he admitted it or not . When one 
admitted the frame of reference , then within this frame-
work he could achieve a high degree of fairness and objec-
tivity . Another thing the critics wanted to accomplish 
was to broaden the scope of historical interest. They 
believed economic , cultural , intellectual , social, and 
religious aspects to be just as important, if not of 
more fundamental importance, than political and constitu-
tional factors . Such broadening of concepts would give 
impetus to the production of important intellectual and 
social histories and would make more acceptable the economic 
interpretation on which Charles A. Beard and others were 
insisting. 
By the mid- 1920's the critics of the traditional 
scientific historiography had made their point and were 
winning the battle. In this decade Vernon L. Parrington 
and Beard published their monumental works; A. M. Schlesinger 
and D. R. Fox began their History of American Life series; 
and Carl Becker wrote a resounding defense of the pragmatic 
or relativist point of view. By the 1930 1 s most young 
historians , whether they liked it or not , were impressed 
by relativist thinking;and with the acute economic problems 
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of the 1930 1 ~ economic interpretations , even Marxist 
interpretations, became more fashionable. By this time 
much more stress in American historical ~~iting was placed 
on social, economic, and intellectual developments . 1 
With the broadening of historical boundaries and 
the development of new interpretations of history, historians 
began to add signific~mtly to the social and economic 
kno'tdedge of the Reconstruction period. These factors 
were given increasing attention and respect . Economic 
developments were increasingly considered essential for 
the understanding of the process of Reconstruction. 
Several hi s torians , led by Charles A. Beard and Howard 
K. Beale , developed a concept of Reconstruction based 
on an economic interpre tation . They felt compelled by 
the problems of the new age in which they lived to ask 
new questions of history--questions which involved man ' s 
basic motivations and the role of economic factors in 
lAusubel , Historians and Their Craft , pp. 89, 
333 ; Barnes , Twentieth Century Ameri ca , ed. Roucek , pp . 
770- 772; Holtrard K. Beale , "lVhat Historians Have Said 
About the Causes of the Civil \'lar, 11 Theory and Practice 
in Historical Study, p . 87; James C. Malin , Essa*s on 
Historiography (Privately published , 1946), p . 1 8; 
John Herman Randall , Jr. and George Haynes, IV, 11 Controlling 
Assumptions in the Practice of American Historians, 11 
Theory and Practice in Historical Study, pp. 23-27, 50-
52 ; Saveth , Understanding the American Past, pp. 33-34; 
Charlotte Watkins Smith , Carl Becker: On History & the 
Climate of Opinion (Ithaca , New York: Cornell University 
Press, 1956), pp. 70 , 83, 363 . 
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any pattern of action . 
Charles A. Beard's education at DePauw University 
in Indiana shortly before the turn of the century started 
him out on his quest for more than just the political 
and military aspects of history. His professor at DePauw 
was James R. Weaver who , i'lhile even the best teachers 
elsewhere were emphasizing political, constitutional, 
and institutional development , taught Beard the social 
and economic forces in history and emphasized the social 
implications of every subject studied. Before entering 
graduate school at Columbia University , Beard studied 
economic history in England, worked with the British 
labor movement, and wrote a book on The Industrial Revolu-
tion. l He studied at Oxford and Cornell before attending 
Columbia and receiving his Ph. D. degree in 1904. 2 At 
Columbia, Beard was a disciple of James Harvey Robinson 
with whom he became t he leading proponent of the "new 
history . " The "new history" Robinson described as not 
new at all but rather the very old concept of studying 
the past not for its own sake but for the sake of the 
present. This 11present- minded11 attitude , along with 
the emphasis upon social , intellectual , and economic 
lHoward K. Beale (ed . ) , Charles A. Beard An 
Appraisal (Lexington : University of Kentucky Press, 
1954), pp. 122, 129. 
2Who's Who, XXIV , 156. 
factors as being of basic importance, are the identifying 
aspects of the "new history . 111 
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Beard's philosophy of relativism in history was 
influenced by Benedetto Croce who believed that history 
was a product of the mind and, therefore, it varied from 
historian to historian, from person to person. A histo-
rian's view and writing of history was vitally influenced 
by his circumstances and his personality. The belief 
that facts were relative allowed one to draw conclusions 
and interpretations from the facts that were available 
without waiting until all the facts were in, as a searcher 
for absolutes must do. Since it was unlikely that all 
of the information about a particular episode would ever 
become knOWl'\ the facts \-Thich were available had to be 
used from which to draw conclusions and interpretations. 
In this way the past could be used to help in understanding 
the present.2 
Beard studied the works of Karl Marx and was 
influenced by them, but his ideas did not stem from the 
writings of Marx alone. He could not accept the dialectical 
class struggle concept of history because it left no room 
lAusubel, Historians and Their Craft, p. 85; 
Barnes, Twentieth Century America, ed. Roucek, pp . 770-
772. 
2Ausubel, Historians and Their Craft, p . 89; 
Beale (ed.), Beard , pp . 140-141. 
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for personalities, human will , chance, ideas, and ethics--
all of which he thought \'Tere important along with the 
powerful economic forces. He revealed that: 
my conception of the economic interpretation of history 
rests upon documentation older than Karl Marx--Number 
X of the Federalist, the writings of the Fathers 
of the Republic, the works of Daniel Webster, the 
treatises of Locke, Hobbes , and Machiavelli, and 
the Politics of Aristotle--as well as the \'~itings 
of Marx himself~l 
He believed with Madison that there were many interest 
groups within the society--manufacturing interests, railway 
interests, landed interests, shipping interests, etc . --
which conflict and compete, each seeking its own interests . 
These internal contradictions would not cease but must 
be recognized, and such recognition, he thought, was 
the beginning of wisdom e.nd statesmanship~ 2 
Beard didn ' t write a book on Reconstruction itself 
but his treatment of the Civil War and Reconstruction in 
The Rise of American Civilization (1927), written in collabo-
ration with his wife, was so important and influential 
that it warrants consideration. The Beards vie'\·Ted the 
Civil War and its aftermath as "The Second American Revolu-
tion11 because of its impact in transforming American 
lcharles. A. Beard , "That Noble Dream, 11 The American 
Historical Review, XLI (October, 1935), 85; Beale (ed.), 
Beard, pp. 121-122. 
2 Ibid. , p. 117. 
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social, economic , and political life . The epoch represented 
that phase in American history through which all industrial 
nations mus t pass--the transition from a society controlled 
by agr arian interests to one controlled by industrial, 
commercial , and financial interests . 1 The Civil War 
was the method by which these interests seized control 
from the formerly ascendant planter aristocracy. The 
Re construction process was the method of consolidating 
and guaranteeing the change against reaction . 2 The revolu-
tion of Civil War and Reconstruction left the capitalists 
in complete control of the United States government . 
They took advantage of this by legislating favors and 
advantages for business in the form of tariffs, national 
banks , subsidies, and grants . They imposed their ideas 
on the legal system and the Constitution of the country. 3 
The Second American Revolution , while destroying 
the economic foundation of the slave-owning aristocracy , 
assured the triumph of business enterprise .4 
Within their economic frame of reference the Beards 
were able to maintain a high degree of detachment and 
lcharles A. and Mary R. Beard , The Rise of American 
Civilization (2 vole . ; New York : Macmillan Co . , 1930; 
first published in 1927) , II , 166- 167. 
2Ibid., PP· 120-121. 
3 Ibid . , pp. 105-110. 
4Ibid., p . 166. 
objectivity. Since the process was just an inexorable 
part of the normal trend of economic development, they 
did not feel constrained to moralize about whether Recon-
struction was good or bad, cruel or just. They made no 
judgments about the ability of the Negro but pointed 
out that the Negro played no role in his own liberation, 
had not advanced during bondage , and was not prepared 
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to be an effective factor in society at the time of his 
liberation . They believed there \oras no evidence to indicate 
that had land been given to the Negro he would have handled 
his opportunity well . In his state of unpreparedness , 
therefore, the Negro remained under the practical control 
of the Washington powers which directed the revolution. l 
The Beard thesis was first elaborated on in a 
detailed work exclusively on Reconstruction by Howard 
K. Beale . Beale was a native of Chicago and a graduate 
of the University of Chicago who received his doctorate 
from Harvard University in 1927, the year the Beards 
published The Rise of American Civilization. 2 Upon publica-
tion of The Critical Year in 1930, Beale became one of 
the prominent names in Reconstruction historiography. 
He taught two decades at the University of North Carolina 
where he established a center of history which produced 
libid., pp. 116- 117. 
2,fuo 1 s Who , XXX, 182. 
a generation of successful scholars, including C. Vann 
Woodward who has made his own mark in revising the inter-
pretation of Reconstruction. l Beale ended his teaching 
career at the University of Wisconsin where he died in 
1959. The organizations to which Beale belonged give 
211 
an indication of some of his attitudes. He was a member 
of the Association for the Study of Negro Life and History , 
the National Association for the Advancement of Colored 
People, the American Civil Liberties Union, the National 
Committee on Conscientious Objectors, and the National 
Council for Prevention of War. 2 
Like Beard, Beale believed that history was subjective 
in nature, that the historian was influenced in his view 
of history by his philosophy of life, his belief or disbelief 
in democracy, his education, his attitude toward urban 
or agrarian life, his attitude toward the Negro's place 
in society, his attitude toward the relative importance 
of human rights and property rights, and his social and 
economic status . In a study of the causes of the Civil 
War, Beale revealed that these factors were important 
and that he believed a historian who recognized and frankly 
admitted his personal frame of reference could approach 
71. 
lBrewer , The Journal of Negro History, XLII, 
2Who 1 s Who, XXX, 182. 
objectivity with more success than those who thought 
themselves objective merely because they used scientific 
tools.l He was also convinced that the study of the 
past could serve a useful purpose in the present. 
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Stud~ of the past , therefore, may increase the indivi-
dual s capacity to meet current problems intelligently. 
Multiplied manifold this individual capacity could 
help society as a whole to avoid repeating mistakes 
of past generations and to plan for a better future. 
This purpose probably is better served by historians 
and students ~rho, witl1 due caution and humility, 
do attempt to interpret and explain the past2than by those who merely catalogue what happened. 
The year 1866 Beale felt to be the crucial one 
of the Reconstruction period, the year when momentous 
decisions were made which affected not only Reconstruction 
in the South but the direction of economic development 
in the succeeding decades. Beale's basic thesis was 
that the Southern question was not the basic issue in 
1866; the real issue was economic. The controversy during 
Reconstruction was actually a new phase of 
the familiar American struggle of East against West, 
old settled regions against frontier, business against 
agriculture, ci~y against country , 'haves' against 
'have-nota' •••• 
The Radicals were representatives of the rising industrial 
class, and their restrictive Reconstruction policy was 
lBeale , Theory and Practice in Historical Study , 
pp. 86- 91. 
2rbid., pp. 91-92. 
3Beale , Critical Year, p . 145. 
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based on a desire to maintain the Republican party in 
power in order to inaugurate favorable legislation for 
the business community. If Radicals could keep the South 
out of the Union until it was safely dominated by Radical 
elements and allowed back into the Union under Radical 
government, then the national government would be in 
safe hands as far as big business was concerned. Should 
the Southern states, ho,.,rever, be allo"red back into the 
Union under Johnson's plan of Reconstruction, the South 
and its natural agrarian ally, the West, \'lOUld control 
the federal government and endanger business' program 
of high protective tariffs, sound money, and monopolistic 
tendencies. 
If Southern interests had coincided with those of 
the rising industrial groups of the North , there would 
have been no Radical reconstruction. The real danger 
from 'a return of rebels to power' was not overthrow 
of the Union, but ousting of the new industrial forces 
from control in Washington through a renewed union 
of Southern planters and Wes tern farmers.l 
Beale contended that the Radicals ''fere able to 
win the very crucial election of 1866 not because the 
majority of people in the country favored the Radicals' 
Southern program or their economic program but because 
the Radicals \>raged such an effective, emotional, slanderous 
type of campaign. ,N.hile conservatives were seeking to 
1Ibid., pp. 8-9 , 145-147, 236 , 265 , 272 , 275 , 
quote-225. 
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soothe the war fever, the Radicals constantly revived 
the war memories for their own political gain. Though 
popular opinion was at first against the Radicals ' economic 
program and reconstruction program, the Radicals so success-
fully hid the economic issue and reopened old wartime 
antagonisms that they won a resounding victory in the 
election. They so controlled the press, clouded the real 
issues by "claptrap," appealed to emotions, and attached 
the stigma of copperheadism and treason to their enemies 
that Johnson and his followers were overcome. 1 Beale 
admitted that some Radicals were sincerely concerned about 
the Negro's freedom and his ability to vote; some sincerely 
feared the effect of former Confederates coming back 
into the federal government . However, some merely wanted 
to stay in po"rer, while a great number wanted the Negro 
vote for expediency's sake and wanted to maintain political 
power in order to prevent the destruction of the legislative 
enactments favorable to business~ 2 
Though Beale gave a different set of motives 
for the Radicals, his attitude toward them differed little 
from the 11 Dunning11 interpretation. Although he did admit 
that some were sincere humanitarians whose efforts happened 
to be in line with their economic motives, he saw no good 
libid., pp . 141-142, 300- 375. 
2Ibid., pp. 143-145, 173-174, 195~ 
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in the Radicals and their program of Reconstruction. 
He thought Reconstruction was the wrong term for the 
~wong program imposed for the \1rong motives . The Radicals 
also were wrongly labeled because they were radical only 
on matters concerning not themselves but a distant rival, 
and on economic questions they were generally conservative. 
Beale interpreted the opponents of the Radical Reconstruction 
program as leaning toward "radicalism of an agrarian 
type . "1 
The Radicals misrepresented the situation in the 
South in order to get their legislation passed , according 
to Beale . The lawlessness which existed in the South 
was not a manifestation of defiance or resistance to the 
government. The Black Codes were not unjustifiable in 
the light of the Southern Negro problem. The Negro 's 
work was undependable and irresponsible. The Freedmen's 
Bureau Beale deemed undoubtedly important and necessary 
for the protection of the Negro in many areas but in some 
areas intolerable not only because of what it stood for 
but because of the incompetence and partisanship of some 
of the Bureau agents . 2 Congressional Reconstruction 
seemed to Beale disastrous for the South. "Real recon-
1 Ibid . , p . 7. 
2rbid., pp . 47, 69, 93-96, 157-158, 167, 188-
191, 193-194. 
struction did not come until Southerners were free to 
work it out for themselves . "1 
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Beale was a defender of Andrew Johnson. He felt 
that historians had dealt unduly harshly with the Recon-
struction pr esident. Many had accepted the Radical point 
of view about Johnson being a pig- headed , drunken, incapable 
president. Of course , by 1930 much had been done by 
Schouler and 'Unston , Stryker and Bowers to rehabilitate 
Johnson . Beale portrayed him as a courageous man , a sober 
man , and a fairly able president whose policies were th''larted 
due to the unfai r tactics of the Radicals . In his Recon-
struction policy Johnson ' s cause was just, in Beale's 
opinion . In addition to this , Johnson made a courageous 
stand against monopoly and big business, against tariff 
and tax laws favorable to the wealthy. 2 He was opposed 
to those who sought profit through exploitation of the 
public wealth. He thus stood out as "one of the first 
great conservators of our national resources . "3 For these 
reasons the Radicals were opposed to Johnson. Though 
Beale tried to vindicate Johnson , in many ways he criticized 
him. Time and again he pointed out that Johnson was 
mistaken on some matter--he shouldn 't have taken the 
!Ibid.' p . 7. 
2Ibid. , pp . 11-18, 32-37 , 218, 236 , 264, 317. 
3Ibid. , p . 271. 
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swing around the circle, for instance. But particularly 
Beale criticized Johnson for not perceiving and exploiting 
the deep economic issues in 1866. In Beale's opinion 
Johnson should have selected the economic issues as the 
main ones of the campaign rather than Reconstruction 
and with his powers of patronage have formed a third 
party which would have bound the Westerners to him in 
a great anti-business, anti-monopoly party. This action 
would have divided the Republicans and would have formed 
a powerful conservative party (conservative as opposed 
to radical; actually, in economic matters the names probably 
should be exchanged) allowing the party of Johnson to 
win the election of 1866 and thus not only inaugurate 
its own economic policy but also its own moderate Southern 
policy. But Johnson was too hesitant, undecided, and 
didn't grasp the basic issues clearly; therefore, he 
lost his opportunity. 1 
Beale seems to be opposed to big business interests 
and to favor government regulation. He considered the 
post-Civil War railroads to have been particularly oppressive 
when uncontrolled. 2 He subscribed to the idea that the 
Radicals realized the Fourteenth Amendment would become 
1Ibid., pp . 24-27, 85, 114-115, 122-123, 224, 
225, 299,~. 
2Ibid. , p . 256. 
the great bulwark of conservative big business interests 
against interference by state regulat.ions . 1 However, 
he did not favor a confiscation program and ridiculed 
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Northern property interests for suggesting that plantations 
be confiscated when they '\'10uld be horrified to have had 
the same suggestion made about their ovm property. 2 
In his article on Reconstruction in the Encyclopaedia 
of the Social Sciences, Beale summed up his concept of 
the heritage of Reconstruction--years of suffering; a 
decline of aristocracy and a rise of masses in the South 
to create the new South; the failure to solve the problems 
of ignorance, poverty, and racial differences in the South; 
the failure to give lasting protection to the Negro despite 
constitutional amendments; the creation of the "Solid 
South" which prevented the Democratic party from becoming 
a truly liberal organization; the Fourteenth Amendment 
as a bulwark against social legislation; and finally, 
firm control of the country by big business interests . 3 
Beale indicated that the growth of industry would have 
been considerably different had it not been for the undis-
1~. , p . 217. 
2Ibid., p . 190. 
3Howard K. Beale, "Reconstruction," Encyclopaedia 
of the Social Sciences, eds . Edwin R. A. Seligman and 
Alvin Johnson (New York: Macmillan Co . , 1934), XIII, 
172. 
turbed control of the national government by business 
during Reconstruction and the succeeding years. These 
years molded the course of American industrialization, 
and the tariff and other advantages which the government 
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gave business helped to determine the character of American 
enterprise . Had Johnson's policy succeeded and the tariff 
been lowered in succeeding years , "the industrial development 
of the country would have been different--equally great , 
but different. "1 What the difference would have been 
he didn't explain, but one might assume he felt that 
the power of exploitation by the business class would 
have been considerably reduced by a government not so 
totally controlled by business interests . 
In 1940 Beale published the most extensive comment 
on Reconstruction historiography to date . This article 
revealed that after a decade Beale's economic interpreta-
tion was asstrong as ever, but his ideas concerning the 
Radicals and the tragic aspects of Reconstruction were 
perhaps mellowed to a degree . He called for a revision 
of the old idea that the South was a complete victim 
of the Radicals . 
Is it not time that we studied the history of Recon-
struction without first assuming, at least subconsciously, 
that carpetbaggers and Southern white Republicans 
were wicked, that Negroes were illiterate incompetents, 
lBeale, Critical Year, p . 273; --------' Encyclo-
paedia of the Social Sciences , XIII, 172. 
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and that the whole white South owes a iebt of gratitude 
to the restorers of 'white supremacy'? 
He suggested revision along the following lines: (1) 
cease judging individuals and emphasize the social and 
economic forces which motivated people; (2) study Reconstruc-
tion in its geographical setting--the whole country--
not just the South; (3) study the influx of Northerners 
into the South as objectively as any other population 
movement within the country; (4) recognize the role of 
ignorance and inexperience in the Reconstruction period 
and give due blame to lack of public education in the 
ante-bellum South; (5) study Reconstruction in its proper 
time setting--not just 1865 through 1877 but as a part 
of the period 1850-1900; (6) study Reconstruction in 
terms of a two-fold revolutionary hypothesis--industrial 
versus agricultural and introduction of more democracy 
in the South; (7) study the Negro under Reconstruction 
more intensively; (8) study the Populist-bourbon controversy 
in Reconstruction and its bearing upon political and 
economic conflicts; ( 9) study the successes and failures 
of Radical governments in each state; and (10) study 
education under Reconstruction. 2 
Charles A. Beard and Howard K. Beale presented 
808. 
lBeale, The American Historical Review, XLV, 
2Ibid., pp. 807-827. 
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a framework of interpretation which was intriguing, which 
called attention to some recognizable forces at play , and 
which helped to satisfy a need historians feel to try 
to draw some sense or synthesis out of a mass of historical 
material . The framework which they erected has provided 
a convenient skeleton to which a generation of historians 
could add and continually provide more body. With the 
follo'\'rers which the 11Beard- Beale" interpretation attracted, 
it became a serious rival to the traditional "Dunning" 
interpretation . 
Another prominent historian to emphasize the 
economic aspects of Reconstructi on and to interpret the 
period as the transition from agrarian control to industrial 
domination was William Best Hesselt ine. He was the first 
of several scholars of this persuasion to be from the 
South. He was born in Virginia , educated at Washington 
and Lee University and at the University of Virginia 
before receiving his Ph. D. degree from Ohio State University 
in 1928. From 1928 to 1932 he was on the faculty at the 
University of Chattanooga; then , from 1932 to the presenthe 
has taught a t the University of Wisconsin. l Hesseltine 
l·tas not only a follol'ler of Beard 1 s economic interpretation 
but was a disciple of Carl Becker , the high priest of 
relativism in history , though he was disappointed in 
1Who 1 s Who, XXX, 1262. 
Becker's acceptance of official propaganda during World 
War II . 1 
222 
In his several works, including a biography of 
Grant, a history of the South, a study of 585 prominent 
Confederate leaders during Reconstruction, and in articles 
and reviews on the period , Hesseltine demonstrated his 
acceptance of the concept of the Second American Revolu-
tion. He conceived of Reconstruction as the method used 
by capitalists to make secure their triumph over the 
agrarian leaders and to open the Southern resources for 
their exploitation. Reconstruction assured for the capital-
ists their continued domination of the national government , 
but it was a failure as a method of economic penetration 
of the South. Military government and Congressional Recon-
struction did not, in Hesseltine's opinion, bring stability 
nor economic opportunities as expected but, instead, 
brought political exploitation, high taxes, and unrest 
in the South. Finally, businessmen were convinced that 
only with the removal of the political exploiters could 
economic exploitation proceed; therefore, Reconstruction 
was abandoned when the political innovations failed to 
bring the desired economic results. With Radicals repudi-
ated and troops removed from the South, capitalists then 
lBarnes, Twentieth Century America, ed. Roucek, 
p . 812. 
began a pro cess of conciliation and infiltration of the 
former enemy. 1 
. Hesseltine believed that most of the criticisms 
of President Grant had stemmed f r om partisanship. He 
found that Grant ' s enemi es had been much more articulate 
and voluminous in their ~~itings than his friends ; conse-
quently , "Consciously or unconsciously they stuffed the 
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ballot boxes of history against Grant , and the writer has 
essayed a recount. 112 This recount showed the '\'forst criticisms 
of Grant to have been partisan political charges, but 
it also char ged that the gener al was not mentally equipped 
or sufficiently prepared to be a successful politician. 
He was inept in handling men ; he was ignorant of the 
Constitution; he used the same methods of trial and error 
and tenacity , quick decisions and energy which had been 
succe ssful during the war but which had also caused the 
disasters of Cold Harbor and the Wilderness . These tactics 
1William B. Hesseltine , Confederate Leaders in 
the New South (Baton Rouge : Louisiana State University 
Press, 1950), pp. 134-137; , "Economic Factors 
in the Abandonment of Reconstructi on , 11 The Mississippi 
Valley Historical Review, XXI I (September, 1935) , 191-
210; , The South in American History (Rev . from 
A History of the South 1607- 1936; New York : Prentice-
Hall, Inc ., 1943), pp . 482 , 488- 489, 496, 516; --~---' 
Ulysses s. Grant Politician (New York: Dodd, Mead & 
Co . , 1935), p . 48. 
2 Ibid. , p . vii . 
did not prove successful in politics as they had in the 
long run during the war . Hesseltine described Grant's 
development in office as that of a party politician and 
not of a statesman. Grant served at a time when his 
party was in a period of transition from its earlier 
ideals concerning freedom and the common man to the new 
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goal of protect ing the economic interests of big business. 
He, therefore , "became the 1 safe 1 representative of the 
more reactionary economic interests of his day. "1 
Hesseltine ' s History of the South 1607-1936, 
published in 1936 , was designed for college student use . 
After several printings Hesseltine revised the book and 
changed the title to The South in American History (1943) . 
The change in title was to emphasize that the South was 
American and must be treated as a part of the American story~ 
In these books he tried to strike a balance on the treatment 
of Reconstruction. He recognized some contributions of 
Radical Reconstruction, the chief being the establishment 
of public school systems in the South. 2 On the other 
hand, he felt the Radicals ' state constitutions were 
"beyond the needs of agricultural communities and opened 
broad avenues for later graft and corruption. "3 There 
libid., pp. vii-viii, 190, 372, quote-viii . 
2Hesseltine, South in American History, p . 523. 
3Ibid. , p . 513 . 
was gross corruption in the Southern states during Recon-
struction, but, he pointed out , this situation was true 
of all the states in the nation at that time . 
The situation that existed in the South was but one 
manifestation of a laxity in public morals which 
characterized the first days of the dominance of 
the Masters of Capital. l 
Thus, he attributed the corruption to the transition 
in society , but he seemed to intimate that there was 
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some correlation between high Negro population and more 
flagrant corruption. 2 To Hesseltine the greatest disaster 
of this "tragic era" was the reduction of cordiality 
between the old master class and the Negro and the rising 
to dominance of the poor white prejudice against the 
Negro. 3 
In his Confederate Leaders in the New South (1950) 
Hesseltine presented a study of 585 prominent Confederate 
leaders and the roles which they played in post-war life . 
All of these men whom he studied retained much of their 
earlier prominence far into the post-war era. He found among 
them a basic split in their acceptance of the ,.,ar and adjust-
ment to the new circumstances . The exemplars of the two 
groups were Jefferson Davis , who clung to his philosophy and 
libid 524· • • , p . 
2 Ibid. , p . 525 . 
3Ibid. t p . 485. 
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refused to either admit or accept defeat, and Robert 
E. Lee, who followed a course of realism. The former 
group was theoretical, unbending , never surrendering, 
never admitting that the matters fought over were settled. 
They maintained the constitutional position and deplored 
co-operation with the former enemy. On the other hand , 
Lee exemplified those Southerners who accepted the results 
of the war in good faith as being final . They were ready 
to turn to other pursuits and to co- operate within the 
nation . 1 In general the political and business leaders 
followed the example of Lee and made practical adjustments 
to the new order of things . With the old economic and 
political order destroyed, they pragmatically acquiesced 
i n the new order, reconciled themselves to the triumph 
of the capitalists, and in general joined forces with 
them. 2 
In his earlier works Hesseltine had given the 
traditional explanation of the Compromise of 1877 as an 
agreement that the Southerners would allow Hayes to be 
seated as president and , in return, Hayes would remove 
the troops from the South;3 but in Confederate Leaders 
lHesseltine, Confederate Leaders, pp . 1-41. 
2Ibid., pp. 93-94. 
3Hesseltine, South in American History, p. 537; 
--------' Grant, p . 421 . 
, 
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he interpreted the Compromi se of 1877 as being the symbol 
of Southern acquiescence to the new business order. 
The Wormley Agreement was the outward aspect of the bargain ; 
deeper aspects were not merely political and racial in 
nature but economic . The compromise included an understanding 
that the leaders of the South would co-operate with the 
masters of capital in exploiting the resources of the 
South. The Southerners woul d enjoy the re\'lards of manage-
ment while the North would en j oy the rewards of ownership. 
Thus , through an alliance \'lith the proponents of 
the New South , would the masters of Northern capital 
penetrate the South and r ealize the d1eam \'lhich Radical 
reconstruction had failed to fulfill . 
One of the reviewers of Conf ederate Leaders took 
issue with Hesseltine on his suggestion that the Compromise 
of 1877 was perhaps deeper than the Wormley Agreement. 
He expressed doubt that Southern politicians desperately 
sought Northern capital and came to an agreement with 
Northern capitalists for economic exploitation of the 
South. "If such a conscious premeditated alliance was 
arranged, we shall need much additional research to sub-
stantiate it. 112 
Actually , much additional research was being 
applied at that very time to the economic aspects of 
lHesseltine, Confederate Leaders, p . 139. 
2Lester J . Cappon , Review of Confederate Leaders 
in the New South, by William B. Hesseltine , The American 
Historical Review, LVI (July , 1951) , 999. 
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the Bargain of 1877. A year later (1951) C. Vann \~oodward 
published his Reunion and Reaction The Compromise of 
1877 and the End of Recons tructlon. Wood\'rard accepted 
the 11Beard-Beale 11 thesis of the Second American Revolution 
and simply attempted to add t o that concept a new appraisal 
of the ending of the revolution, the Thermidor of the 
revolutionary process . 1 He described the Republican party 
of 1876 as the party of conservatism, the defender of 
vested interests and big business, having its system of 
subsidies, privileges , and tariffs which was 
entrenched in the law by Republicans while the voters 
were diverted by oratory about R~construction, civil 
rights, and Southern atrocities. 
The old Whig element of the Republican party was dominant. 
Despite its conservative national character, ho\'rever, 
the party s till clung to its Radical policy in t he South , 
seeking to appeal to the Negro and poorer elements. Until 
the Compromise of 1877 was struck , the Republican party 
was out of contact with its natural allies in the South--
the Whiggish conservative interests . 3 
The Southern Democratic party, which was gradually 
1c. Vann Woodward, Reunion and Reaction The 
Com remise of 18 and the End of Reconstruction (Garden 
City: Doubleday & Co., Inc ., 195 { first published in 
1951: Bos ton, Little, Brown & Co.}, p. v . 
2Ibid. , p . 36 . 
3rbid., pp. 36-37. 
229 
redeeming the South after Radical Reconstruction , Woodward 
described as being more like the old party of Henry Clay 
than the party of Jefferson , Jackson , or even Davis . 
The new Southern Democrats 
spoke for much the same t ype of economic interests as 
the Republicans--railroads, i£dustries, business enter-
prise of one kind or another. 
Thus, the dominant element of the Southern Democratic 
party and the dominant of the Northern Republican party 
were na tural allies . The Bargain of 1877 was the consum-
mat ion of that alliance . 
The real agreement which actually settled the 
situation in 1877, according to Woodward, was not simply 
acceptance of Hayes in return for removal of troops from 
the South . ·It included a complex of ma tters, including 
agreements about the organization of the House of Repreaenta-
tives and the election of its Speaker, cabinet appointments 
for Southerners, control of the patronage, railroad sub-
sidies, and internal improvements . It was actually an 
agreement between dominant business interests in both 
areas to co-operate in obtaining conditions favorable 
to economic exploitation, including federal subsidies 
for internal improvements and other aids t o business 
development; thus, the agreement was larger, more extensive, 
and more important than just an agreement between a group 
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of men in a Washington hotel. Several weeks of diploma tic 
arrangements were necessary to arrive at this sectional 
compromise which developed out of the community of interest 
between conservative Southern Democrats and conservative 
Northern Republicans . The Wormley Agreement concerning 
the seating of Hayes and the removal of troops from the 
South was given emphasis by the Southerners, according 
to Woodward, in order to appeal to the South by claiming 
that they had delivered the South from Carpetbag control 
rather than admitting that the presidency had been surren-
dered chiefly for business and financial reasons. 1 
Some features of the Compromise of 1877 were almost 
immediately violated. The Democrats did not vote for 
Garfield as Speaker of the House as they had promised, 
nor did Hayes back the internal improvement bills for 
the South as his negotiators had promised. In this super-
ficial sense the compromise did not last, but in a deeper 
sense, Woodward contended, the coalition remained. The 
Southern Democrats remained within the Democratic party 
but aligned themselves with the conservative Eastern 
wing which was "as devoted to the defense of the new 
economic order as the Republicans ."2 Thus, the South 
under the redeemer regime became a bulwark against any 
1~., pp . 222-227. 
2~., p . 265. 
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changes in the new economic order which had evolved. 
This agreement between conservative Southern Democrats 
and conservative Northern Republicans became an important 
factor in American politics in the succeeding generations.l 
Comer Vann Woodward was a native of Arkansas, 
received his undergraduate education at Emory University, 
obtained an A.M. degree at Columbia and a Ph.D. degree 
at the University of North Carolina. At the latter he 
studied under Howard K. Beale. He taught at the University 
of Florida from 1937 to 1939, at Scripps College in Califor-
nia from 1940 to 1943. Since 1946 he has been at The Johns 
Hopkins University.2 His economic, cultural, intellectual, 
and social approach to history has been used mostly in 
studying the new South, the South after Reconstruction; 
but in these he has thrown light on the Reconstruction 
period itself. In his Origins of the New South 1877-1913 
(1951) he pointed out that Radical rule in the South 
was very brief and that its importance had been exaggerated. 
Radical Reconstruction , like the Confederacy was 
an ephemeral experiment. By comparison the work 
of the Redemption was more enduring. For it was 
not the Radicals nor the Confederates but the Redeemers 
who laid the lasting foundations in matters of race, 
libid., pp. 251-257, 265-267. 
2w. M. Brewer, Review of Origins of the New South 
1877-1912, by c. Vann Woodward, The Journal of Negro 
History, XXXVII (April, 1952), 206; Who's Who, XXX, 
3048. 
politics, economics, and law for the modern South.l 
He also contended that the contrast between the 
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Radical governments and the redeemer governments in ma tters 
of taxation and honesty had been exaggerated and distorted. 
The redeemers did cut expenses and salaries and were able 
to reduce state taxes; however, much of the reduction was 
deceptive since 'many responsibilities were shifted from 
state to county and, therefore, total taxes didn 't change 
too greatly . In addition the tax system, with its poll 
tax and its exemptions for new manufacturing capital, 
Woodward considered deplorable though he conceded that 
some of the special exemptions were held over from Radical 
Reconstruction. 2 With the policy of retrenchment the 
redeemers neglected vital areas of social responsibility, 
thus allowing ignorance and suffering, and caused rational-
ization of this negligence to become a part of the South 1s 
set of values.3 The reputation for honesty which the 
redeemers have Woodward attributed to the lack of criticism 
and exposure. There was much corruption under redeemer 
rule, according to Woodward , because of the niggardly 
salaries paid public officials and "the result of economic 
lc. Vann Woodward, Origins of the New South 
1877-1912 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 
1951), p. 22. 
2 Ibid., pp. 59-60. 
3Ibid., pp. 60-65. 
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and social conditions that continued long after Redemption."1 
Woodward did not intend to suggest that corruption under 
the redeemers was as bad as during Reconstruction or that 
the corruption was localized in the South; however, he 
did believe necessary some revision of the traditional 
view that pure corruption characterized Reconstruction 
and pure honesty characterized redemption. 2 
Though a Southerner and largely educated in the 
South, Woodward yields to few white historians in his 
concern for the Negro. He contended that the Reconstruction 
period was not a good test of the Negro's capability of 
self-government . The Negro had no economic resources 
or social standing comparable t o his political power. 
He was not in command of the revolution that was taking 
place; therefore , the Negro was controlled by other ele-
ments--elements sometimes idealis tic, sometimes unscrupulous . 3 
In one of his books, The Strange Career of Jim Crow (1955) , 
Woodward pointed out that the pattern of segregation had 
no t always existed; indeed , he demonstrated that it was 
not even a product of Reconstruction but rather a late 
nineteenth century and early twent i eth century development . 
This was an answer to the popular assumption of many 
1~., pp. 66-74, quote-73. 
2Ibid., pp . 73-74. 
3woodward, Reunion and Reaction, p. 15. 
Southerners that segrega tion was an age-old , i mmutable 
folkway which would prove impervious to any legisla tion 
agains t it. In the same book Wood'\'lard also showed a 
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favorable attitude toward the 1954 Supreme Court decisions 
concerning segregated schools and referred to the post-
World War II years as the "Second Reconstruction ," during 
which the Negro had gained, and would continue to gain, 
more and more rights . 1 
In a more recent book Woodward suggested to South-
erners that they not cling desperately to agrarianism 
and racial segregation in an attempt to maintain sectional 
identity . Forces were at work which had discredited t hese 
differences and woul d eventually eliminate them as the 
institution of slavery had been elimina ted; however, 
this did not mean that the South would lose its identity 
in the nation . The region had a distinguishing aspect 
which was not subject to the pressures of conformity and 
nationalism--"the collective experience of the Southern 
people . "2 Sever al facets of Southern history set the 
area off from other parts of the country. Whereas America 
as a whole had experienced economic abundance, the South 
lc. Vann Woodward, The Strange Career of Jim Crow 
(Rev . ed . ; New York: Oxford University Press, 1957; first 
published in 1955) , passim. 
2c. Vann Woodward , The Burden of Southern History 
(Baton Rouge: Louis iana State University Press, 1960), 
pp . 3-25, quote-16. 
had suffered scarcity; whereas America as a whole had 
a record of unique success, the South had endured defeat 
and failure; whereas America as a whole had developed 
a reputation for innocence and a feeling of moral compla-
cency, the South had been afflicted with conscience pangs 
because it maintained a great social evil and experienced 
its aftermath; whereas America as a whole had been born 
free in Lockean liberalism and thus differed from most 
other nations, there was in the South a large segment 
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of the population which was not "born free . 11 Consequently, 
the South was American enough to be secure in its national 
identity and yet had experienced enough differences to 
have a rich regional heritage valuable both to the section 
and to the nation . 1 
Another historian within the "Beard-Beale" school 
who was particularly interested in the Negro was Vernon 
Lane Wharton , who wrote a history of The Nesro in Missis-
sippi 1865-1890 ( 1947) . \Vharton had a practical, "present-
minded" purpose in \'II'i ting about this period of Negro 
history. He believed 1865 to 1890 to have been the years 
during which the Negro 's status changed from slavery 
to a caste system. The caste slov1ly developed during 
that period not as a solution to the race problem but 
as a modus vivendi. Wharton felt that in the years immedi-
libid., pp . 16-25. 
ately after World War II the caste system was beginning 
to crack and that the Negro ' s position was changing. 
In part these changes would be brought about by leaders 
of both races; therefore, he felt they should have as 
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much knol'Tledge as possible about the forces and the measures 
which had brought the rac i al situa tion to its present 
condition . He attempted to make a contribution to that 
knowledge . 1 
The caste system had s o evolved by 1890, according 
to Wharton , that the Negro knew and complied with his place 
in the society. The code was actually stronger than the 
legal bonds of slavery or the Black Codes of 1865, but 
at least in the caste system Wharton saw hope for the 
Negro because his former static position under slavery 
was now subject to change. The Negro's situation would 
not stay static because his free labor was valuable , 
he had some educa tional opportunities, and exceptional 
Negroes gained respect of even demagogic whites . These 
forces worked to undermine the caste system; consequently, 
the Negro's status had i mproved with the decades . "No 
man can foretell the limits of that improvement. "2 
Wharton tried to correct what he considered some 
lvernon Lane Wharton , The Negro in Mississippi 
1865- 1890 (Chapel Hill : University of North Carolina 
Press, 1947) , pp . 5-6 . 
2Ib1d. , pp. 274-276 , quote- 276. 
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errors about the Negro in the period 1865- 1890. He contended 
that the Negro did not vtai t for emancipation to be thrust 
upon h1m but actively participated in establishing his 
own freedom . The great numbers who fought in the Civil 
lllar demonstrated this fact . 1 Wharton believed the "Dunning" 
historians had placed the wrong emphasis on the actions 
of the newly freed Negroes. Rather than vast numbers 
of them wandering about the countryside or crowding into 
towns as the "Dunning 11 writers said, actually only a 
minority participated in this type of jubilation. 2 Another 
distortion concerned the character of free Negro labor 
during Reconstruction . Wharton claimed that traditional 
Reconstruction historians had repeated the myth of bad 
labor in order to justify the Black Codes and to criticize 
the policy of Reconstruction . There were some bad laborers 
and worthless Negroes , of course; but no more than ordinary , 
in Wharton 's opinion. They actually worked well as free 
laborers and the whites soon recognized that fact . The 
Negroes made modest economic progress with the good weather 
years of 1868 and 1869; the bad crops in 1866 and 1867 
were due to ,.,eather and army worms, not the inefficiency 
of Negro labor. 3 Finally , vfuarton contended that Negro 
libid.' p . 31. 
2Ibid.' p . 52. 
3~. , pp. 115-124. 
participation in government was not so disastrous as the 
"Dunning" school h ad thought. He claimed that the Repub-
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lican Reconstruction government in Mississippi was fairly 
good and remarkably honest, contrary to popular opinion 
at the time. 
Altogether, as governments go , that supplied by the 
Negro and white Republicans in Mississi~pi between 
1870 and 1876 was not a bad government. 
Wharton pointed out that the Republican party 
in Mississippi had substantial support among white citizens. 
From 15, 000 to 20, 000 of the 70,000 to 80 , 000 white voters 
joined with the Negroes to sustain the Republican party 
in po\'ler. He described this element as being composed, 
in the years immediately after the war, largely of very 
poor whites who had been against the war; but also within 
this group was a \'rell-to-do planter and businessman element 
which became larger and larger until 1874. A great number 
of the latter group were old Whigs who were against the 
small farmer and against the Democratic party. 2 Many 
of these well-to-do, conservative old Whigs advocated 
giving the Negro his full constitutional rights . Some 
were motivated by humanitarianism, some by commercial and 
lrbid., p. 179. 
2Ibid., p . 155. (The old Whig element \'Ti thin 
the group of Southern whites \'lho co-operated with the 
Republicans was also emphasized by David Donald \'lho 
wrote on "The Scala,..,ag in Mississippi Reconstruction. 11 
See below, ' pp. 264-265.) 
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financial interests, and some by the hope of personal 
gain; some worked through the Democratic party, some 
through the Republican party. But they did not lead the 
masses of the people . The majority opinion of whites, 
nursed on the idea of Negro inferiority and the necessity 
of subjugation, could not accept the conservative view. 
The Black Codes were an accurate expression of their 
will . The small farmers and poor whi tea ,.,.i thout social 
and economic security were determined not to allow the 
planter and professional class to place the Negro on 
an equal level. l vfuarton ' s opinion on this matter is 
in conflict with that expressed by the Marxist W. E. B. 
DuBois and by Horace Mann Bond who believed that the 
planter class prevented the co- operation of poor white 
and Negro elements along class lines by sowing the seeds 
of racial hatred. 2 
In agreement with both the Marxians and the "Beard-
Beale" school , ~fuarton believed that t he Radicals generally 
were radical only in politics, not in economics, and 
that they represented the indus trialis t class . Confiscation 
and redistribution of the land was suggested only and 
not carried out because property rights were jus t as 
lrbid., PP· 142-144, 157, 181- 183, 227 , 229. 
2see Chapter 12. 
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sacred to the persons whom the Radicals represented as 
they were to the Southern property holders. Confiscation 
'\'IOUld set a bad example from the point of view of the 
industrialists; therefore, the great experiment of establish-
ing the freedmen on a sound economic basis was not to 
be tried. l 
Wharton \·ras one of a group of important scholars 
which the South produced during the last three decades . 
Like several others in the group Wharton was educated 
at the University of North Carolina under Howard K. 
Beale . These men were influenced by the economic and 
intellectual changes which had taken place during their 
lifetimes . They were able to give quite a different 
account of Reconstruction from that given by earlier 
Southern students who studied under Dunning at Columbia 
because they were liberal in their economic and racial 
ideas . Wharton demonstrated his liberal economic viewpoint 
by his lack of condemnation of confiscation and his dis-
approval of the manner in which Northern industrialists 
treated their laborers who attempted organization . 2 
Though \'lharton '\'las favorable to the Negro and 
his continued progress, he did not please all his Negro 
readers because he was a gradualist . He contended that 
lWharton, Negro in Mississippi, p . 60. 
2Ibid. , pp. 60 , 82. 
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perhaps it was for the best that the federal government 
did not intervene on behalf of the Negro after 1875 despite 
the fact that the Negro was gradually relegated to a 
position half- way between slavery and full citizenship. 
From this caste status the Negr o could make slow but 
certain strides forward, while the white population slowly 
yielded and allowed the Negro more opportunity and indepen-
dence. "Social r evolutions ar e not accomplished by force , 
unless that force is overwhelming, merciless, and continued 
over a long period. 111 Carter G. Woodson , the editor 
of The Journal of Negro His t ory, reviewed Wharton's book 
and admired the author's fairness to the Negro and his 
use of materials which "pseudo historians" influenced 
by Burgess and Dunning had ignored; hm'lever, he disagreed 
with Wharton ' s tolerance of gr adualism. "Here the author 
abandoned the role of the historian and preaches defeatism 
and social frustration . 112 
T. Harry Williams is primarily a historian of 
the Civil War , but he has made several contributions 
to Reconstruction history. Williams was born in Illinois, 
attended Platteville State Teachers College in Wisconsin 
libid., p . 198. 
2Carter G. Woodson , Review of The Negro in Missis-
sippi 1865-1890, by Vernon Lane 1Vharton , The Journal 
of Negro History , XXXIII {January, 1948) , 94- 96 , quote-
96. 
2.4'2 
where he received a bachelor ' s degree in 1931. He received 
his doctorate from the University of Wisconsin in 1937. 
He taught history for three years at the University of 
Oklahoma. Since that time Louisiana State University 
has claimed his services . He has served since 1955 on 
the Historical Advisory Committee for the department 
of the Army. In addition to his other duties , he serves 
now as a director of the Civil War Centennial Association. 1 
He shO'\'led himself to be in the "Beard- Beale" school in 
a study , with Helen J . Williams , of Wisconsin Republicans 
and Reconstruction . They i ndicated that Thaddeus Stevens' 
plan of Reconstruction was to protect the interests of 
Northern industrialists and bondholders by keeping the 
South out of the Union until Negro voters could assure 
the maintenance of Republican domination. Wisconsin 
Republicans were not enthusiastic about this plan , according 
to the Williamses; however, they clung to the Republican 
party and supported the Radical Reconstruction legislation 
chiefly because Republican leaders would give the Northwest 
the internal improvements which the people of Wisconsin 
needed. 2 There is some disagreement with Beale on one 
lWho ' s Who , XXX, 3001. 
2Helen J . and T. Harry liilliams, 11Wisconsin Repub-
licans and Reconstruction, 1865- 1870, 11 The '"~isconsin 
Masazine of History, XXIII (September, 1939), 17-18. 
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detail since the latter attributed the Northwest's adherence 
to the Republican party chiefly to the wool tariff. 1 · 
This disagreement on detail , of course, does not violate 
the general agreement \'Ti th the "Beard-Beale" economic 
interpretation. In a study of some historians' attitudes 
toward Reconstruction, Williams made it clear that in 
his opinion 11 The men who made Reconstruction were moved 
by issues of economic and political po'l'rer far more than 
by democratic idealism."2 
In another article Williams focused on a neglected 
feature of Reconstruction in Louisiana--the unification 
movement of 1873 . According to Williams the bitterness 
and chaos due to the poli tical struggles between Repub-
licans on one hand with their Carpetbaggers, Scala\·rags , 
and Negroes, and the Democrats or conservatives on the 
other hand was bad for the reputation and the economic 
prospects of the state; therefore , a group of Negroes 
and whites of New Orleans decided to form a racially 
unified movement designed to take over the state administra-
tion and provide the harmony and stability which the 
business community needed. The white originators of the 
movement represented the elite of New Orleans wealth 
and breeding. They guaranteed the Negro political and 
lBeale, Critical Year, p . 284. 
2Williams , The Journal of Southern History, XII, 473 . 
civil equality and, if possible, economic equality . 
The motives of the whites were mixed. The plan was dis-
tasteful to some, but they felt it was the only way to 
achieve honest government and a stable economy . Many 
thought, with General Beauregard , that Negro suffrage 
was a permanent fixture and that \'Thi tes could lure the 
Negr oes away from the Carpetbagger and control his vote 
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if they ackno\vledged Negro rights . A very few were actually 
against any sort of racial discrimination. The movement 
failed for two reasons . First, most whites coul dn 1 t 
accept the unification program because they felt the 
concessions would lead to racial equality . According 
to "VTilliams it was surprising that so many whites did 
accept the proposition of equal rights for the Negro , 
not that they did not accept them . And second, it was 
an amateur reform movement. Its leaders made the mistakes 
of amateurs and were opposed by seasoned professional 
politicians of both parties who saw the movement as a 
threat to their position . l 
On the national level one of the most seasoned 
politicians was Thaddeus Stevens . The first unsympathetic 
biography of Stevens written in the twentieth century 
was by Richard Nelson Current . Current was a native 
lT. Harry '\'lilliams , "The Louisiana Unification 
Movement of 1873," The Journal of Southern History, XI 
(August , 1945) , 349- 369. 
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of Colorado '\'tho received his A. B. degree at Oberlin College , 
his A. M. degree at Fletcher School of La\>T and Diplomacy , 
and his Ph. D. degree at the University of Wisconsin in 
1939. He has served as a teacher of history at several 
colleges and universities including Rutgers, Illinois , 
and the Women ' s College of the University of North Carolina. 1 
At the University of Wisconsin he studied under Professor 
William B. Hesseltine , and it was Hesseltine 
who first sho,ied him the need for a new Stevens biography 
and '"hose teachings conditioned the point of view 
from which it was written •••• 2 
Current ' s biography of Stevens, the fifth to appear in 
the twentieth century, used materials never before employed 
by Stevens ' biographers , including the Simon Cameron 
papers; the Edward McPherson papers; some unused items 
among Stevens ' own papers ; the collections at Dartmouth, 
at the Historical Society of Pennsylvania, and at the 
Pennsylvania State Library ; and the journals of Lancaster , 
Pennsylvania. 3 
Current criticized earlier biographers of Stevens 
for accepting Stevens ' facade of equalitarianism as a key 
to his life . On the other hand , he criticized Stevens ' 
lWho Is wllo ' XXX, 646 . 
2Richard Nelson Current, Old Thad Stevens A 
Story of Ambition (Madison: University of Wisconsin 
Press , 1942), p . 14. 
3~. 
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extreme critics who saw in him only motives of vengeance 
against the South , perhaps stemming from affection for 
his alleged mulatto mistress. 
None has taken adequately into account the simple 
fact that he was, above everything else, a man of 
politics seeking ilways to get and exercise the powers 
of public office. 
Thus, Current's title for his biography--Old Thad Stevens 
A Story of Ambition (1942). The struggle for more and 
more political power, whether it be as House leader or 
his unsatisfied ambition to become senator, vice-president, 
and president--this was the driving force behind Thaddeus 
Stevens. 2 
Current doubted the sincerity of Stevens ' equalita-
rian pretenses and his claims of concern for the Negro . 
He suggested that Stevens used the anti-masonry movement 
as a vehicle to ride to power until he saw it was wearing 
out as an issue; then, he jumped to anti-slavery as a 
nevr and more pov1erful method of fulfilling his ambi tiona, 
and he continued to exploit the issue even to his death.3 
In addition to his crusades for the common man , 
Stevens was a supporter of the new rising industrial class 
in the North and a defender of economic inequalities, 
libid.' p . iii. 
2rbid., pp. 235 , 251, 284. 
3121£., pp. 35, 52-53, 217-218, 292-293 , 320. 
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according to Current. Old Thad was interested in retaining 
high protective tariffs and subsidies and grants for 
railroads and other private enterprise. The connection 
between the railroad and iron industries and the Radicals 
who represented them was very close. Stevens was 
not only the embodiment of Pennsylvania capitalism 
himself but also a go-between for others of that 
ilk, one whose function it was to convert the votes 
of the many into the policies of the few. l 
His support of greenbacks was not a sign of being against 
industry, in Current's judgment , because manufacturers 
of the East were debtors along with the farmers, had 
sizable stocks of goods on hand, and therefore were against 
contraction of the currency. 2 
A single quotation serves to illustrate Current's 
interpretation of Stevens as a thorough-going ambitious 
politician rather than an equalitarian and his interpretation 
of Reconstruction as an instrument of Northern business: 
Unfortunately for the American serfs, Stevens in 
the years to come was to befriend them more for the 
benefit of the Republican party than for their own 
sake . As for their former masters, he knew that 
a •warfare on Southern property' was the order of 
the day if Pennsylvania iron men and manufacturers 
were to keep the advantages they had gained during 
the war.3 
libid., pp. 52-53 , 217, 226-227, 242-243, 246-
249, 251,~, quote-226 . 
2Ibid., pp. 238, 290-291. 
3 Ibid., p . 217. 
Bernard A. vleisberger has said that Current in 
1942 was "riding the wave of a generation's disillusionment 
i'li th industrial capitalism . "1 Consequently, he did not 
like Stevens . Current thought it the height of irony 
that Stevens should be considered by some a great equalita-
rian . 
None had done more than he to bring on the Age of 
Big Business, with its concentration of wealth and 
its diffusion of poverty, its inequalities and its 
inequities , which were beginning to trouble the nation 
even before the fresh sod had turned green again 
upon his unpretentious grave . 2 
Thus, Current came to many of the same conclusions 
about Stevens as an unsavory character as had the "Dunning u 
his torian s , but the motives ascribed to Stevens were 
different. Current saw Stevens as a very ambitious con-
summate politician who was interested solely in keeping 
himself, his party, and his class in power, not as a 
vindictive man with innate ha tred for the former slave-
holders, as the "Dunning" historians tended to interpret 
him . In a review of Faim M. Brodie's b iography of Stevens 
in 1960, Current criticized her for paying too little 
attention to the personal and party ambitions of Stevens 
but admitted tha t perhaps in his biography he had "over-
lBernard A. Weisberger, Review of Thaddeus Stevens 
Scour~e of the South , by Fawn M. Brodie, The Mississippi 
Valley Historical Review, XLVI (March , 1960), 726. 
2current, Stevens, p . 320. 
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emphasized considerations of personal ambition and partisan 
politics."1 
There have been three studies of Reconstruction 
in Tennessee . The first, by James W. Fertig, dealt mostly 
with t he various theories of Reconstruction and the sentiment 
for or against these in Tennessee. 2 The more recent two 
are quite the opposite--detailed accounts of the political 
affairs of the period. The latest of these is by Thomas 
B. Alexander who seemed to recognize the importance of 
economic aspects despite the fact that he limited his 
treatise to political Reconstruction. He claimed that 
the "Dunning" stereotype of Reconstruction did not apply 
to Tennessee; on the other hand, neither did the Marxian 
interpretation fit the facts . 3 Ho,'lever, "Economic interpre-
tations of Reconstruction are highly illumina ting; they 
4 
can throw much light on Tennessee ' s course." Alexander's 
account is largely political detail presented in a non-
interpretative manner. Besides its thoroughness perhaps 
its chief contribution is the great number of personal 
lRichard Nelson Current, Review of Thaddeus Stevens 
Scourge of the South, by Fawn M. Brodie, The American 
Historical Review, LXV (January, 1960), 392. 
2see Chapter 4. 
3Thomas B. Alexander , Political Reconstruction 
in Tennessee (Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press, 
1950), p. 239. 
4rbid., p . 241. 
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facts which it presents on all the participants of any 
importance in Tennessee's Reconstruction. 
Thomas B. Alexander was born and educa ted in 
Nashville, Tennessee, where he received his bachelor's, 
master's, and doctor's degrees from Vanderbilt University. 
Political Reconstruction in Tennessee (1950) was his 
doctoral dissertation, written under the direction of 
Frank L. Owsley. One of h i s interesting observations 
in the study wa s the persistence of Whiggery in Tennessee 
during Reconstruction. He found \mat David Donald had 
found in Mississippi--that the old Whig element still 
existed and was important though it formed itself into 
no new political organization. Since publication of 
his dissertation, Alexander has spent much of his time 
pursuing the Whig thread found in the fabric of Tennessee 
Reconstruction into a broader territorial and chronological 
expanse. His project when completed will be a study 
of the persistence of Whiggery in the United States, 
1860-1900. 1 
Two special monographs have been i~itten on the 
Freedmen's Bureau. Paul s . Pierce's treatment near the 
turn of the century was competent and as complete as 
might have been expected from the materials he had at 
lLetters from Thomas B. Alexander to author, 
August 1, 1960, and September 20, 1960. 
his disposal. His sources consisted mostly of printed 
congressional documents. However, since that time the 
National Archives has made available for research the 
official records of the Freedmen's Bureau. George R. 
Bentley was the first person to use these materials for 
writing a general hi story of the Bureau. In addition 
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to these records, he used a great deal of other manuscript 
and secondary material . 
Bentley implied that the Bureau carried out much 
important relief work; but he emphasized that many un-
worthies got relief, while many who were in real need were 
not able to obtain help. 1 The Bureau courts, according 
to Bentley, were able temporarily to provide justice for 
the Negro before the law, but before the Bureau withdrew 
from the South it was apparent tha t permanent courtroom 
protection of the Negro against violence by white people 
had not been provided. 2 The Bureau made very real and 
permanent contributions t o Negro education, rendering 
a commendable service for the Negro, the South, and the 
nation. Yet, the educational effort would have been more 
successful had the Bureau schools not so aroused the 
hostility of Southern whites by the use of schools to 
lGeorge R. Bentley, A History of the Freedmen's 
Bureau (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 
1955), pp. 76-79, 142-143. 
2rbid., pp. 152-168. 
support and advocate the Republican party.l By use of 
the vast new historical materials available, Bentley 
came to a somewhat more negative conclusion about the 
values of the Freedmen's Bureau than had Peirce a half 
century before him. Perhaps one of the reasons for this 
was that Bentley saw the Freedmen ' s Bureau as an agent 
of the rising industrial class . Businessmen hoped the 
Bureau would organize the Negro labor force in the South 
more effectively so it would be more productive for the 
advantage of Northern business . They also hoped the 
Bureau would "provide better protection for t..h.eir invest-
ments in the South than yet existed. 112 The Bureau would 
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help in preventing an alliance between Southern and Western 
agrarian interests which might harm the industrial power 
of the Northeast. It also marked a very rapid step forward 
in the centralization of the national government . 
The freedmen ' s bureau was a part of a policy which 
tended to consolidate the political and economic 
power of the nation in the North and East . ) 
The most recent defense of the idea of the Second 
American Revolution was a study by George Ruble Woolfolk. 
His work was an attempt to explain and document the rise 
of the new business civilization and the process by ,.,hich 
libid., pp. 169-184. 
2 Ibid. , p . 47. 
3 Ibid. , p. 38. 
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the power and wealth of the South was transferred to the 
control of the commercial class of the Northeast and 
the Middle West--and, thus , how the South became an economic 
tributary to these sections . The Beards had described 
in very broad terms what had happened; now, Woolfolk 
addressed himself to the problem of how the transformation 
had taken place . 1 Woolfolk's stud y was entirely economic 
in na ture, touching on politics only very rarely. His 
sources were many and diverse but his central sources 
were the reports of the National Board of Trade and the 
Boards of Trade and Chambers of Commerce of key cities . 
According to Woolfolk the war transformed the 
merchant and industrial groups from economic segments 
having little group consciousness to powerful self- conscious , 
politically experienced groups ready to transform the 
economic and social patter ns of the nation to suit their 
needs and wants . These economic interests wished to 
concentrate government power in the national government 
and use it for nationalistic economic purposes . Industry 
must be protected and developed if the United States was 
to compete with Europe and not be tributary to her. 
The first plan to consolidate political and economic 
lGeorge Ruble Woolfolk , The Cotton Regencl The 
Northern Merchants and Reconstruction , 186 -1880 New 
York : Bookman Associates , 195 , pp. 7- • 
gains after the war was to underwrite business progress 
in the country by maintaining a high protective tariff 
and placing an excise tax on cotton. In order for this 
to work , the South must produce good cotton crops , and 
this required organization of the productive capacity 
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of the laboring force of the region . The Radical Congress 
obliged businessmen with the Freedmen ' s Bureau designed 
to organize that labor force . Woolfolk referred to the 
Bureau as a "super- plantation scheme . "1 When the cotton 
policy was defeated in 1867-1868 due to poor cotton crops 
in the Sout h and increased u se of poorer grades of cotton 
elsewhere in the world , the capitalists altered their 
strategy . The New England , Pennsylvania , and Mid- West 
capitalists formed an alli ance and concentrated their 
att a ck against the internationalism of the New York capital-
ists and their dependence upon the European money market. 
This alliance broke the hold of New York City over the 
nation ' s economy by persuading Congress to extend privileges 
of internal ports of entry to the Mid- Western cities . 
With this and the tariff, their aims of economic national-
ism were largely achieved and they proceeded to exploit 
the wealth of the South. 2 
The South was left open to this exploitation 
lrbid. , pp . 6o- 6L. 194. 
2rbid . , pp . 118- 140. 
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by its own failure to exploit Southern resources and markets 
for itself , Woolfolk explained. This failure was due 
to several reasons chiefly beyond the control of Southerners , 
including the hard money policy of the federal government , 
a usurious credit system , persist ence in the production 
of cotton , lack of capital , failure to stimulate immigration , 
and the depression of 1873--
all of these delivered the South into the hands of 
whatever group of exploiters might become the ' Regents ' 
of the pol:ler of ' King Cotton •. l 
The alliance of Northeast , Pennsylvania , and Northwest 
capitalists was the beneficiary of this exploitation , 
of course . 
Politically, the strategy of business during 
Re construction was to a l low the Radicals to stir up all 
the fuss , and under its cover business would outstrip 
agrarianism and secure the position of dominance . The 
Freedmen ' s Bureau and Negro suffrage were shams behind 
which the Negro ' s economic inferiority could be maintained. 
According to Woolfolk , Andr ew Johnson , the "democratic 
liberal," was one of the f ew "who understood re construction 
for what it was- -a Yankee euphemism for capital expansion. "2 
The idea of the Second American Revolution , since 
outlined by Beard and placed specifically in Reconstruction 
lrbid., pp . 94- 115 , quote- 195. 
2Ib1d., pp. 40 , 60- 61 , 81- 82 , quote- 81. 
historiography by Beale, has become very influential. 
Few works on Reconstruction written since 1930 failed 
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to show the influence of this thesis. Not all the authors 
articulated it, of course , but most all felt its impact 
and took into account at least some of the facts and 
ideas which the school had advanced. This is not to 
say that the "Beard-Beale" school has definitely taken 
over the dominant position within Reconstruction interpre-
tation, since that is a very difficult thing to measure . 
Certainly, more scholarly l'TOrks within the last three 
decades have taken account of it than heve not; but scholarly 
works are always in the vanguard , and there is more doubt 
as to how much the "Beard- Beale11 thesis has affected 
common textbook writing and popular folk attitudes toward 
Reconstruction. The latter lie outside the range of 
this study but would make an intriguing investigation 
in themselves . 
Despite its prominence in Reconstruction historiog-
raphy , the 11Beard-Beale" thesis has come under attack 
within recent years . Several scholars engaged in independent 
research published findings which they felt would materially 
alter the Second American Revolution concept. All disputed 
the idea that the business interests of the Northeast 
were the chief motivating force behind Radical Reconstruction 
and that the Radicals and their program were simply tools 
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of these businessmen ; rather , they insisted, there was 
too much division on economic issues among Northern business-
men for them to have been a solid force behind Radical 
Reconstruction . 
Irwin Unger, in an article concerning "Business 
1 Men and Specie Resumption , " admitted that it had been 
fashionable to treat the Civil War- Reconstruction period 
as a business-agriculture struggle in which Northeast 
business interests took contr ol of the government and 
established conditions favorable to business . He singled 
out the idea that business had defeated agrarian interests 
and provided for resumption of specie payment by 1879. 
Businessmen were not by any means of one mind on the 
currency issue , he pointed out. For example, commercial 
men in the West were against resumption of specie payment 
while those in the East were split in sentiment- -interna-
tional traders preferring resumption and domestic traders 
preferring the greenbacks; in financial circles Western 
bankers generally wanted neither contraction nor further 
inflation while the Eastern segment \'ranted resumption; 
and among manufacturers the stable industries such as 
textiles wanted contraction while new dynamic industries 
lrrwin Unger, "Business Men and Specie Resumption , " 
Political Science Quarterly , LXXIV (March, 1959) , 46- 70. 
wanted greenbacks . 1 Unger contended that it was dangerous 
to assume a stable unified point of view among businessmen. 
He felt the America of the 1860 ' s and 1870 ' s was too 
complicated to be explained simply in terms of businessmen 
and farmers and was surprised that the idea had gained 
so much support. 
~lliatever may have been true of earlier periods of 
our national development, it is clearly not valid 
to speak of a single business attitude toward the 
money question after the Civil War. 2 
Stanley Coben , in a study of the relation between 
"Northeastern Business and Radical Reconstruction: A 
Re- examination," agreed that there was too much division 
on economic issues among Northern businessmen for them 
to be considered a unified force, particularly as the 
driving force behind Radical Reconstruction. The business-
men were divided on the tariff--Pennsylvania with its 
iron industry wanted high tariffs while New England with 
its textiles wanted lower tariffs . Businessmen were 
divided on the currency question- -some wanted specie 
payment , some wanted greenbacks . As an example of how 
these economic factors influenced Radical Republicans , 
Coben pointed out that Stevens voted for higher tariffs 
and greenbacks while Sumner voted for lower tariffs and 
lrbid. , pp. 48-6o. 
2rbid. , p . 70~ 
hard money . 'rhe idea chiefly advanced by Hesseltine that 
Northern businessmen supported Radical Reconstruction 
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in order to exploit the South with the help of the federal 
government Coben believed to be erroneous . Capitalists 
a ctually shied away from the South until Radical Reconstruc-
tion ended; therefore , Coben believed that scholars must 
look elsewhere for the motives and aims behind Radical 
Reconstruction , but he did not indicate in what direction 
they must turn. 1 Coben is a native of New York and was 
a student at Columbia Universi ty at the time he wrote 
the article . 2 
Robert P. Sharkey , a native of Atlanta, Georgia , 
who holds a Ph. D. degree from The Johns Hopkins University 
and who taught economics at the University of South Carolina 
before becoming Administr ative Assistant to President 
Milton Eisenhower of The Johns Hopkins University , 3 made 
it clear that he was not attacking Beard's Second American 
Revolution idea in general but only in some of its particu-
lars . In fact, his study , Money , Class , and Party An 
Economic Study of Civil War and Reconstruction (1959) , 
1stanley Coben , "Northeastern Business and Radical 
Reconstruction: A Re- examinat1on , 11 The Mississippi Valley 
Historical Review, XLVI (June , 1959 ), 67- 90. 
1960. 
2Letter from Stanley Coben to author , August 25, 
3Letter from Robert P . Sharkey to author, August 
9 , 1960. 
was written under the direction of c. Vann Woodward, 
a leading exponent of the "Beard-Beale" thesis, and in 
his acknowledgements he expressed indebtedness not only 
to Woodward but to William B. Hesseltine of the University 
of Wisconsin , another leading proponent of the "Beard-
Beale" school. 1 Sharkey believed with the 11Beard-Beale 11 
group that economic factors were of prime importance, 
but he felt that Beard and Beale had created a monolithic 
conception of business opinions and purposes which was 
not the most useful instrument in understanding the period. 
Only by understanding the interplay and contest of 
forces within the 'capitalist' or 'business' group 
itself can the historian begin to arrive at a sound 
and comprehensive interpretation of this formative 
period of American history. 2 
It was an oversimplification, Sharkey claimed, 
to state that the capitalists received the benefits of 
the war. Actually, the industrial capitalis ts profited 
from the war and supported Republican financial policies , 
but the financial capitalists tended to suffer due to 
inflation and they opposed the policy of greenbacks and 
high protection . Tha t the interests of these groups 111ere 
divergent Beard did not recognize . 3 According to Sharkey , 
lRobert P. Sharkey , Money , Class , and Party An 
Economic Study of Civil War and Reconstruction (Baltimore: 
Johns Hopkins Press, 1959), p . 9 . 
2Ibid. , p . 306 . 
3rbid., pp . 292-300 . 
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Beard and Beale assumed the Western farmers were discontented 
in 1866 and wanted inflated currency and, therefore, that 
the Radicals kept the South out of the Union partially 
because they realized that Southern and Western farmers 
would combine to advocate inflation . However, Sharkey 
contended that the farmers were prosperous in 1866 and 
apathetic about the money question . But, even assuming 
that the farmers would have been inflationary , the Radicals 
were by no means united on the idea of sound money; in 
fact, the ultra-Radicals , Sharl{ey pointed out, wanted 
greenbacks . Beale and Beard said that Radicals represented 
business interests and that manufacturers favored high 
tariffs and contraction of the currency , but Sharkey 
contended that business interests were not unified on 
these ideas and most manufacturers wanted high tariffs 
and easy money. 1 
Among the group called Radical Republicans, Sharkey 
found sharp differences on financial issues. One group , 
i ncluding Thaddeus Stevens, Ben Butler, and Ben Wade , 
were consistent and principled greenbackers . A second 
group, including James G. Blaine, \'lilliam E. Fessenden, 
and James A. Garfield, were consistent and principled 
hard money men. A third group , including John Sherman , 
John A. Bingham , and James F. Wilson, held fast to neither 
11£1£. , pp . 301-306. 
principle but "was motivated primarily by political con-
sidera.tio.ns. nl From 1865 to mid- 1868 the Republican party 
could not be called the hard money party-- that description 
'vould more nearly fit the Democratic party; but, as the 
Democrats definitely accepted the soft money position in 
the campaign of 1868, the hard money and political Radicals 
joined to make the Republican party the party of sound 
money . It may actually be , Sharkey pointed out, that 
true economic, political , and social radicalism died 
"'i th the failure of impeachment , the death of Thaddeus 
Stevens , the election of Grant , and the fading of Ben 
Wade . 2 At least , it seemed to Sharkey, there should be 
some differentiation among the Radicals . He accepted 
the separation of the Radicals into "old" and "new11 as 
advanced by Louis .M. Hacker;3 but whereas Hacker made 
the primary distinction between the two groups in terms 
of racial attitudes , Sharkey suggested the difference 
should be shown thus-- "old radicals" represented industrial 
capitalists while "new radicals 11 usually supported financial 
capitalistic interests and monopolistic enterprises . 4 
1rbid., p . 280. 
2rbid., pp. 279-281. 
3Louis M. Hacker , 
The Develo ment of Forces 
of the Ni neteenth Century 
1940) , pp. 340- 345. 
The Triumph of American Capitalism 
in American Histor to the End 
New York: Simon & Schuster , 
4sharkey , Money , Class , and Party, p . 307. 
Thus, contrary to the "Beard-Beale 11 conception, there was 
no monolithic unity in the thinking of the business class 
or of the Radical Republicans . 
Sharkey suggested that if one chose to recognize 
in the Radicals a true economic and political philosophy, 
it would have to be that of "the true ultras"--stevens, 
Butler , and Wade--rather than that of the moderates--
Garfield, Fessenden, and Blaine. These true Radicals 
wanted nationalism, equalitarianism, economic freedom, 
soft money, and the protective tariff. They wished to 
protect America from foreign monopolies by the tariff 
and from financial oligarchs by easy money . With these 
principles their opposition to the slave pO\'ler was natural. 
When the war was over, they 
turned much of their holy wrath upon the plutocracy 
of the North and its spokesmen • •• who, they felt, 
would gl~dly place the country at the mercy of finance 
capital. 
And Sharkey showed considerable admiration for the Radical 
program . 
In these terms Radicalism has meaning. Indeed it 
emerges as a fairly consistent social philosophy 
and not one to be despised. The ideas which bound 
together such men as Thaddeus Stevens, Benjamin Wade , 
Ben Butler , 1Pig-Iron• Kelley, Peter Cooper, Wendell 
Phillips, Horace Greeley, and Henry c. Carey were 
not the unworthiest vision of America which could 
have arisen after the convulsive spasm of civil war. 2 
ll£1£., pp. 281-282, quote-282. 
2Ibid., p . 282. 
David Donald , a Mississippian educated at the 
University of Illinois and on the graduate faculty at 
Columbia University since 1951 , 1 began his scholarly 
career as an adherent of the "Beale" interpretation. 
I 
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In 1944 he published a study of 11 The Scalawag in 1-Ussissippi 
Reconstruction" and revealed that the Scalawags of that 
state were not renegades and the lowest dregs of society 
as tradition had it . Actually , they were the old ~hig 
elements which had been powerful before the war and included 
some of the wealthiest and best educated men in Mississippi . 
The Whig element did not merge with the Democratic party 
during the Civil War and made several post- war attempts 
to reorganize the party . Being unable to form a moderate 
or middle party between the Radicals and the extreme 
secessionists , the Whig element joined the Republican 
party . According to Donald it was natural for these 
large planters and businessmen to join the party dominated 
by business interests. An estimated twenty-five to thirty 
per cent of the white Mississippi voters became Republican 
by 1873 and advocated a moderate program which accepted 
the realities of Reconstruction, accepted civil rights 
for Negroes , and urged business class legislation; however , 
in the crucial election of 1873 in Mississippi , the vfuig 
element was defeated by a combination of Radical Carpetbaggers 
lWho 's Who , XXX, 748. 
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and Negroes on one hand and Democr ats on the other. After 
this , the vfuigs gradually made their way into the Democratic 
party on the appeal of the color line . It was with the 
co- operation of these Whigs which swelled its ranks that 
the Democratic party was able to win the election of 
1876 , rather t han the intimidation of Negroes to which 
the victory has been attributed. 1 
By 1956 , when Donald published an article on 
Andrew Johnson , 2 his attitude toward Reconstruction had 
been modified to an extent . Unlike Beale, Donald was 
antagonistic to Johnson ' s role in Reconstruction . Con-
cerning the Republicans' motives he stated that some 
\'Tere concerned about the freedmen, many only wanted to 
stay in office, many believed the party was identical 
in its purposes with the nation and all mankind, and 
there were some who were chiefly concerned about the 
maintenance of tariff and land grant legislation . Thus , 
the e conomic issue was only one of several, and apparently 
it was not considered the most important. Donald , in 
fact , considered "political exigency" to have been the 
real factor causing the Republicans to unite against 
lDavid H. Donald , "The Scalawag in Mississippi 
Reconstruction , " The Journal of Southern History , X (Nov-
ember , 1944) , 447- 460. 
2David H. Donald , "Why They Impeached Andrew 
Johnson," American Heritage , VIII (December , 1956) , 21- 25 , 
102- 103. 
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Johnson. According to Donald, Johnson's persistence 
in his policy of Reconstruction, which erected Confederate-
dominated Southern state governments that alarmed Northerners 
and placed them in fear of losing the results of the war, 
left his Republican colleagues with nothing to do but adopt 
a more harsh plan of Reconstruction which would provide 
some guarantees for Northerners and loyalists. Being 
in a weak position Johnson should have been more sensitive 
to public opinion, should have been prudent rather than 
quarrelsome, and should have tried to build unity in the 
party rather than considering a third party. By not doing 
these things he turned over control of the party of which 
he was the nominal head to the Radicals. Historians have 
called the impeachment charges against Johnson "flimsy 
and false." 
Yet perhaps before the bar of history itself Andrew 
Johnson must be impeached with an even graver charge--
that through political ineptitude he threw away a 
magnificent opportunity.l 
In a review of Sharkey's Money, Class, and Party 
in 1960, David Donald seemed to have moved entirely away 
1Donald, American Heritage, VIII, 21-25, 102-103, 
quote-103. In the same year Donald published a small 
book, Lincoln Reconsidered Essa s on the Civil War Era 
(New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 195 , in which he 
took issue with the conception of the Radicals created 
by Howard K. Beale and T. Harry Williams . He contended 
that Radicals were not all of one mind and were not all 
villains and were not always wrong. pp. 103-127. 
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from the "Beard-Beale11 thesis . He pointed out correctly 
that Sharkey did not quarrel with the general lines of 
the "Beard" school but just its generalizations concerning 
currency. 
Such a refined economic interpretation of the period 
is, to this reviewer, almost as1questionable as the simplistic Beardian hypothesis . 
Exactly thirty years after the publication of 
Beale ' s The Critical Year A Study of Andrew Johnson 
and Reconstruction (1930), another intensive study of 
the critical period, written by Eric L. McKitrick, took 
issue with many of the conclusions of the earlier study. 
Beale considered the crucial issue of the election of 
1866 to have been economic and declared that the Radicals ' 
emphasis on Reconstruction as the chief issue had only 
been a blind or a sham to cover their real motives of 
capturing the nation with their policies of sound money 
and a high protective tariff. Beale was favorable to 
Andrew Johnson but thought he made a serious mistake 
by not using the currency and the tariff issues and the 
patronage to form a third party to defeat the Radical 
Republicans who were becoming the tools of large business 
interests . McKitrick contended that these issues were 
1navid H. Donald , Review of Money , Class , and Party 
An Economic Study of Civil War and Reconstruction, by 
Robert P. Sharkey , The American Historical Review, LXV 
(July, 1960) , 929. 
not available as issues upon which to build party unity 
in 1866 because there was no unity of thought concerning 
the currency, tariff, and monopoly issues themselves. 
For example, some people favored high tariffs and green-
backs, some favored high tariffs and contraction of the 
currency, some favored low tariffs and contraction. A 
degree of unity and organization on these economic issues 
might have been possible a generation later during the 
Populist era, but McKitrick found little evidence to 
support the idea that they were already crystallized 
in 1866. 1 To Beale's suggestion that Johnson should 
have championed the inflationary elements, McKitrick 
replied that the Johnson administration's fiscal policy 
led by Secretary of the Treasury McCulloch had been essen-
tially contractionist in nature, and a reversal would 
likely have lost him more support than it would have gained 
him. In 1866 there were few items which commanded more 
~nity within his administration than McCulloch's financial 
pol1cy.2 The tariff, rather than being a profound potential 
issue in 1866, in McKitrick's opinion, made little difference;3 
in other words, the real issue in the election of 1866 
1Eric L. McKitrick, Andrew Johnson and Reconstruction 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1960), pp. 367-368. 
2 Ibid., p. 372. 
3~., pp. 373, 374n., 375n. 
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was precisely what everyone in 1866, including the expert 
political managers of both parties whose business it was 
to know such things, thought 1t was--the Reconstruction 
policy . Since this was the chief issue, McKitrick turned 
the "Beale" thesis around-- instead of gaining control 
of Reconstruction policy by trying to create a unity on 
economic issues where there was no unity, he should have 
worked with the Republicans on the Reconstruction problem 
where Republicans were unified and thus gained tremendous 
influence over economic policies . 
To have co-operated with Congress and the party on 
reconstruction might really have made President Johnson 
a figure of towering moral authority on a sweeping 
range of other matters . Thus fortified, upon what 
great objects might he not have shed his enormous 
prestige? vfuat vistas might not have been open to 
him then, in the work of making this disorderly Republic 
a model of economic enlightenment?l 
Beale suggested that Johnson should have used his 
great powers of patronage to create a strong personal 
political party to thwart the Radical efforts. McKitrick 
countered that the patr onage was a delicately balanced 
machine with which one tampered only with dire results. 
Placing persons in office who have not the support of 
the local people and of the higher officials and political 
leaders within the state and district causes more disaffection 
for the president than affection. When Johnson actually 
lrbid., p . 377. 
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began tampering with the patronage , he probably did himself 
more harm than good , in McKitrick ' s opinion. 1 
Beale claimed that the most influential newspapers 
\'rere domina ted by the business interests who favored 
the Radical Republicans; that the newspapers were dependent 
upon advertising, and the big business interests boycotted 
those newspapers which were hostile to the Radical Republi-
cans . To this , McKitrick replied that the newspapers 
were not a ctually dependent upon advertising but upon 
subscrip tions; thus, the newspapers l'rere influenced in 
their editorial policies not by big business but by the 
public itself. The public supported those newspapers 
which said the things they wanted to hear , and many editors 
had to change their editorial policies to favor Radical 
Republicanism because of a declining subscription rate . 2 
The election of 1E66 , which Beale declared was 
based chiefly on emotionalism and sham, McKitrick contended 
was actually based on more clear- cut principles than most 
elections . On the one hand were the Republicans who had 
been committed to a total war effort and who demanded 
guarantees from the South in peace and on the other hand 
were the Democrats who had been against the total war 
concept and \'Tho '\"ranted restoration on an immediate and 
lrbid., pp . 377-379 . 
2rbid. , pp. 439-442 . 
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equal basis for the Southern states . Each party found 
it hard to repudiate the extremes within its organization , 
and thus, to an extent, each became what the opponent 
claimed it was--the Republicans , a Radical party and 
the Democrats, a Copperhead party. 1 
Though only a very short portion of McKitrick's 
book waa written as a direct attack on Beale's study , 
actually the whole book forms a refutation of the economic 
point of view. To McKitrick the political and psychological 
considerations were the crucial factors; and, whereas 
Beale had been favorable to Johnson except for criticizing 
his hesitancy and lack of decision in forming an effective 
third party against his enemies, McKitrick was unfavorable 
to the Reconstruction president and attributed much of 
the trouble and extremity of the period to him. In this 
respect McKitrick agreed with the conclusions of James 
Ford Rhodes concerning the president and his blame for 
the way Reconstruction turned out. 2 McKitrick also seemed 
to favor, with Rhodes , the Reconstruction plan of Massachu-
setts• Governor Andrew which revolved around the ideas 
of using the natural Southern leaders as instruments 
of Reconstruction and requiring Southern states to guarantee 
lrbid., pp . 409- 410. 
2see Chapter 2. 
the civil rights of Negroes on equality with whites . l 
McKitrick spoke of the situation at the end of 
the war in terms of the psychological needs of the masses 
of the North and of the South. He explained that con-
querors needed to feel that they were truly victorious, 
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that the principles against which they fought were destroyed 
and the principles they fought for were completely vindi-
cated and exalted. His examples were Germany and Japan 
after World War II , both of which played to perfection 
the role of conquered peoples . The American society 
thus received the gratification it needed as a victor 
and therefore could act with true magnanimity and become 
close friends with the former enemy . This need is felt 
especially when the whole people are involved in a demo-
cratic total war, such as the Civil War . Military victory 
was not quite enough--there had to be some acceptance 
upon the part of the South of the symbols for which the 
North fought ; there had to be recognition that secession 
was wrong; there had to be protection for Southern Unionists 
and Southern Negroes; and there was a vague idea that 
Southerners should accept Northerners in a civil manner. 
\fuen the South did not act in this manner, the North 
realized no satisfaction or sense of accomplishment in 
libid., pp. 231- 237 . 
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its victory; and the magnanimous feeling which engulfed 
all at the war 1 s end soon began to fade away . Northerners 
began to feel that the results of the war had not been 
secured, that the sacrifices had been for naught, and, 
therefore, they began to require more of the South. 1 
On the other hand, the South had not been told 
specifically where it stood or what the terms were to 
be . Lacking accurate communications with the Northern 
authorities which should have told them what was expected 
of them, the Southerners proceeded to re-establish their 
governments with the old Confederate leadership and to 
pass acts which were distasteful to the North. McKitrick 
believed the South should have been told precisely what 
its position was and what it must do to bring about a 
final settlement to satisfy t he North 1 s victorious feelings 
and thus bring peace again . Shortly after the war, according 
to McKitrick, the South was ready to be told what to do 
and would have faithfully carried out the stipulations 
imposed by the victorious North; however, as months passed 
without these definite stipulations being made, an easy 
settlement became more and more remote . The magnanimous, 
the back-to-normal sentiment which prevailed at the end 
of the war began to dissipate . 2 
lrbid., PP· 24-41. 
2rbid., PP· 198- 199, 201-212. 
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The chief theme of McKitrick ' s book was how Johnson 
threw away his own power both as President and as 
party leader, how .he assisted materially , in spite 
of himself , in blocking the reconciliation of North 
and South , and what his behavior did toward disrupting 
the political life of an entire nation •••• l 
Shortly after the war Johnson ' s position was very strong. 
Almost all the Republican newspapers of the country were 
behind him and most were to remain in support of him until 
early in 1866. 2 The Radicals were not a solid phalanx 
of one opinion and in opposition to Andre'v Johnson from 
the early part of 1865 on. Here McKitrick differed again 
with the economic interpretation which described the 
Radicals as having formulated plans to mount an attack 
on Johnson early in 1865. 3 Gradually, the whole Republican 
party did begin to move toward the more extreme aims of 
Negro suffrage, exclusion of Southern states, and ant i-
Johnson sentiment. But the men called Radicals did not 
cause this movement, in McKitrick ' s judgment. 
If there were to be a real prime mover, a ' causal 
agent, • such a role would have to be played by the 
one man--Andrew Johnson-- whose behavior w~s critical 
in anything and everything the party did. 
Unlike Paul Buck who narrated the slow return 
libid. , p . 14. 
2Ibid. , p . 21 . 
3Ibid., pp. 53, 54. 
4 Ibid. , p . 66. 
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to reunion, McKitrick emphasized that the reunion might 
have been much more rapid if things had gone differently 
in the early months after the war . Andrew Johnson should 
have considered himself an agent of the victorious element 
in dealing with the defeated, but he refused t o impose 
terms . When Congress reconvened he refused to act as 
a party leader and co-operate with the congressional 
party leaders to work out a rational plan of Reconstruction ; 
instead, he remained on the outside and constantly thwarted 
the efforts of Congress to establish some sort of terms 
of peace . At any point along the way until the passage 
of the Reconstruction Acts, Johnson could, by a word or 
a gesture, have resumed his rightful and logical place 
as a party leader and exerted tremendous influence in 
developing the policy of Reconstruction. Instead, he 
continually showed antagonism and lack of co-operation, 
pride and egotism. Though undoubtedly an able man he 
threw away his chances to play anything but a negative 
role in developing the terms of peace. His interference 
in a positive manner could always have made itself felt 
because no one person or group ever claimed the entire 
allegiance of the Congress, certainly not Thaddeus Stevens . 
By his vetoes and his attacks, Johnson alienated more 
and more of his former SU )porters and forced the Congress 
toward a more radical position. 
By his unwillingness to compromise or negotiate 
on the issues of Reconstruction, Johnson made the issue 
a clear one in the election of 1866--either the people 
were to accept him or to accept the will of Congress; 
to accept restoration as he had brought it about or to 
accept Reconstruction as Congress would handle it . With 
the issue thus clarified the Republican party was unified 
and swept forward to an overwhelming victory . vmen the 
Fourteenth Amendment was formulated without his co-operation 
and accepted without his approval , Johnson exerted his 
influence to get the South not to accept the amendment. 
As he persisted in this course, a moderate plan of Recon-
struction became less and less likely. The election of 
1866 showed that the North overwhelmingly supported Recon-
struction with the terms provided by Congress in the 
Fourt eenth Amendment . In McKitrick ' s opinion these terms 
should have been accepted. 
And now if Johnson and the South were to accept the 
decision and support the Amendment , the entire tangle 
of reconstruction might be straightened out o~ce 
and for all and at last there would be peace . 
The policy of Reconstruction was the important issue of 
the day, not economic matters or balance of power in the 
government . Had the president and Congress harmonized 
11£!£., pp . 10- 11, 14, 21, 61- 67, 85, 198- 199, 
212, 292-293, 295 , 327n., 334, 339 , 343 , 363, 443, 449-
450, 468, 473, quote- 450. 
on this issue, no strain on the balances in government 
would have occurred. 1 
'2:7:'7 
McKitrick gave quite a different picture of Thaddeus 
Stevens than other historians and biographers . He attributed 
to Stevens the characteristics of neither a great man 
nor an evil genius; rather , he described Stevens as a 
good parliamentary tactician on day to day matters but 
not a developer of overall party strategy and policy . 
His extreme type could not lead the majority except in 
the way they were already tending . Neither Stevens nor 
Sumner nor any extremist led the Republican party toward 
the Reconstruction Acts, according to McKitrick. The 
development of important policy took place among more 
moderate men of the party such as Fessenden and Trumbull . 2 
McKitrick treated the impeachment as chiefly a 
psychological affair. The Radicals had already rendered 
Johnson helpless, why should they try to remove him from 
office? McKitrick believed that the president's actions 
had created in the Radicals a "deep psychological need 
f .. 3 to eliminate Johnson from American political life orever •••• 
From the first mention of impeachment in 1866 until the 
final indictment in 1868, Johnson could easily have killed 
lrbid. , p . 110. 
2~., pp . 267- 269, 273 , 339. 
3112.!.9:. , p . 490. 
the talk with some co- operation, but he continually took 
the initiative in antagonizing the Radicals until they 
were impassioned in their ill- will toward him and their 
desire to elimina te him. The impeachment served its 
purpose by providing the Radicals with "a long-needed 
psychological blow- off. " "The affair had served, in short , 
as a catharsis . 111 
McKitrick pointed out quite correctly that discus-
sion of constitutional theories of Reconstruction "has 
been out of vogue for some time and no longer has the 
vitality that it once had. 112 Since historians began to 
place the emphasis on economic and social aspects of 
Reconstruction, the constitutional issue had not been 
taken as seriously as by earlier his torians such as Burgess 
and Dunning. According to McKitrick most recent defenders 
of Andrew Johnson simply assume the validity of the presi-
dent ' s position and assume that other theories were merely 
blinds for political or economic programs. McKitrick 
didn't believe that constitutional issues should be handled 
in such a perfunctory manner and devoted several pages 
of his book to the discussion of each of the five major 
constitutional theories of Reconstruct1on. 3 McKitrick 
1 Ibid., pp. 499- 509 , quotes-507, 508 respectively. 
2Ibid., p . 94. 
3l£!£. , pp. 93-119. 
contended that "Andrew Johnson was by no means the only 
man who cared immensely about the Constitution. "1 Of 
course , "political arrangements" underwent a change in 
such a tumultous time as the emergence from Civil War , 
but the Constitution still formed a real check on men ' s 
minds and men were concerned about the Constitution. 2 
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McKitrick thought Reconstruction would perhaps have lasted 
mu ch longer without these constitutional scruples . 3 
Though McKitrick entitled his work Andrew Johnson 
and Reconstruction , it was actually a history of the 
Reconstruction process from April, 1865, through March, 
1867, with an "Afterthought" on the impeachment . The 
approach was political , not personal ; Reconstruction 
rather than Andrew Johnson formed the center of the work. 
The materials which McKitrick used for his study were 
admittedly not new since he trod the path of George Fort 
Milton and Howard K. Beale , but with a somewhat different 
point of view. The only contribution which he claimed 
was a new approach to the body of facts . 4 This, of course , 
is true and he t hought through again the chief problems 
of the two year period; ho'l'tever, his judgment of Andrew 
libid. , p . 95 . 
2 Ibid. , p . 96 . 
3Ibid., p . 119. 
4 Ibid. , p . 511 . 
Johnson is reminiscent of that of James Ford Rhodes, 
William A. Dunning, and Walter L. Fleming. 
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CHAPTER 6 
THE MARXIAN INTERPRETATION 
The "Beard- Beale" school opened new possibilities 
tor the interpretation of Re constr uction as basically 
a class struggle . If the Civil War was the instrument 
by which the industrialists won control of the nation 
from agrarian elements and Reconstruction was the process 
by \orhich that dominance was permanently secured, then 
the period must have been pregnant with seething, revolutionary 
class dynamics . Thus reasoned the disciples of Karl 
Marx , who in the mid-1930 ' s busied themselves with the 
creation of a Marxian interpretation of Reconstruction. 
The date is significant for three reasons-- it is shortly 
after the appearance of the "Beard-Beale" interpretation , 
it corresponds in time with a deep concern of Americans 
over economic problems because of the great depression , 
and it corresponds in time with the sympathy of many 
Americans for the Marxian approach \'lhich was stimulated 
by the "popular front" movement . 
The only two books exclusively concerned with 
Reconstruction written by Marxians were published in 
1935 and 1937. Since that time the Marxians have continued 
active but have not essayed any full-scale vTOrks on the 
period . Thus, the \'lri tings of W. E. B. DuBois and James 
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s . Allen remain the "classic 11 and dominant works "'i thin 
this school of interpretation. 
Born in Great Barrington, Massachusetts, on February 
23 , 1868 ( the day before the passage of the resolution 
impeaching President Johnson ), Wi lliam E. Burghardt DuBois 
was educated at Fis~ University, the University of Berlin , 
and at Harvard University where he received his Ph. D. 
degree in 1895 in the fields of history , government , 
and economics . 1 He was of Negro parentage, felt the 
sting of racial discrimination , and spent a lifetime 
combating ideas of Negro inferiority and suppression 
of Negro rights . 2 In his early years DuBois seems to 
have been rather conservative in economic thought; yet , 
in the first decade of the t'·tentieth century, he began 
to turn toward socialism. He did not yet want complete 
socialization , but he advocated public ownership of public-
type enterprises such as railroads , mines, and many kinds 
of factories . 3 He joined the Socialist party temporarily 
lHarry Washington Greene, Holders of Doctorates 
American Negroes An 
\iho Have Earned 
1 7 - 19 3 Boston : Meador 
~~~~Wh~o , XXX, 778. 
2see Chapter 10. 
3Francis L. Broderick , w. E. B. DuBois Negro 
Leader in a Time of Crisis (Stanford : Stanford University 
Press , 1959), pp. 86-87; Elliott M. Rudwick , "The Niagara 
Movement , " The Journal of Negro Histor y, XLII (July , 
1957), 199. 
but resigned in 1912 in order to throw the influence of 
his Crisis magazine behind Woodro"' Wilson. 1 
The changes wrought by the Russian Revolution 
made plain in DuBois' mind the gradual change which was 
taking place in his thinking . A visit to Russia in 1928 
caused the orientation of his thinking to shift even 
farther to the 11 left. "2 In the 1930's DuBois was not 
a Communist because he abhorred war and could not accept 
the dogma that economic 'fl'ongs would be corrected by 
inevitable revolution . 
On the other hand, I believed LDuBois wrote in 194Q7 
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and still believe that Karl Marx was one of the greatest 
men of modern times and that he put his finger squarely 
upon our difficulties when he said that economic 
foundations, the way in which men earn their living , 
are the determining factors in the development of 
civilization, in li~erature , religion, and the basic 
pattern of culture . 
DuBois was a fighter for two programs--justice 
to Negroes and socialization of the economy. 4 Thus, 
it was natural that his writing on Reconstruction be for 
two similar purposes--vindication of the Negro ' s role 
An Essay 
York: 
2Ibid., pp . 284- 3oo. 
3Ib1d., pp. 302-303; that DuBois still holds this 
point of view is indicated in his letter to author, November 
9 , 1959. 
4aroderick, DuBois, p. 199. 
in Reconstruction and application of the Marxian inter-
pretation to the period. Though the chief centers of 
his historical interest were the Negro in America and 
the history of Africa, he was particularly attracted to 
Reconst ruction because during that period an effort was 
made "to realize the democracy which the Declaration of 
1 Independence tried to lay down as our national goal." 
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Black Reconstruction (1935) was a massive , detailed 
account of the period 1860- 1880 with particular emphasis 
on the role of the Negro . By his own admission , DuBois 
depended heavily on secondary sources for his facts. He 
did not use the papers of J ohnson , Sumner, Stevens, Welles, 
Chase , Fessenden, Schurz, Greeley, McCulloch, McPherson , 
Sherman, or Trumbull . Much of the material was derived 
from state histories written by "Dunning" historians, 
whom DuBois described as anti-Negro . 2 
To DuBois the Reconstruction period was a series 
of revolutionary efforts, not simply a period of petty 
politics and race hatred as some historians had described 
it. One of these efforts was the vast Negro labor movement--
the attempt of the freedmen to learn new ways of making 
a living in the tumultuous and confusing times . Another 
lLetter from W. E. Burghardt DuBois to author, 
June 8, 1960. 
2DuBois , Black Reconstruction , p . 724. 
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effort was the labor movement of poor white men who had 
long been in depths of poverty . A third revolutionary 
force was the attempt to organize labor and capital accord-
ing to new patterns and to establish a new economy. Recon-
struction also included a revolutionary attempt on the 
part of the aristocratic whites to restore the forceful 
economic organization of slavery despite new laws and 
other revolutionary forces . 1 
Civil War and Reconstruction symbolized to DuBois 
the triumph of modern industry in America over the agricul-
tural e conomy. This new industry with monopoly as its 
method destroyed an outmoded economic system--slavery--
but ultimately established a new feudalism. During Recon-
struction the new industry co- operated temporarily with 
the humanitarian abolition- democracy movement. The abolition-
democracy leaders were a self-sacrificing set of statesmen 
who wanted the Negro to be educated, to own land and capital, 
to gain experience in the exercise of civil rights and 
p olitical power . They wanted federal guidance and protection 
for the Negro and, in order to get at least part of their 
program across, they had to co-operate with the new Northern 
industry. The abolition-democracy wanted to establi sh 
universal suffrage which would, in turn, establish a 
dictatorship of t h e proletariat leading to crea tion of 
lrbid., pp . 346-347. 
286 
industrial democracy . l However, DuBois admitted that 
apparently only a few of the abolition-democracy leaders 
"wholly grasped the fact that this necessarily involved 
dictatorship by labor over capital and industry . 112 Industry 
wished to consolidate its control of the United States 
government in order to use it for its own interests. 
Industrial leaders feared the return of Southerners to 
Congress and therefore co-operated with the abolition-
democracy element; however , they were not concerned with 
the elevation of the Negroes or the other laborers within 
society. In f act , as soon as industry had consolidated 
its position through the use of the Reconstruction process, 
the industrialists co-operated with the conservative 
element in the South and established a conservative economic 
control over the government and the people of the nation 
which is still in effect. 3 
In DuBois 1 opinion the basic arguments of Reconstruc-
tion boiled down to these three: Seward and Johnson 
said, in effect, 
1 Ibid., pp. 185, 186. 
2Ibid., p . 185. 
3rb1d., pp . 185-187, 206 , 212 , 277, 327, 328 , 
346 , 368,-s83-584, 596, 622. 
Damn the Nigger; let us settle do\'m to work and 
trade!l 
Stevens and Sumner said, in effect, 
Make the slaves free with land, education a~d ballot, 
and then let the South return to its place . 
Blaine, Conkling, and Bingham said, in effect, 
Guard property and industry; when their position is 
impregnable , let the South return; 1-Te will then hold 
it with black votes, until we capture it with white 
capital. 3 
The divisions which DuBois made bet\oreen the abolition 
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Radicals and the industrial Radicals appears to have been 
original although it became a rather common device later. 4 
The basic features of the "Beard-Beale" school 
were recognizable in DuBois ' account; however, he went 
much further by his contention that Sumner and Stevens 
tried to establish a dictatorship of the proletariat 
in the South. He indicated that the dictatorship of 
the proletariat in the South failed because the federal 
government did not impose the dictatorship long enough 
for the proletariat to gain control of the economic organ-
ization of the South.5 
libid. , p . 268. 
2Ibid. 
3Ib1d. 
4Louis M. Hacker first used the terms "old Radicals" 
and "new radicals" in his Triumuh of American Cauitalism 
in 1940, but the division was the same as DuBois 1 • 
5Ibid. , p . 345. 
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DuBois seems to have seen the economic aspects of 
the Compromise of 1877 long before C. Vann Wood\'rard presented 
a vast amount of evidence to substantiate the thesis . 
The terms made in 1876 were simple : the Negroes 
were to be disfranchised and organized into a labor 
caste, while the white South was to be furnished capital 
for industrialization to complement its restored agri-
culture.l 
With the election of 1876 Northern industry began 
an exploitation which was built on much the same 
sort of slavery which it helped to overthrow in 
1863. It murdered democracy in the United States 
so completely that the world does not recognize 
its corpse . It established as dominant in industry 
a monarchical system which killed the idea of democ-
racy.2 
This quotation effectively demonstrates DuBois ' attitude 
tm'fard capitalism. 3 
The acceptance of Black Reconstruction by reviewers 
depended, of course, on the point of view of the reviewer . 
For example , a Negro critic wrote of the book that not 
all DuBois ' attempts to fit Reconstruction into the Marxian 
pattern were successful, but , in spite of this, the '\·rork 
'\'Tas as significant as Beard ' s Economic Interpretation 
of the Constitution of the United States . "Black Recon-
1\'lilliam E. Burghardt DuBois , "Reconstruction, 
Seventy-Five Years After," PhTlon The Atlanta University 
Review of Race & Culture, IV 1943) , 210; , Black 
Reconstruction , p . 630 . 
2Ibid., p . 187. 
3see Chapter 12 for the racial aspect of DuBois' 
work. 
struction reveals Dr. DuBois as both the merciless critic 
and the constructive historian. "l Avery Craven, on the 
other hand, excoriated the work as being based on bad 
sources and written in bad temper. He condemned DuBois 
for going to the opposite extreme from a pro- Southern 
historian and smearing the motives and character of all 
persons who did not agree with the abolition-carpetbag 
attitude . 
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The result is not history but only a half-baked Marxian 
interpretation of the labor side of Reconstruction 
and a badly distorted picture of the Negroes' part 
i n Southern life . 2 
Though DuBois' work was Marxian in tone it did 
not quite state the orthodox Marxian interpretation of 
history . DuBois described the Reconstruction governments 
in the South as the rule of the dictatorship of the prole-
tariat; but , according to Marxian dogma, the bourgeois 
democratic revolution must come first, followed by the 
proletariat revolution . A more nearly orthodox Marxian 
account "i'Tas given by James s. Allen in his brief and 
lR. w. Logan, Review of Black Reconstruction An 
Essay Toward a History of the Part Which Black Folk Played 
in the Attempt to Reconstruct Democracy in America, 1860-
1880, by w. E. Burghardt DuBois, The Journal of Negro 
History, XXI (January, 1936) , 61-62, quote-61. 
2Avery Craven, Review of Black Reconstruction 
An Essay Toward a History of the Part Which Black Folk 
Played in the Attempt to Reconstruct Democracy in America, 
186o-188o, by w. E. Burghardt DuBois, The American Journal 
of Sociology, XLI (1936), 535. 
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interpretative account of the period--Reconstruction 
The Battle for Democracy (1865- 1876) (1937) . Allen quite 
properly , according to the Marxian doctrine , described 
Reconstruction as the bourgeois democratic phase of revo-
lutionary development, and he was still anticipating the 
arrival of the proletariat revolution. Civil War destroyed 
the feudal slave power, the last obstacle to unbridled 
industrial development , and Reconstruction prevented the 
return of slavery and the return of slave masters to polver 
until the industrial monarchs could consoli date their 
power and create a situation favorable to t he rapid develop-
ment of large scale industry and monopoly . l 
Allen described the dominant middle class element 
as bourgeois revolutionists and noted that they were 
split into t''lo wings during their struggle for power 
over the slave oligarchy. The center faction, led by 
Lincoln, was vacillating, compromi sing, and wavering; 
the left, led by Thaddeus Stevens, was more direct and 
revolutionary . The split was evident during the war, 
but it became more decisive after the war as Johnson 
led the center toward the right and tried to use his office 
to halt the rising indus trial bourgeois ie. In so doing 
1James S. Allen, Reconstruction The Battle for 
Democracy (1865-1876) (New York: International Publishers, 
1937), p . 207, passim. 
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he was forced to rely for support on the former slavocracy 
and tried to use his office as an agent of the Confederacy. 
"The North returned :from victorious war only to find a 
traitor in the most exalted post of the Union . "1 Presiden-
tial Reconstruction Allen described as a "reactionary 
holiday. "2 The left wing of the bourgeois revolutionists 
was led by Stevens, who "insisted upon a complete social 
reconstruction of the states before admittance . "3 This 
is what "Dunning" critics of Stevens said about him in 
condemnatory terms . Allen used not a tone of condemnation 
but of gr eat admiration. 
The Reconstruction Acts of 1867 established a 
bourgeois democratic dictatorship in the South, but the 
dictatorship , in Allen's opinion , was not thorough and 
decisive enough. The former ruling class was treated 
with unprecedented leniency ; they were t oo readily given 
amnesty. Even the leader of the rebellion was released. 
The dictatorship did not suppress effectively white supremacy 
agitation , and Ku Klux Klan methods were indecisively 
dealt "VIi th. In s tead of establishing a reign of terror , 
the congressional r egime allowed the Southerners to establish 
their own reign of terror. The bourgeois democracy should 
libid., pp. 21- 23, 34, 36 , quote-36 . 
2Ib1d. , p . 56 . 
3rbid. , p . 34. 
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have "let loose the full measures of dictatorship" by 
, 
banishment, imprisonment, and confiscation of property. 
The reason this was not done, Allen explained, \'ras that 
capitalism was developing so rapidly and the bourgeoisie 
had reached such a mature stage that it was already losing 
its revolutionary potency and becoming reactionary in 
comparison to the rising proletariat and farm class. 
As the industrial bourgeoisie established itself in leader-
ship, it called into being a new set of opposition to 
the new leaders. The object of attack now shifted from 
the slavocracy to the industrial oligarchy. The latter 
moved to the right in a defensive position. Driven to 
a more and more reactionary position, the industrial 
bourgeoisie came to terms with the ex-Confederates in 
1876 and abandoned the glorious democratic attempt in 
the South . This nationwide bourgeois reaction was exem-
plified, in Allen's opinion, by the ruthless suppression 
of the railroad strikes of 1877. The reactionary bourgeois 
coalition formed in 1876 still domina ted the nation in 
1937, according to Allen. l Vii th this group entrenched 
in po'\'rer , the issues of Re construction--land, suffrage, 
and civil rights--continued to exist. Allen demonstrated 
faith that the 11revolutionary and progressive forces 
1rbid. , pp. 89-90, 211-213~ 
of our epoch" could fulfill the democratic promises of 
the Reconstruction era. l 
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The great costs of Re construction about which 
historians raged were incurr ed , according to Allen , chiefly 
because Reconstruction governments offered many social 
services which the bourbon governments did not see fit 
to render . The claim that taxes were raised to a confiscatory 
level Allen did not refute but replied "why not?" Since 
direct confiscation had failed, indirect confiscation 
was needed. The corruption which did occur in the Southern 
state governments was indeed small compared to that of 
the Northern states, but the blame for it should not be 
placed on Negroes or on individuals . Graft, corruption , 
and vices were characteristic of bourgeois democratic 
government in a period of rapid capitali s tic development. 2 
Allen gave more credit to the Negro for his abilities 
and more attention to his role in Reconstruction than 
any other writer on the Reconstruction period, save DuBois . 
These people just out of bondage bore themselves exceedingly 
well and supported the most advanced ideas of the day . 
Allen rejoiced that the Negroes were given full political 
rights so soon after emancipation. 
lrbid., p . 215. 
2rbid., pp. 140-144. 
Rarely in history had an enslaved people so rapidly 
taken up the cudgels in a struggle for bourgeois 
democracy, fully and most intimately aware of the 
issues of the ne\'T epoch , a pO\'Terful force on the 
side of progress . l 
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Allen gloried in some of the incidents which 
traditional historians had criticized the most; for example , 
most historians looked aghast at the black and white 
conventions and legislatures with their low tone of educational 
·and parliamentary polish, ,.,i th their non-taxpaying and 
illiterate members . To Allen , however, this was a sign 
of the profound and fundamental nature of the social 
revolution in progress . Rough characteristics were common 
and excusable among rising groups, even indicating a 
sort of primitive vitality , Allen intimated. Another 
example is the matter of violence. The traditional historians 
abhorred the manifestations of violence on either side 
during the Reconstruction; Allen, however, appreciated 
the revolutionary play and interplay and regretted that 
the congressional governments did not suppress the former 
ruling class more decisively and violently. A Marxian 
believing in the inevitable war between the classes in 
society finds violence easier to face than do persons 
who hold no such doctrine . A third example of Allen's 
opposite opinion from most historians was his conception 
of Reconstruction not as a tragic era but as a wonderful 
lrbid., p . 209, passim. 
era. The attempt of the Radicals to establish popular 
democracy in the South "produced one of the most glorious 
chapters in our revolutionary and democratic heritage . 111 
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His only regret was that the period was followed by reaction. 
Paul Lewinson, who reviewed Reconstruction The 
Battle for Democracy (1865-1876) , stated that the book 
dressed up in Marxian jargon was misleading because of 
its strange emphases and terminology; however, he found 
the book in general less misleading than Bowers 1 Tragic 
Era. 2 Howard K. Beale found that Allen 1 s work would cause 
historians to rethink their interpretations . 
Allen ' s application of Marxian theory to the period 
has also forced upon those of us who do not accept 
his general interpretation certain important modifica-
tions of our own points of view. 3 
No important books on Reconstruction have been 
written '\-ti thin the Marxian interpretation since the '\'IOrks 
of DuBois and Allen. One pamphlet on Thaddeus Stevens 
appeared in 1942, written by Elizabeth Lawson who described 
Stevens as one of those rare men in bourgeois revolutions 
libid. , pp . 207-208. 
2paul Lewinson, Review of Reconstruction The 
Battle for Democracy (1865-1876) , by James s . Allen, 
The Mississippi Valley Historical Review, XXV (June, 
1938) ' 120- 121. 
809. 
3Beale, The American Historical Review, XLV, 
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who was a genuine democrat . vlliile others feared the 
revolutionary forces unleashed during the period , Stevens 
gloried in them as they would cleanse America of human 
bondage . Like DuBois and Allen , Lawson emphasized the 
importance of the Negroes in their own emancipation. 1 
Another Marxian, Herbert Aptheker , has written an article 
on Reconstruction, and two of his books contain considerable 
material on the period; but as his entire emphasis is on 
the Negro , these works will be discussed in Chapter 13. 
Three writers should be mentioned whose works 
deal partially with Reconstruction and reveal a deep 
belief in the class struggle , though the authors may 
not be Marxians . One is Louis M. Hacker who divided 
the Radical Republicans into two groups--the old Radicals 
who supported industrial cap:talist legislation but also 
worked for Negro rights , and new Radicals who were whole-
heartedly for industrial capitalism and were interested 
in abolitionism only as a tool. 2 The second is Philip 
s. Foner whose fourth volume of The Life and Writings 
of Frederick Douglass included the Reconstruction period 
and afterwards . Foner waa very favorable to Negroes 
lElizabeth Lawson, Thaddeus Stevens (New York: 
International Publishers, 1942), pp. 3- 5. 
343. 
2Hacker , Triumph of American Capitalism, pp . 340-
in general and to his subject in particular, but he said 
Douglass failed "to understand the class character of 
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the struggle in which he was engaged • ••• "l The third 
historian who should be mentioned at this point is Horace 
Mann Bond, who emphasized the impact of social and economic 
factors on education and the influence of the class struggle 
in the development of society. 2 
1Philip s. Foner , The Life and Writin~s of Frederick 
Douglass , Vol . IV: Reconstruction and After New York : 
International Publishers, 1955), 96. 
2Bond, Negro Education in Alabama; see Chapter 
12 for a full discussion of Bond's work . 
